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ABSTRACT 
DISMANTLING THE MASTER’S HOUSE: DECONSTRUCTING THE ROOTS OF ANTIBLACK 






This critical inquiry into the social constructions of “black” and “white” identities 
analyzes the roles of the three “western” monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) 
in the cognitive and sociohistorical developments of racial slavery and antiblack racism. 
Specifically, it investigates the sociohistorical consequences of the inherent dualisms of 
the “western” monotheisms and how those dualisms are expressed in the production of 
social theories and systems that rely on believer/non-believer oppositions and binaries 
defined by a Manichaean view of the universe and a teleological conception of history 
that fosters and sustains an eternal holy war against infidels. What emerges from this 
analysis in the end is a reconnection of Islam with Judeo-Christianity, resulting in the 
(re)formulation of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic complex as a specific instrumentality in the 
formation of “white” and “black” identities and the creation and preservation of white 
supremacy.  
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Audre Lorde’s famous declaration “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle 
the Master’s House” originated within the paradigms of a “black” feminist discourse 
designed to confront and challenge the epistemological hegemony of a “racist 
patriarchy”(Lorde, 1984, p. 112). In the twenty-eight years that since have passed, the 
master’s tools and the master’s house have become nearly synonymous with 
Eurocentric epistemology and Eurocentrism, and a new generation of scholar-
activists has taken up the challenge posed by her theorem. This research project owes 
its inspiration to the enduring power of Lorde’s idea. And, like other post-colonialist 
studies that have followed in the wake of her assertion, it seeks to “dismantle” 
(deconstruct) the taxonomic systems and theories of knowledge the “West” has used 
to divide and conquer, marginalize and dismiss, and oppress and exploit the “rest of 
us.” Taxonomic systems are systems of classification used to organize data into sets 
of information that can become knowable (Lincoln, 1989, p. 7). The information that 
constitutes what is “knowable” or “known” in this particular instance are concepts 
and ideas that together comprise the organizing principles of race as a mechanism of 
social stratification and human identity. This study therefore seeks to identify and 
investigate those taxonomies that have been central to the social construction of the 
master’s house of Eurocentrism and the sociohistorical concepts that underlie the 
modern constructs of “black” and “white” identities. As Bruce Lincoln points out in 
Discourse and the Construction of Society:  
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Taxonomy is thus not only an epistemological instrument (a means for organizing 
information), but it is also (as it comes to organize the organizers) an instrument 
for the construction of society. And to the extent that taxonomies are socially 
determined, hegemonic taxonomies will tend to reproduce the same hierarchic 
system of which they themselves are a product (1989, pp. 7-8).  
 
The ideology of white supremacy, the organizing principle of Eurocentrism, 
creates a hierarchic system that socially organizes and categorizes both the objects of its 
epistemological violence (those whom it exploits and oppresses) and its subjects (those 
who “know” and reproduce the sociology of knowledge that supports and sustains it). By 
this means it constructs a social order based on the codes and imperatives of a “racial 
contract” that “establishes a fundamental partition in the social ontology of the planet …” 
(C. W. Mills, 1997, p. 55). That “partition” effectively separates the West from the rest of 
us in its presentation as an impassable divide between “white” persons and nonwhite 
“others” (Du Bois’ color line). This thesis locates and identifies the cognitive origins of 
this social dichotomy and examines the mechanisms and events that led to its 
formularization in the binary categories of “black” and “white.” 
Racism was and is the blunt instrument of European hegemony. The imposition of 
racial identity, the dehumanizing rhetoric of racial discourse, and the pervasive 
psychological violence of the Eurocentric episteme have been far more instrumental in 
the institutionalization and maintenance of the white supremacist regime than the 
exercise of brute physical force. Even the symbolic acts of racist discourse—”white” frat 
brothers cavorting in blackface, hangman’s nooses displayed in schoolyards, swastikas 
graffitied on headstones in Jewish graveyards—serve as brutal reminders that the idioms 
and iconography of this system can be as oppressive and destructive as actual physical 
violence. The taxonomies that structure and support this discourse of white 
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supremacy/black inferiority also constitute the epistemological tools used to posit, police, 
and psychologically maintain the existential borders of the racial state according to the 
strict codes of the racial contract. How then are these borders and boundaries and the 
hegemonic sociology of knowledge that informs them to be confronted and contested? 
The theoretical approach used here starts with the idea of a decolonization of knowledge 
using a double critique and border thinking—the conceptual basis of which is explicated 
and discussed in the methodology section below. Although these concepts emerged from 
an analysis of European and Islamic fundamentalisms and their intersections (a subject 
that will be explored in-depth in this thesis), the “double critique” also is applied here to 
both Eurocentric and African-centered thought. Walter Mignolo—referring to Moroccan 
philosopher’s Abdelhebir Khatibi’s work on “Occidentalism,” the “Creolization” concept 
of Martinican philosopher Edouard Glissant, and Argentine philosopher Enrique Dussel’s 
“myth of modernity,”—posits this “double critique” as creating the conditions for the 
emergence of an “other thinking.” He defines this “other thinking” as:  
[…] a way of thinking that is not inspired in its own limitations and is not 
intended to dominate and to humiliate; a way of thinking that is universally 
marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved; and as such, a way of thinking that, 
because universally marginal and fragmentary is not ethnocidal (Mignolo, 2000, 
p. 68). 
 
The “other thinking” perspective, the ability to think, speak and act as “Other,” 
provides an ethical alternative to the genocidal logic of the modern world system of white 
supremacy, and an escape from the self-referential pseudo-universalizing tautologies of 
centrist ideologies—irrespective of whether such ideas emerge from Euro- or Afro- 
centered thinking. Much of the interpretative and explanatory power of this study rests, 
therefore, on the effort to locate and define a perspective that lets us view the “master’s” 
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narrative and the counternarratives of notable “black” intellectuals (and others) from both 
within and without the cognitive events surrounding their sociohistorical constructions, 
and at the intersections of their confrontations with each other. The “double critique” 
process needed to perform an “other thinking” and the “other thinking” itself suggest the 
involvement of a “double-consciousness,” not unlike the theory that informs Du Bois’ 
idea of the same. This study argues, however, that self-awareness and recognition of a 
“double-consciousness” (or self-awareness of one’s otherness) does not itself signal a 
“liberation” or constitute a form of “liberation” from the hegemonic violence of 
Eurocentric epistemology; nor does it necessarily illuminate the ways in which “black” 
liberation discourses (African-centered thought) often are premised within Eurocentric 
theories of race and history. Self-awareness as “other”—as conceived and defined by 
one’s oppressors—may be catalytic in fostering agency and motivating the will to resist 
and overcome, but liberating the “black” body does not necessarily free the “black” mind. 
As Lewis R. Gordon correctly points out: “Black Studies/African American 
Studies/Africana Studies was born with the express purpose of decolonizing the minds of 
people, especially black people” (author’s italics) (2006a, p. x). Gordon also suggests 
intellectual capital used in pursuit of liberation theory is better spent in “transcending 
rather than dismantling [the] Western ideas” that inform the master’s house. He 
respectfully rejects what he sees as Lorde’s mischaracterization of the “master’s tools” 
and argues old tools can be used to create counterhegemonic tools that can resist and 
combat the consequences of what he calls epistemological colonization (Gordon & 
Gordon, 2006a, p. xi).  
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Questions and concerns about the “tools” used by “black” scholars to resist and 
combat epistemological colonization led me to examine the sociohistorical roots of 
“black” identity and its sociohistorical development within a Eurocentric milieu. It also 
led me to understand and define the earliest form of black liberation discourse (African-
centered thought) as a type of strategic essentialism for self-defense and self-preservation 
actuated by the existential reality of antiblack racism. Thus early “black” scholars 
responded or reacted to the blackness that was invented and imposed on them by “white” 
oppressors by transforming it into a “tool” for survival and a weapon for liberation.  
Although this thesis does not examine in detail the specific discursive and didactic 
features of early black liberation discourses, it does use as its starting point the paradigm 
of black studies established by “black” thinkers in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Key organizing principles of that paradigm are based on biblical discourses and the 
efforts of early “black” activist-scholars to find within the Bible’s texts moral and 
spiritual solutions to the problems of racial slavery, injustice and inequality. The theory 
and practice of black liberation discourse therefore has been informed and influenced by 
the religious beliefs and practices of African Americans since its founding. Thus it is 
important to examine the complex function of “race” and racism in the religious faiths 
that sanctioned and promoted the enslavement of Africans, and that Africans in America 
sought to reinterpret and reform with their liberation discourses. This critical inquiry into 
the social constructions of “black” and “white” identities analyzes the roles of the three 
“western” monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) in the cognitive and 
sociohistorical developments of racial slavery and antiblack racism. Specifically, it 
investigates the sociohistorical consequences of the inherent dualisms of the “western” 
 6 
monotheisms and how those dualisms are expressed in the production of social theories 
and systems that rely on believer/non-believer oppositions and binaries defined by a 
Manichaean view of the universe and a teleological conception of history that fosters and 
sustains an eternal holy war against infidels. What emerges from this analysis in the end 
is a reconnection of Islam with Judeo-Christianity, resulting in the (re)formulation of a 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic complex as a specific instrumentality in the formation of “white” 
and “black” identities and the creation and preservation of white supremacy.  
The several chapters that follow outline the origins and development of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, and trace how racist myths and symbols in these belief systems 
provided the justifications and rationalizations for the mass enslavement and exploitation 
of African peoples. Islam and the ethnographic theories and beliefs of Muslim societies 
receive the bulk of the attention in this study. The role of Islam in the African slave trade 
and in the formation of both “black” identity and European-centered thought warrants 
much more investigation and analysis. Several notable studies address the Islamic slave 
trade in Africa and its impact on African societies, but the role of Islam as a central factor 
in the formation of “black” identity and Eurocentric thought has received far too little 
treatment. The research presented here is designed to address some of those gaps in our 
understanding of these sociohistorical constructions. 
Audre Lorde was resolute in her refusal of the possibility of the master’s tools 
dismantling the master’s house. She succinctly stated her doubts as follows: “They may 
allow us to temporarily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring 
about genuine change” (Lorde, 1984, p. 112). Lewis R. Gordon, in his “insider’s” critique 
and constructive engagement with Lorde’s suppositions, argues for the erection of “new 
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houses” with “new tools.” He contends: “When enough houses are built, the hegemony of 
the master’s house—in fact, mastery itself—will cease to maintain its imperial status” 
(author’s italics) (Gordon & Gordon, 2006a, p. xi). The methodological strategy chosen 
for this thesis is to negotiate between these two poles of deconstruction/construction to 
build a new house (new domain of knowledge) in a “decolonialized” neighborhood far 






This literature review presents an overview of the theory and methods used in the 
selection of key texts for study and analysis. I chose this approach because many of the 
key texts cited in this thesis are discussed within the contexts in which they are 
referenced. Consequently, I have minimized the discussion here to avoid redundancy and 
to focus on a few key issues and concerns that require explanation or clarification.  
As a research project grounded in the field of Pan African studies, this thesis 
draws from several disciplines including mythology, religion, sociology, history, 
anthropology and philosophy. The chronological scope of this research project also spans 
several millennia of diverse human sociohistorical developments and events. Needless to 
say, the ambitious nature of this project and its particular theoretical approach requires a 
familiarity with a broad array of scholars, theories, methodologies and texts from 
multiple fields of study. My own diverse interests in historiography and my library 
training provided some advantages from the outset in identifying and selecting materials 
pertinent to this endeavor. I also relied heavily on the materials in my personal print and 
electronic libraries, the majority of which consist of primary research materials and key 
texts in Pan African and related areas of study. Thus by means of these specialized 
resources and the electronic and print resources of the library, I was able to access the 
materials needed to complete this research project.  
 9 
My goal of deconstructing the Eurocentric biases in western culture and 
scholarship, particularly in terms of the study of “western” religions and monotheisms, 
required me to review key theoretical studies that would help in formulating my own 
theoretical approach to my topic. Additionally, I needed materials that also would enable 
me to understand the historiographic and philosophic traditions upon which various 
theories and methods were formed and informed. With these goals in mind, I decided to 
locate and classify the larger and general set of theoretical literature into two basic 
categories: items written from a Pan African perspective; and those items that emerged 
from other traditions such as post-structuralism, deconstructionism, post-colonialist 
studies, and critical race theory. While admittedly some overlapping occurs between the 
two categories of general theoretical literature (as is the case with the other categories 
listed below), I still felt it was important to my research strategy to delineate these 
materials on the basis of their origination or locus of enunciation regardless of their 
concurrences or lack thereof.  In the domain of Pan African theory—a category that 
includes a wide array of theorists from all sectors of the African Diaspora—I relied 
extensively on the work of St. Clair Drake (1987, 1990) for his comprehensive treatment 
and analysis of the social construction of race in the fields of Egyptology, sociology, 
anthropology, and religion. Additionally, I consulted works by Anthony Appiah (1992), 
Jan Carew (1994; 1988), Amie Cesairé (1972), Chinweizu (1975), Cheikh Anta Diop 
(1974, 1978), W. E. B. Du Bois (1946), Frantz Fanon (1965, 1967; 1968), Lewis G. 
Gordon (1997; 2006b), John G. Jackson (1970, 1985), Kandiatu Kanneh (1998), Maghan 
Keita (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005), Charles Mills (1997), Wilson J. Moses (1998), V. 
Y. Mudimbe (1988), Ivan Van Sertima (1985, 1992), Frank Snowden (1970, 1983), 
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Chancellor Williams (1974), and Michelle M. Wright (2004). While the above list is by 
no means exhaustive, the work of these scholars proved essential in shaping my overall 
research strategy and in providing a general background to theoretical issues of special 
concern in the construction of “black” liberation discourses.  
The “other” theoretical literature of particular use to me in this study came from a 
variety of Asian, European, Euro-American, Latin American, and Middle Eastern 
sources. The most noteworthy of these are studies by Samir Amin (1989), Bill Ashcroft 
(1998), Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann (1967), Martin Bernal (1987), James M. 
Blaut (2000; 1993), Ernst Breisach (1994), Enrique Dussel (2000; 1993), Johannes 
Fabian (2002), Michel Foucault (1994; 2003), Jack Goody (1986, 2004, 2006), John 
Hobson (2004), Abdul R. JanMohammad (1985), Bruce Lincoln (1989), Walter D. 
Mignolo (2003; 2000), Sara Mills (2004), Fernando Ortiz (1995), Roy Porter (2000), Jose 
Rabasa (1993), Joseph Roach (1996), Edward Said (1994), Robert J.C. Young (1990, 
1995), and Slavoj Zizek (2002). Several of the scholars listed above have produced key 
texts that deconstruct and expose the Eurocentric bias in western scholarship. Books and 
articles by Martin Bernal, James Blaut, Enrique Dussel, Jack Goody, John Hobson, Jose 
Rabasa, and Robert J.C. Young, in particular, provided great insight into the “white 
mythologies” perpetrated as history by Eurocentric scholars. Martin Bernal’s “Aryan 
Model” of the origins of western civilization navigates a path outlined in the work of 
George G.M. James (1954) three decades earlier. Both influenced my thinking about how 
modern European identity is built on a model of “classical civilization” that obscures its 
Afroasian roots. The work of Walter D. Mignolo provided core components of the 
theoretical framework applied throughout this study, especially his concept of border 
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thinking. Blaut, Goody, and Hobson furnished essential correctives to European history 
and historiography, revising the chronology of economic and technological “progress” in 
Europe and situating it in its proper relationship to cultural, economic and technical 
developments in other regions of the world, especially Asia. 
The study of the emergence of the three monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam) requires careful evaluation of sources, given the tendency of many scholars in the 
field of religion to accept unquestioningly the premises and purported historical value and 
veracity of religious texts. Keeping these issues in mind, I reviewed the works of Karen 
Armstrong (1993), F.E. Peters (1991, 2003a, 2003b), and Rodney Stark (2003) for 
insights into the traditional paradigms in the study of monotheism (Stark), and Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam (Armstrong; Peters). Christos Evangeliou (2003), Jonathan Kirsch 
(2004), and Regina M. Schwartz (1997) offered thoughtful materials on the violent 
legacy of monotheism in western culture and history. The work of German Egyptologist 
Jan Assmann (1996, 1997, 2001), however, set the standard in my approach to the origin 
and evolution of monotheism and its impact on the ancient world. Assmann’s work 
introduced me to George Spencer Brown’s “first law of construction,” a concept of 
mathematics and logic that also applies to the procedures and processes that inform the 
social construction of knowledge.  
To understand the emergence of Judaism in the ancient world, I relied extensively 
on studies by Thomas Thompson (1999; 2005) and Mark S. Smith (2001), two scholars 
whose use of archeology, linguistics, and mythology and folklore in the study of the 
origins of Judaism and Christianity has revolutionized these fields. Karen R. Andriolo 
(1973) furnished an excellent overview of how the worldview expressed in the Old 
 12
Testament informed and structured concepts of Jewish identity and genealogy. For 
scholarly views of the construction and canonization of the Bible, I referred to works by 
Israel Finkelstein & N.A. Silberman (2001), W.M. Schniedewind (2004), and A.N. 
Wilson (1992). I used texts by Karen Armstrong (1993), John Dominic Crossan (1998), 
Robin Lane Fox (1986), John G. Jackson (1985), and A.N. Wilson (1992) as guides for 
understanding the origins and development of Christianity. And it also should be noted 
here, all references to the Old Testament and New Testament have been taken from an 
authorized King James Version of the Bible (1999) edited by Barry Mosher. This study 
did not require any particular translation of biblical verses for its analysis or 
interpretation. Consequently, I chose a commonly accepted version for my purposes. 
For the traditional paradigm of Islamic studies, I relied on the work of Karen 
Armstrong (1993), Reza Aslan (2006), Carl Brockelmann (1960), and F.E. Peters (1991, 
2003a, 2003b). The traditional paradigm of Islam, like that of Judaism and Christianity, is 
grounded in accounts of the religion’s origins as presented by its sacred texts and their 
interpreters. A new paradigm emerged over the last few decades that cast the origins and 
development of Islam in an entirely new light. Ibn Warraq (1998b, 2000b) is a leading 
scholar in this effort. He has edited and contributed to a series of essential reference 
works noted for their critical analysis of Islamic history. Warraq’s publications were an 
essential resource in developing the perspective on Islam presented in this study. The 
passages from the Quran cited in this thesis were taken from a translation by Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali (1983). 
I found much useful material to address the role of religion in the construction of 
ethnicity and race in books and articles by Aziz al-Azmeh (1992), Roger Bastide (1967), 
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James Brunson & Runoko Rashidi (1992), Gay L. Byron (2002), David Brion Davis 
(1984), St. Clair Drake (1987, 1990), I. Ephal (1976), Peter Frost (1991), David M. 
Goldenberg (2003), Michael Gomez (1998), Robert E. Hood (1994), Graham W. Irwin 
(1977), Bernard Lewis (1982, 1985), Jonathan Schorsch (2004), Ronald Segal (2001), 
and Werner Sollors (1997). For the history of “race” as a social construction, I used 
works by Theodore Allen (1994), C. Loring Brace (2005), Oliver C. Cox (1945, 1948), 
St. Clair Drake (1987, 1990), Jack Forbes (1993), George M. Fredrickson (2002), Ivan 
Hannaford (1996), Benjamin Isaac (2006; 2004), Winthrop D. Jordan (1968, 1974), 
James H. Sweet (1997), and Lloyd A. Thompson (1989). Charles W. Mills’ The Racial 
Contract (1997) furnished important insights into the development of white supremacy 
and was a major influence on my thinking throughout this project.  
Books and articles by Samir Amin (1989, 1997), Robin Blackburn (1997a, 
1997b), Benjamin Braude (1997), Moses I. Finley (1998), John Hunwick & Eva Trout 
Powell (2002), Herbert S. Klein (1999), Martin Klein (1992), Bernard Lewis (1982, 
1985), Orlando Patterson (1982), and Ronald Segal (2001) comprised a major component 
of the basic resource materials I used to research slavery and the development of racial 
slavery. 
The rise and expansion of Islam, and the Moorish invasion and occupation of 
Iberia, both receive considerable treatment in this thesis. Books and articles by A.G. 
Bostom (2005), Jan Carew (1992, 1994; 1988), David Brion Davis (1984), William 
McKee Evans (1980), Richard Fletcher (1992), Paul Fregosi (1998), Graham Irwin 
(1977), Stanley Lane-Poole (1886), Maria R. Menocal (2002), Daniel Pipes (1980), and 
 14
Richard E. Rubenstein (2003) served as the main reference materials for research into this 
aspect of my thesis. 
Finally, I believe the literature selected for review and analysis in this study well 
represents the disciplines and topics involved. My selection criteria emphasized the 
collection of the newest research materials available on a given subject as well as the 
inclusion of groundbreaking studies by the earliest known scholars in the various fields. I 
also sought to review materials from scholars who were highly critical or directly 
opposed to the theoretical perspectives I brought to this study. By this means I hoped to 
both familiarize myself with diverse and divergent opinions and to strengthen or modify 
my arguments as needed. The biggest challenge for me throughout this process was 




THEORY & METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This study takes the form of a counterhegemonic discourse in the tradition of Pan African 
and African-centered scholarship and in its conduct of intellectual warfare against white 
supremacy. Thus the rhetorical act of “dismantling” articulated in its title serves as a 
central metaphor for both the theory and methodology of the liberation discourse 
employed herein, and the analysis and critique of its principal object of investigation: the 
sociohistorical constructions and taxonomies of “blackness.” While critical theory and its 
offshoot, critical race theory, provided key interpretive methods and strategies in the 
formation of this study, ultimately, given my own predilections as a bricoleur, I 
approached this research project as a bricolage. In other words, in the tradition of a 
professional “jack of all trades,” I chose the research theories and practices that guided 
this project based on the questions asked and their specific contexts to produce a work 
that could navigate within and between particular epistemologies and methodologies, and 
within and between various competing paradigms and perspectives. And, in the 
multidisciplinary spirit of Pan African Studies, I drew from diverse human disciplines—
comparative mythology, comparative religion, sociology, anthropology, history, 
historiography, ethnography, philosophy, classical studies and cultural studies—to 
produce a complex analysis and synthesis that represents my interpretation and 
understanding of the subjects of investigation of this thesis. The merit of this approach, in 
my opinion, rests not with its conclusions, but with its heuristic process of identifying and 
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investigating critical problems faced by scholar-activists in the struggle to dismantle the 
ideological structures and infrastructures of white supremacy. The sections that follow 
provide definitions for key terms used in this study, and an extended discussion of 
important theoretical and methodological problems germane to this research project.
 17
Definition of Concepts: Monotheism 
 
I will give the name, ‘deconstruction of monotheism’, to the research project 
consisting in the dismantling and analysis of the constitutive elements of 
monotheism, and more directly of Christianity, thus of the West, in order to go 
back to (or proceed toward) the resources that might form simultaneously the 
buried origin and the imperceptible future of the world that calls itself ‘modern’ 
(Nancy, 2003).  
 
Monotheism, simply defined, means: the doctrine or belief that there is only one 
God. Since this religious ideology informs and influences every aspect of modern 
western society and identity—as it has been translated over time from “the sphere of the 
sacred to nationalism, and thence to other collective identities”—it hardly seems 
necessary to define it (Schwartz, 1997, p. 16). But what do we really know about One-
God-ism? We know Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the three monotheistic faiths, share 
a belief that: “only a single deity is worthy of worship for the simple reason that only a 
single deity exists” (italics added) (Kirsch, 2004, p. 9). We know this single deity is 
variously called “Yahweh” or “Lord” or “Allah.” We know each of these religions has 
produced a sacred text that purportedly documents the revelation of the one true god and 
his doctrine, and that the believers in these traditions view their sacred books as true and 
unassailable. But what do we really know about the origins and evolution of monotheism, 
its sociohistorical development, its various practices, and the ancient texts that authorize, 
historicize and document its religious ideology?  
This thesis addresses the above questions with a particular goal of investigating 
the role of the monotheisms in the formation of collective identities based on the 
believer/nonbeliever dichotomy that defines and determines membership (and exclusion) 
in the monotheistic faiths. This thesis also looks at an inherent contradiction in the 
concept and practice of monotheism: the problem of dualism in Judaism, Christianity and 
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Islam. Although this problem arises at the conceptual level (the manner in which human 
beings conceive and theorize the godhead), it has important implications for monotheism 
as praxis. As Rodney Stark points out in For the Glory of God: “In practice, absolute 
monotheism is possible only when the supernatural is conceived of not as a being but as 
an essence, as an impersonal, remote, divine principle such as the Tao” (author’s 
emphasis) (2003, p. 10). Stark uses the term “supernatural” to denote: “forces or entities 
(conscious or not) that are beyond or outside nature and which can suspend, alter, or 
ignore physical forces” (author’s emphasis) (2003, p. 4). “Gods,” then, are a particular 
form of the supernatural consisting of “conscious supernatural beings” (author’s 
emphasis) (2003, p. 4). Stark assumes God is an entity or force beyond nature and 
employs the term supernatural to describe the nature of God(s) whether viewed from the 
perspective of monotheism or cosmotheism. As the term cosmotheism implies, it is 
possible to view God(s) as the cosmos. In this instance theogony and cosmogony (the 
origin of god(s) and the origin of the cosmos) are one and the same. When viewed from 
the perspective of Ancient Egyptian beliefs or other so-called pagan spiritual traditions, 
the relationship between the one god and the many gods on the one hand, and God and 
the world, or the creator and the creation on the other hand, can be seen as just aspects of 
the same question. Thus, according to the cosmotheist belief system (a system that 
precedes the “revelations” of the three western’ monotheisms), rather than being beyond 
nature the divine or divinity (whether seen as one or as an aggregation of many) both 
manifests and inhabits the natural world and everything in and outside it. This form of 
natural “religion” or nature worship is the exact antithesis of Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
beliefs (Assmann, 2001). 
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Stark’s idea of the supernatural nature of god(s) (an idea that is consonant in the 
three monotheisms) is grounded in a view of creator, creation and the act of creating as 
separate and distinct spheres of being and action—as actor (god) and action (creation) 
and the product of action (the universe). From this perspective god and nature are 
separate and distinct in their nature and being—God is one thing, nature is something 
else, something that in fact can be seen as ungodly. The cosmotheistic view of god(s) as 
nature and god(s) in nature does not necessarily recognize or accept the notion that god is 
therefore super natural, except in the sense that the cosmos and everything in it exists in 
the same super or extraordinary state of consciousness and being. In citing the 
problematic nature of term supernatural, however, I do not want to lose sight of the 
initial quotation from Stark and how, by definition, it limits and qualifies the practice of 
absolute monotheism. Stark posits absolute monotheism as practicable only in godless 
religions. This view is grounded in his recognition of a central paradox in monotheism. 
Stark explains:  
… although monotheism means belief in only one God, in none of the great 
monotheisms—Judaism, Christianity, or Islam—is there only one supernatural 
entity. In each, God is surrounded by a cloud of beings ... This necessarily limits 
monotheism since, in order for a divine being to be rational and benign, it is 
necessary for the religious system to postulate the existence of other, if far lesser, 
beings. That is, evil supernatural beings such as Satan are essential to the most 
rational conception of divinity. Thus Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are 
dualistic monotheisms—each teaches that, in addition to a supreme divine being, 
there also exists at least one evil, if less powerful, supernatural being. As Jeffrey 
Burton Russell put it, “Dualism posits two opposite powers of good and evil, 
attributing evil to the will of a malign spirit.” The principle of dualism reflects the 
necessity either to conceive of a single divine essence [emphasis added] that is 
above the question of good or evil by virtue of being remote from any exchanges 
with human (the Tao), or to admit the existence of more than one supernatural 
being (author’s emphasis) (2003, pp. 10-11).  
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Differences in the godly and godless conceptions of the divine therefore engender 
different human customs and cultures. Those who posit and subscribe to the idea of the 
divine as a supreme essence, utterly impersonal and remote from human affairs, do not 
have to be concerned with the idea that this essence is responsible for any of life’s 
vicissitudes. Those who believe in a supreme being, on the other hand, in practice, cannot 
allow that being to be responsible for the evil, irrational and bad things that happen in the 
world every day. Thus the western brand of monotheism is grounded in a theological 
dualism, which constructs and authorizes other internal or metaphysical divisions based 
on the irreconcilable categories of good and evil. As will be discussed below in this 
thesis, this theological dualism in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheisms provides, via 
the believer/non-believer binary, a template for the extrapolation of this “religious” 
distinction into a distinction based on the illusion of race. But let us return now back to 
the crucial distinction in monotheism between those who posit a Supreme Being and 
those who posit a Supreme Essence to explain the nature of the divine. For Stark this 
distinction marks the difference between godly and godless monotheisms. Taoism and 
Confucianism exemplify the godless variety. Meditation and mysticism constitute the 
principal practices associated with these beliefs, but not worship. Stark contends godless 
monotheisms (which are not only found in the East) generally are less appealing, and 
incorporate in their “popular forms” a “substantial pantheon of Gods” to make 
themselves more attractive and accessible to the masses (2003, p. 5). Stark believes 
people prefer godly religions: “Because Gods are the only plausible sources of many 
things people desire intensely” (2003, p. 5). Such desires can be for material “things” or 
for peace, freedom, inspiration or a host of other “rewards of the spirit” (Stark, 2003, p. 
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5). Prayers, rituals and offerings constitute the modes of exchange and principal methods 
of communication between humans and god(s). More important, where godless religions 
motivate their adherents to seek enlightenment through a conscious integration of the 
individual “self” with the “absolute” self that constitutes the essence of all existence or 
non-existence, “Godly religions rest upon revelations, on communications believed to 
come from the Gods” (author’s emphasis) (Stark, 2003, p. 5). Divine communication 
from the Supreme Being therefore inspires and informs religious practices and modes of 
worship, and religious theory in the form of theology. According to Stark: “theology 
consists of explanations that justify and specify the terms of exchange with Gods, based 
on reasoning about revelations” (author’s emphasis) (2003, p. 5). Such explanations also 
affirm, through their expression and institutionalization in the religion’s cult(ural) 
customs and behaviors, the truth, legitimacy and efficacy of its precepts and practices. It 
is here that a religion’s revelators and specialists (theologians, priests, and sages) prove 
most compelling and persuasive. Stark notes: “Since the ultimate proofs of religious 
claims typically lie beyond direct examination, it is through the testimony of others that 
people gain confidence in a religion” (2003, p. 7).  
Dualistic monotheism as defined by Stark, points to an inherent problem with 
monotheism—its denial of agency. God, in the monotheist conception must be good, and 
thus its explanations for evil rests on extra-divine force or forces that are supernatural but 
not supranatural in that they cannot exceed the authority and power of the one god. 
Contradictions abound in this formulation, contradictions that undermine the singularity 
or unity of the monotheistic godhead. Thus a dichotomy arises in the form of the struggle 
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between good and evil. This irreconcilable and eternal antagonism lies at the roots of the 
believer/non-believer dichotomy that also informs the western monotheisms.  
The psychosocial events that provide the contexts and conditions for the 
emergence of the monotheism of early Israel, in particular, as delineated by the quote 
below, adumbrate later discussions in this thesis about the process of othering as it relates 
to religious identity. Mark S. Smith sets the stage for us with this observation: 
Within the Bible, monotheism is not a separate “stage” of religion in ancient 
Israel, as it is customarily regarded. It was in fact a kind of ancient rhetoric 
reinforcing Israel’s exclusive relationship with its deity. Monotheism is a kind of 
inner community discourse using the language of Yahweh’s exceptional divine 
status over and in all reality (“there are no other deities but me”) in order to 
absolutize Yahweh’s claim on Israel and to express Israel’s ultimate fidelity to 
Yahweh in the face of a world where political boundaries or institutions no longer 
offered sufficiently intelligible lines of religious identity. In its political and social 
reduction in the world (first because of the rise of the foreign empires in the 
seventh century followed by its exile in 587-583), Israel’s elevated the terms of its 
understanding of its deity’s mastery of the world. […] Put summarily: Israel was 
now no nation, but the gods of other nations, including the greatest powers, were 
not really gods; and Yahweh was the sole force over both (2001, p. 9). 
 
Here, Smith illuminates two salient points that will be considered below: 
monotheism as a form of rhetoric, which, in this case, applies to its “revelation” within 
the larger context of polytheism (cosmotheism), and the use of monotheism to erect and 
police ideological boundaries and formulate religious identity. Smith also reminds us 
that: “comparing ancient polytheistic religions with a monotheistic one is anachronistic, 
as the term “polytheism” only has any meaning or sense because it is contrasted with 
monotheism” (2001, p. 11). Neither of these terms meant anything to the ancient cultures 
involved. Early Israel’s version of monotheism evolved over hundreds of years, 
appearing in its earliest textual forms sometime in the seventh century BCE (Finkelstein 
& Silberman, 2001; Smith, 2001). And, as texts and artifacts indicate, Israelites continued 
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to worship other gods throughout their early history, practicing to varying degrees what 
could be described as Henotheism (Schwartz, 1997; Smith, 2001). Henotheism (also 
known as monolatry) is a term coined by Max Muller. It means devotion to a single god 
while accepting the existence of other gods. Most of the Old Testament can be described 
as henotheistic. Thus the early religious worldview of the ancient Israelites shared many 
common features with its Iron Age neighbors in North Africa, the Levant, and 
Mesopotamia (Smith, 2001).  
Smith offers several other vital points to consider as we define monotheism. First 
he notes the fallacy of presentism, as mentioned above, in the conceptualization of 
monotheism:  
The concept of monotheism reflects our modern situation as much as the 
circumstances of ancient Israel or the Bible, for monotheism is largely a modern 
concern. Monotheism’s importance perhaps derived in part from contact between 
modern Europeans and non-Westerners, as a way of defining the Western 
religious tradition in contrast to non-European cultures (Smith, 2001, p. 11).  
 
Smith’s statement also identifies and recognizes the role of monotheism in the 
ideological structuring and construction of modern Western identity, but sees this process 
as a modern reactionary phenomenon. Here it is argued that this process of self-definition 
in the West coheres during the so-called European Middle Ages when the conflicts and 
confrontations between European and Islamic societies heighten the contradictions 
between these two monotheisms and produced a territorial definition of the West as 
Christendom. Although the roots of the concept of Christendom are to be found in Jewish 
theocratic traditions, the idea makes a significant appearance in Europe with the reign of 
Constantine in the fourth century CE, and expands with the founding of the Holy Roman 
Empire under Charlemagne in the ninth century CE (Mastnak, 2002). Therefore, in 
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medieval times the lands under the auspices of the Roman Church “were thought of as 
Christendom, not Europe per se” (Blaut, 2000, p. 4). Christendom thus represented the 
concept of “god’s land” for Europeans, as did land of Israel for Jews and the dar al-Islam 
(abode of Islam) for Muslims (Tibi, 2005, p. 327).  
Monotheism continued to occupy and perform a prominent role in western culture 
even after the movement toward secularization in most European societies during the so-
called European Age of Enlightenment. As a core component of western consciousness it 
influences every aspect of Euro-American social development and the institutions that 
comprise the building blocks of western social identity—including and especially the 
formation and constitution of the secular democratic state. According to Smith: 
Monotheism has served as the “sublime idea” in Western civilization in contrast 
to (or to avoid?) the contentious differences in actual beliefs and practices. For an 
increasingly secularized culture, monotheism could serve as a substitute for 
religious beliefs and rituals, some of which might be seen as primitive for some 
highly “cultured” Westerners … monotheism in part serves an essentially liberal 
point of view (theologically and politically speaking), with little connection to 
explicit religious tradition or praxis (2001, p. 11). 
 
While monotheism may function as a “substitute for religious beliefs” in 
supporting the “liberal” tradition in Western culture, it nonetheless maintains its structure 
of dualism and binary oppositions. Consequently, the basic monotheistic formulary used 
to structure society in the modern secular West replicates the fundamental distinctions 
between believers (in this case, those who are recognized as members of the polity and 
thus eligible to benefit from its rights and privileges), and nonbelievers (those who are 
excluded from full membership for whatever reasons: caste, race, gender, economic 
status, etc.). In the medieval era the boundaries between Christendom and Islam 
demarcated “religious” distinctions (as did the boundaries between the monotheisms and 
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so-called pagan faiths). The “religious” identities fostered by these distinctions provided 
the cognitive ground that conditioned and contextualized “national” identities and 
nationalism.  The formation of modern Western nation-states, rather than breaking with 
this pattern of identity formation merely transformed and continued it in new guises and 
disguises. According to Regina M. Schwartz, the ancient view embodied in the biblical 
narrative of the so-called Deuteronomistic history (Judges through 2 Kings of the Hebrew 
Bible)—which sees the true nation (Israel) as worshipping the true god and all other 
nations as worshipping false gods—is clearly reflected in the formation of the modern 
nation-state: 
In theory, Christendom seemed to incorporate many nations under one God, with 
the spread of Christianity’s monotheism creating one holy empire. But in practice, 
when more or less secular nations were carved out of that empire, each had its 
version of a tutelary deity: instead of one God who spoke Latin, the French God 
spoke French, the German God spoke German, the English God spoke English 
(with an Oxbridge accent) and the U.S. God spoke English (with a southern 
accent). Nonetheless, these nations were still under recognizably the same God, 
despite his various linguistic, cultural, and national manifestations—the God of 
the West—and he was differentiated from the pagan deities of the East (Schwartz, 
1997, p. 121). 
 
“One nation under God”—is the pledge taken by countless schoolchildren daily in 
classrooms across the U.S. It is a statement often cited by fundamentalist Christians to 
advance the establishment of a theocratic form of government over the United States. In 
its basic formulation it incorporates monotheistic dualism to instantiate a nationalistic 
distinction between members of the American polity and others.  
One final point needs to be made before moving to the next definition. Not one of 
the revelators of the monotheisms (Moses, Jesus, Mohammad) ever wrote a single word 
of what came to comprise the sacred books of their respective faiths. Yet the very concept 
of monotheism and the notion of religion itself could not exist in its various forms today 
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without the written word and, more specifically, the invention of the alphabet. Jack 
Goody, in his groundbreaking study of literacy, family, culture, and the state, analyzes 
and assesses the impact of writing on human societies and explains how religions 
organized themselves and societies though their early control of literacy and through their 
roles as the producers, curators, interpreters and disseminators of ‘sacred’ texts. Goody 
contends: 
With writing a new situation arises since the priest has privileged access to the 
sacred texts (whether in the singular or plural) of which he is the custodian and 
prime interpreter. As a mediator he has a unique link to God, whose Word only he 
is often able to read. In the beginning was the Book, but it was the priest who read 
and explained it. Hence religions of the Book are often associated with 
restrictions on the uses and extent of literacy (1986, p. 17). 
 
Religions of the Book (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) deeply invest in policing 
the written word of god and advancing it over all other discourses. Thus monotheists give 
considerable attention to the production and reproduction of authorized texts, the removal 
and condemnation of texts considered spurious or heretical and the assertion of what are 
purported to be god’s written law or commands over and above those deemed to be man 
made. This focus on the authority of the book and the inerrancy of the word of god often 
creates conflict and dissension in secular societies that accept or tolerate religious 
diversity. 
For those societies described as oral or non-literate, problems of policing and 
controlling belief systems generally do not exist. In such cases religion is not a distinct 
element in the social matrix; it is the social matrix. When the belief systems and the 
social systems are one in the same there are no religious boundaries to police and protect 
because the concept of religion does not exist. This is true in the case of most so-called 
traditional African societies. Most African languages do not even possess a word for 
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“religion” because no cognitive distinctions are made between so-called religious 
practices or any other normative behaviors; all are viewed as part of the typical way of 
life (Goody, 1986, p. 4). Consequently, laws and codes of ethics are situational and 
embodied in the specific contexts in which they are relevant or applicable. In monotheist 
societies the opposite is often true, as Goody points out:  
Once literacy enters into interpersonal communication, then good and evil tend 
(though not immediately) to be written down and systematized as a code of law or 
ethics. Ideals embodied in a text rather than a context are no longer attached to 
present concerns in the same tight way; an old eschatology may persist or a new 
one be created which conflicts, by accident or design, by interest or essence, with 
other aspects of the socio-cultural tradition. In other words, religion can become a 
relatively distinct element in the social matrix, both manifesting and creating a 
greater complexity of beliefs and practices (1986, p. 21). 
 
These distinctions between oral and literate cultures played a significant role in 
the encounters between certain African societies and Muslims and Christians. For 
example, the people without the Book more often than not perceived themselves to be at 
a decided disadvantage to the people with the Book due to the impression that the written 
word of god was more effective and its interpreters more powerful. In such encounters 
the people with the Book assumed they were superior and, as will be discussed in the 
chapters that follow below, acted on their assumptions according to monotheist precepts 
and practices that often resulted in ethnocidal and genocidal consequences. This African 
saying of unknown provenance succinctly sums up this tragic outcome: “Before the 
“white” man came, they had the Bible and we had the land. After the “white” man came, 
we got the Bible and they got the land.” 
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Definition of Concepts: Eurocentrism 
The white man who invented the pencil also invented the eraser. 
—African Proverb 
 
The term Eurocentrism is a relatively recent addition to the vocabulary of 
anticolonialism. It denotes the “false claims made by Europeans that their society or 
region is, or was in the past, or always has been and always will be, superior to other 
societies or regions” (Blaut, 2000, p. 4). The notion of European superiority that forms 
and informs Eurocentrism is grounded in ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is the idea that 
one’s own ethnic viewpoint or Weltanschauung (worldview) is the only one of merit, and 
the only lens and filter through which the customs and practices of others is understood 
and judged (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). Eurocentric thought, however, is an extreme 
expression of ethnocentrism in that has imposed its worldview on others through 
conquest, colonialism and neocolonial exploitation.  
According to geographer J. M. Blaut, “four kinds of Eurocentric theory”—
religion, race, environment, and culture—have been used to explain how Europe 
managed to assert its power and control over the rest of the world’s societies, their 
wealth, and their human and natural resources (2000, p. 1). Let us briefly examine each 
theory in the order of Blaut’s presentation. (1) European Christians (like their Jewish and 
Muslim monotheist counterparts) claim to worship the one true god, who, through his 
special dispensation, guides their progress through the entire course of human history. 
Accordingly, their purported covenant with god and his intervention in human history on 
their behalf both explains and justifies European imperialism and global domination. 
European hegemony is thus directed and ordained by god. (2) As self-identified “white” 
people, Europeans claim a natural superiority over all other people in the world based on 
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pseudo-scientific notions of race. Skin color and other phenotypic characteristics 
constitute the visible somatic markers that separate Europeans from the rest of 
humankind. According to the ideology of white supremacy, these biological markers 
signal immutable differences in intellect, morality and culture, and comprise a taxonomic 
system that organizes and classifies human groups in a hierarchal arrangement that places 
so-called “whites” on top of a human pyramid. (3) Europeans also claim the sub-
continent of Europe (the homeland of god’s people) is superior to other environments in 
its geographic location, climate and resources. Theories of environmental determinism—
the belief that the physical environment rather than social conditions determines 
culture—date back to the ancient Greeks (B. H. Isaac, 2004) but reappear in various 
guises in every age. Jared M. Diamond’s Pulitzer prize-winning book, Guns, Germs, and 
Steel, presents a recent version of environmental determinism that seeks to account for 
Europe’s successful conquest and colonization of much of the world in the supposed 
“unique” climatologic and topographic features of the Eurasian continent (1997). (4) 
And, finally, Europeans claim the concepts of culture and civilization for themselves, the 
roots of which stretch back to the very beginnings of human existence (Blaut, 2000, p. 1). 
This Eurocentric theory of civilization brings us to a key contradiction of Eurocentrism: 
its dependency on “Greater Europe,” the so-called Holy Land of the Middle East and 
North Africa, for key features of its philosophy and sciences and, most important, for its 
monotheist religious identity. Europe simply cannot maintain the integrity of its ideology 
of ethnic and cultural supremacy without cannibalizing, assimilating, and claiming for 
itself the achievements of other societies in nearby regions and around the world (Amin, 
1989; Blaut, 1993, 2000; Dussel, 1993, 2000; Goody, 2006; Hobson, 2004; Rabasa, 
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1993). Nor can it define itself without the reification and subsequent negation, denial and 
suppression of the other.  
In defining Eurocentrism, we need to ask the questions: when, where and how did 
it begin? Blaut traces the beginnings of “modern Eurocentrism” to the year 1492: 
When Columbus returned from his first voyage to America, he described a people 
who were heathens, and who, he believed, could be conquered easily. Moreover, 
the conquest of their land would provide gold and other wealth to Europeans. It 
seemed clear that Europeans were superior to these Americans and would profit 
from this superiority. The conquest did indeed prove fairly rapidly (mainly 
because the American populations were decimated by introduced Eastern 
Hemisphere disease), and the profits were indeed immense. Europeans could now, 
for the first time on a significantly large scale, make a clear distinction between 
themselves and a non-European people to whom they could really believe 
themselves to be superior. The Eurocentrism that thus emerged in the sixteenth 
century has two essential characteristics: superiority seemed to be confirmed by 
the success of colonialism; and superiority produced great profits (2000, pp. 4-5). 
 
Blaut uses the adjective “modern” to make a subtle distinction in his argument 
about the origins of Eurocentrism. As pointed out above, a credible argument can be 
made that the concept of Christendom denotes a cognitive threshold or starting point for 
Eurocentrism. I would also argue here, along with Enrique Dussel, that the roots of 
“modern” Eurocentrism can be seen in events in medieval Iberia that set the stage for 
Columbus’ voyage across the Atlantic (Dussel, 2000). According to this view, the basic 
ideological structures and taxonomies that inform the social construction of Europe as the 
“European Miracle”—Blaut’s term that describes the Eurocentric account of the 
purported spiritual, intellectual and environmental superiority of the European people and 
their habitat—cohered in the Iberian peninsula during the latter centuries of Moorish 
occupation and rule. There, in Spain, the three monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam) came together in convivencia and competition to give birth to new forms of human 
identity and oppression founded on religious distinctions between believers and 
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nonbelievers. This volatile mixture and clash of monotheisms provided the ideological 
context and the sociohistorical conditions for the emergence of racial slavery, the 
transatlantic slave trade and European imperial conquest. Columbus’ voyage seen from 
this perspective marks the culmination of a series of events in Iberia that led to the 
transformation of this western-most outpost of Europe from a backwater of the Euro-
Afro-Asian world system to the first global European empire. 
The conscious or unconscious development of those precepts of Eurocentrism that 
pre-date the emergence of Spain as an imperial power could be said to constitute the first 
phase in the evolution of Eurocentrism. This first phase established the conceptual and 
ideological basis for white supremacy and its use as a mechanism of social organization 
and stratification. The second phase, which develops primarily outside of Europe, 
constitutes the experimental and existential phase when the practices and tenets of 
Eurocentrism are tested and applied on a global stage. Jose Rabasa sees this final phase as 
congruent with the “invention” of America as a new world by Spanish historians during 
and after the conquest and subjugation of its peoples (Rabasa, 1993). This invention of 
America was an invention of America as Other by conquistadors, missionaries, 
government officials, adventurers, settler colonialists, historians and writers. The 
taxonomies of difference they created and disseminated—which included textual, 
pictorial, dramatic, and cartographic means of representation—brought together a 
panoply of stock motifs to depict the so-called new world and its native inhabitants as 
cannibalistic, exotic, passive, idolatrous, and suitable only for servitude and exploitation 
if not extermination. Rabasa, in his analysis of how encyclopedias and maps organized 
and presented these views of the Other, also shows how that process of objectification is 
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linked directly to the development of the concept of the Universal Self as European. In 
charting these cognitive and cultural events in the Americas and Europe, Rabasa 
identifies the publication of Mercator’s Atlas in 1595 as a significant milestone in the 
construction of Eurocentrism. Mercator was not the first “to organize a standard 
compendium of maps in a book format with a narrative supplement,” but it was he who 
coined the term atlas after a mythical king of Mauretania” (author’s italics) (Rabasa, 
1993, p. 180). It is Mercator’s Atlas, his compendium of maps and their accompanying 
commentaries that Rabasa sees as constitutive of Eurocentric thought: 
As far as I know there is no history of the atlas as a genre. Insofar as such a 
history might turn out to be important for clarifying the question of Eurocentrism, 
I believe that the analysis of Mercator’s Atlas is a necessary preparatory task. I 
also believe that the Atlas manifests the main constituents that have defined 
Europe as a privileged source of meaning for the rest of the world. Eurocentrism, 
as I will try to point out with respect to the Atlas, is more than an ideological 
construct that vanishes with the brush of a pen or merely disappears when Europe 
loses its position of dominance. The trace of European expansionism continues to 
exist in the bodies and minds of the rest of the world, as well as in the fantasies of 
the former colonizers (author’s italics) (1993, p. 181). 
 
To Mercator also goes the credit for innovating a linear form of map projection 
(first published as a map of the world in 1569) that results in Greenland appearing larger 
than Africa (Africa is thirteen times the size of Greenland) and Europe appearing larger 
than South America. Indeed, the entire northern hemisphere in Mercator’s map projection 
looms larger than the southern. Rabasa compares Mercator’s map with Juan De la Cosa’s 
Portolan World Chart to illustrate “the radical shift of perspective a Mercator projection 
introduces into the European experience of the world” (1993, p. 189). Not only does 
Mercator’s design privilege Europe over other geographical areas of the world, it also 
metaphorically expresses Europe’s relationship with the rest of the world in binary 
terms—modern/ancient, Old World/New World, masculine/feminine, et cetera—with the 
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“positive” terms accorded to Europe (Rabasa, 1993, p. 188). Thus the cartographic 
historicizing of the world via Mercator’s map and atlas makes the world and its history 
meaningful only from the perspective of Europe. As Rabasa puts it: “If specific political 
configurations establish boundaries and national identities for a European geographic 
space, then the rest of the world acquires spatial meaning only after the different regions 
have been inscribed by European History” (1993, p. 192). This inscription of the 
geographic space of the world by Europeans opens its territories to European 
domination—spatially through conquest and colonization, and temporally through the 
usurpation or transmutation of all local histories as European History. 
The world-remapping work of Mercator serves as one salient example of the 
centralization of Europe in global space and time. Economist Samir Amin, like Edward 
Said, cites the role of the “artificial construction of the “Orient” as “Other” by Europe as 
a central component of the “mythic foundation” of Eurocentrism, and views “Western 
history” as the product of this ideological invention (Amin, 1989, p. 89). He sees the 
construction of “Western history” as analogous to the Orientalist construct in that it: 
… (i) removes Ancient Greece from the very milieu in which it unfolded and 
developed—the Orient—in order to annex Hellenism to Europe arbitrarily; (ii) 
retains the mark of racism, the fundamental basis on which European cultural 
unity was constructed; (iii) interprets Christianity, also annexed arbitrarily to 
Europe, as the principle factor in the maintenance of European cultural unity, 
conforming to an unscientific view of religious phenomena; (iv) concurrently 
constructs a vision of the Near East and the more distant Orients on the same 
racist foundation, again employing an immutable vision of religion. The four 
theories combined in different ways at different times. For Eurocentrism is not, 
properly speaking, a social theory, integrating various elements into a global and 
coherent vision of society and history. It is rather a prejudice that distorts social 
theories (italics added) (Amin, 1989, p. 90). 
 
For Amin and the other scholars discussed above, race serves as the principle 
organizing force of Eurocentrism and religion provides the basis for European unity. 
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With this system of taxonomy and ideology in place, Eurocentrism then manifests and 
operates in a variety of social ideas and behaviors in ways difficult to identify and trace. 
Eurocentric concepts of knowledge (epistemology) and assumptions about the 
universality of European values often remain hidden or masked in literature, the arts, 
philosophy, the social sciences, the physical sciences, and other cultural and social 
practices. Thus it continues as a systematic discipline and organizing force of intellectual 
and social relations in the so-called “postmodern” era despite recent efforts by activists 
and scholars to expose and deracinate it. In the chapters that follow, however, this thesis 
will focus primarily on how ideas and concepts of religion and race, consciously or 
unconsciously, operate in tandem to produce and reproduce the taxonomies of 




 Definition of Concepts: “Black” liberation discourse (Afrocentrism) 
 
If you don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there. 
—African Proverb 
 
 I began this intellectual journey with the intention and objective of examining and 
critiquing various theories of African identity, culture, and history used by prominent 
“black” activist-scholars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to confront, 
challenge, and contest racial slavery and “white” supremacy. Given the emancipatory 
aims of its inventors and architects, I labeled the collective rhetorical and didactic use of 
these theories: “black” liberation discourses. During the late twentieth century these ideas 
were grouped together under the rubric: Afrocentric. Centered on modern concepts of 
Africa and Africanity, “black” liberation discourses or Afrocentric thought evolved from 
the confluence and synthesis of political and cultural nationalist ideologies developed by 
“free” and enslaved Africans in the West during the dehumanizing epoch of Euro-
American slavery and the apartheid era of racial oppression that followed in its wake. 
Recent scholarship, however, has expanded the definition and practice of Afrocentric 
discourse beyond its confrontational engagement with Eurocentrism to encompass the 
creation and development of a body of literature and thought that delineates and 
disseminates a Pan African worldview. Current developments in the field 
notwithstanding, I embarked upon this project out of a concern that “black” liberation 
discourse (Afrocentric theory), in critical and fundamental ways, remains constrained and 
conditioned by the Euro-American sociohistorical nexus that provided its formative 
context and content. The spatial and temporal development of the Afrocentric paradigm 
within a Eurocentric worldview and its grounding in Eurocentric epistemology and 
methodology constituted, therefore, the principal problems that engaged my attention.  
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This approach to the issues raised by the Eurocentric origins of Afrocentric 
discourse was premised in an important question often posed in postcolonial discourse: 
Can you use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house?  For the purpose of this 
study, the master’s tools are Eurocentric epistemology and the master’s house is 
Eurocentrism. As is often the case, this central epistemological question invoked several 
others in its wake. Can the master’s tools be used to construct counter theories of race, 
culture and history to contest white supremacy? Does race theory in “black” liberation 
discourse circumscribe and subvert the liberating intentions of its paradigm by grounding 
it in a conceptual fallacy that perpetuates intellectual bondage to Eurocentrism? The 
genealogical implications of these critical questions led to the realization that I needed to 
construct a solid theoretical foundation and walls before putting the roof on the house, so 
to speak. In other words, I realized I had to address the basic question of how “blacks” 
became black in the first place. Any systematic effort to identify the conceptual and 
cognitive origins of black liberation discourse must first contend with the formation of 
black identity in the African diaspora—its evolution, content and racialization. Put 
another way: “black” thought requires “black” thinkers.  
While the main investigation of this thesis focuses on the role of the three western 
monotheisms in the sociohistorical and taxonomic construction of “blackness” and 
“whiteness,” the underlying motivation for this research project continues to be driven 
and guided by a concern for the integrity and efficacy of black liberation discourses in the 
struggle against white supremacy. Since the majority of this study focuses on the negative 
aspects of “blackness” imposed on African people before, during and after the 
transatlantic slave trade, it is important here to note the positive attributes of “blackness” 
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and “black” subjectivity that developed from the efforts of early “black” activists as tools 
of resistance. It is this tradition of resistance that informs this research project. 
Consequently, I included this detailed definition and analysis of black liberation 
discourse (African-centered thinking) in this section on theory and methodology. My 
purpose in doing so is to illustrate and illuminate the specific critical perspectives (and 
intellectual biases) I bring to this research project.   
The term Afrocentrism ignites controversy whenever and wherever it appears. 
Molefi Asante, who claims to be a founder of modern African-centered theory and who 
prefers the variant Afrocentricity, offers this concise definition of the concept: “placing 
African ideals at the center of any analysis that involves African culture and behavior” 
(1998, p. 2). The definition of Afrocentrism presented below is based on the shared belief 
of contemporary Afrocentric scholars that modern science affirms that human history 
begins with African history. It also is informed by the collective efforts of “black” 
activist-scholars throughout history to excavate, elucidate, and document a collective 
human heritage that has been erased, ignored or obfuscated by Eurocentrism. 
Accordingly, Afrocentrism is defined here as: a set of scientific and historical facts and 
theories that place the African continent and African people in the center of human 
development, and the systematic explication of those concepts within a philosophical and 
pedagogical framework designed to restore African historical consciousness and foster 
Pan African unity.  
The ideological and philosophical roots of the Afrocentric paradigm and its 
related cultural and historical discourses, like most social constructions, probably extend 
far deeper into the past than historical records document or oral traditions iterate. A 
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number of scholars have noted the obvious connections of such traditions to the 
transatlantic slave trade and its chaotic role in the creation of modern African diasporan 
identities and communities (Gomez, 1998; Holloway, 1990; Sale, 1997; Wright, 2004). 
Others have focused on familiar literary texts (slave narratives, poems, letters) produced 
by the first cohort of “black” literati in the Atlantic world as the artifactual and 
evidentiary instantiations of early African-centered traditions (Bruce, 2001; Carretta & 
Gould, 2001; Ernest, 2004). And still others have looked to European antecedents—
Enlightenment-era historians and travel writers like Vivant Denon and Count Volney, and 
the rites and rituals of the Masonic Lodges of England and France—as inspirations for 
the foundation of Afrocentric theory (Howe, 1998; Lefkowitz, 1997). Despite the 
contributions of these theories to our understandings of the origins of black liberation 
discourse, the specific genealogy of Afrocentric thought before its textual appearance in 
the late eighteenth century still remains a matter of much conjecture and debate. How 
then do we go about the complex task of recovering the intellectual prehistory of these 
paradigmatic ideas? This search must begin with “black” thinkers. “Black” thought 
requires “black” thinkers. 
A number of scholars have examined the roles of “black” antebellum thinkers in 
the formation of Black Nationalist thought and black intellectual traditions. St. Clair 
Drake, Wilson J. Moses, John Ernest, and Scott Trafton, in particular, have produced 
definitive studies that document the origin, pedigree and social context of nineteenth 
century ideas and theories that formed and informed what would be described today as 
early African-centered approaches to African history and culture. These scholars and 
others also have argued that Egyptology evolved as a distinct genre of black intellectual 
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discourse within its broader critique of and confrontation with Eurocentrism and 
scientific racism. Drake and Moses have labeled these scholarly endeavors as 
vindicationist and civilizationism, respectively—terms meant to describe the redemptive 
nature of arguments that assert the humanity and achievements of African people in the 
face of Euro-American claims of black genetic and cultural inferiority (Drake, 1987; 
Moses, 1998). But even in erudite and indispensable works such as theirs, limited 
attention is given to the prominence of Egyptology as a discursive tool of America’s 
leading ideologues of white supremacy and racial slavery. Even Martin Bernal in Black 
Athena, his voluminous writings on the de-Africanization of Ancient Egypt, overlooks or 
omits the singular role of American ethnologists in the formation of scientific racism and 
the Aryan model of ancient civilization (as he has dubbed it) (1987). Trafton’s book, 
Egypt Land: Race and Nineteenth Century American Egyptomania, has been a much-
needed addition to this area of antebellum studies. Trafton documents Egyptology’s role 
in the nineteenth century in providing crucial if not credible support for the 
anthropological schema and theories of prominent American scholars such as Samuel 
Morton, Josiah Nott and George Glidden, and their advocacy of the polygenetic theory of 
human development—a doctrine that purported to demonstrate the separate evolution of 
human populations based on presumed racial and cultural differences (Trafton, 2004). 
Polygenetic doctrine combined biological theories of hybridity (fanciful notions that the 
offspring of “blacks” and “whites” were infertile) with the belief that “blacks” were 
culturally inferior (the Hegelian assertion that “blacks” produced no history or 
civilization) to proclaim that Africans constituted a separate and inherently inferior 
species. The merger of biological studies of human crania and anatomy, which purported 
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to describe the distinct physical differences between “blacks” and “whites” with cultural 
theories that appropriated Ancient Egyptian mummies, monumental architecture and 
portraiture as evidence of Caucasian superiority from antiquity to modernity, produced 
what Robert J. C. Young has referred to as “an indistinguishably scientific and cultural 
theory of race” (Young, 1995, p. 124). The slaveocracy ethos of nineteenth century 
America provided the social and intellectual laboratory wherein biology and Egyptology 
were catalyzed to produce this lethal proslavery concoction. Polygenetic theory provided 
the formula whereby Africans were excluded in theory from the concept of the human 
family as they had been in practice from the Enlightenment-inspired assertion in the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal.” 
This new form of scientific racism appeared at the precise historical moment the 
premises and presumed benefits of racial slavery were undergoing a massive ideological 
and juridical assault by abolitionist forces in Europe and America. The increased 
numbers, visibility and social activism of free “blacks”—actuated and encouraged by the 
abolition of slavery in the Northern states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries—drove white supremacists to seek new arguments to support and maintain the 
slaveocratic system. These theorists agreed with Thomas Jefferson, the founder of 
American scientific racism, that free “blacks” had no place in white America. Beneath 
the rhetorical veneer of its proslavery arguments however—and with the exception of the 
polygenetic thesis—scientific racism differed little in its assumptions and conclusions 
from other ideologies that occupied key and prior positions in the proslavery debate. The 
paramount source among these was western monotheism. The trans-Atlantic slave trade 
began with the official sanction of the Catholic Church. Permission for enslaving 
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Africans was granted in the form of a Papal Bull (decree) that authorized slaving 
expeditions to be conducted as a “crusade” against “infidels” (Blackburn, 1997a, p. 103). 
Christianity and Christian beliefs (such as those based on medieval-era interpretations of 
the Biblical curse of Ham) offered supernatural explanations and divine justification for 
African enslavement and exploitation (Braude, 1997; Sweet, 1997). Religious bigotry in 
the form of Christian doctrine that anathematized non-believers aided in the expansion of 
the transatlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century, and provided an ideological 
framework for the juridical acts that authorized the racialization of slavery in the 
seventeenth century. The century that followed produced some of the earliest and most 
influential “black” writers in the English language. Christianity, with its emphasis on 
biblical literacy, facilitated the emergence of these “black” literati while at the same time 
Christian indoctrination circumscribed, muted or subverted their literary voices and 
messages of protest. The inventors of black Atlantic literature, however, perhaps fully 
aware of the irony of voicing “blackness” in a white language, used and adapted various 
literary forms (poetry, captivity narratives, autobiography) to debate and counter the 
theological bigotry and racism of Euro-America. Phillis Wheatley, Olaudah Equiano, and 
Ottabah Cugoano, among others, addressed in their own ways and entirely independent of 
the traditions of black protest that later followed, the questions of African humanity and 
spirituality, and the rights of “blacks” everywhere to be free (Bruce, 2001; Carretta & 
Gould, 2001).  
Secular worldviews that both preceded and accompanied the rise of Western 
science, and that systematically threatened the traditional authority of Christianity in 
every sphere of Euro-American life, also came into prominence during the Enlightenment 
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era of the eighteenth century (Porter, 2000). The secularization of Western thinking and 
thought engendered a modern epistemology for the modern Eurocentrism that emerged 
with the expansion of European imperial and economic power. Much of this thinking—
grounded in the ideology of natural philosophy—became highly influential in the 
revolutionary rhetoric that flowed back and forth across the Atlantic and that led to the 
radical political transformation of the Atlantic world (Diggins, 1976; Eze, 1997). 
Paramount among these concepts was the idea that human cultures and civilizations 
progressed in a linear fashion through various stages from savagery to enlightenment. 
This theory of social progress emphasized the role of the environment and nature in the 
formation, organization and advancement of human cultures, and served as a fertile 
source of speculation about the differences between European and non-European 
societies (Hannaford, 1996). Influenced by these ideas and responding to their use in 
proslavery arguments, “black” intellectuals in the early decades of the nineteenth century 
took their first rhetorical steps toward the development of the Afrocentric paradigm 
(Moses, 1998). They appropriated Eurocentric theories of progress and civilization and 
developed from them a series of eloquent and often erudite arguments about the antiquity 
of African civilization and its progressive social and scientific influences on the ancient 
Mediterranean world. This civilization debate—which remained deeply rooted in 
Eurocentric notions of human progress and history despite its deconstruction by “black” 
scholars—became a complex staple of black protest rhetoric of the era (Moses, 1998). 
Thus when “whites” insisted Africans were innately deficient in morals or intellect and 
incapable of civilization or the civilized behavior necessary to participate as free citizens 
in America, R. B. Lewis, Hosea Easton, Peter Randolph, David Nickens and other 
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“black” social and religious leaders immediately countered from lecterns, from pulpits, 
and in print with specific examples of African cultural genius (Rael, 2002). Vindicationist 
and race redemptive concerns drove the design and intent of these “black” protestations, 
and directed them as much to the attention of Northern “white” audiences as to that of the 
free “black” literate elite. Yet these arguments often included percipient and profoundly 
apposite approaches to the increasingly intractable problems of defining and achieving 
freedom, justice and equality in a nation that had divided its self into putatively free and 
de facto slave states.  
Just as the development of scientific racism accompanied the rise of abolitionist 
attacks on the slave trade and slavery, the appropriation and use of Egyptology by 
“black” scholar-activists proceeded from their critical need to defend the humanity of 
African people from new and increasingly genocidal onslaughts by Euro-American 
intellectuals. The earliest published references to Ancient Egypt by “black” intellectuals 
marshaled biblical, classical, and contemporary European sources in support of 
arguments designed to elevate or vindicate the character and identity of African people 
within the standard framework of the civilization debate (Moses, 1998). The first black 
newspaper Freedom’s Journal demonstrated this paradigmatic discursive practice in a 
column published the year of its founding (1827). Titled Mutability of Human Affairs, the 
article conveyed in abbreviated form both an explication of Ancient Egypt’s founding by 
“blacks” and a dissertation on the inevitable fall of great civilizations (Bacon, 2003). In a 
brief and rambling exposition, it articulated the principle arguments that have remained 
central to Afrocentric thought since its inception. This example and numerous others 
from the early decades of the century demonstrate that “black” scholars had developed a 
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unique appreciation for the discursive value of Egypt, and recognized its growing 
importance and strategic position as ideologically contested terrain in the intellectual war 
against white supremacy. Thus when Egyptology emerged as a mainstay of racist 
anthropological theories in the 1850s, “black” intellectuals quickly responded to the 
pseudo-scientific assaults and insults of American ethnographers. In an explosive speech 
delivered in Cleveland, Ohio in 1854, Frederick Douglass entered the debate with a 
mockingly ironic rebuttal: “But Egypt is in Africa” (1854, p. 288). With this simple yet 
dramatic declaration of geographical orientation, Douglass and other “black” thinkers 
strategically redeployed an old argument against a new threat, and moved black liberation 
discourse into a new era of scientific debate. 
Despite the Herculean efforts of Eurocentrists to de-Africanize it, Egypt remains 
in Africa. Early “black” activists seized on this geohistorical fact and organized and 
expanded it into a discourse that both asserted and defended the African origin of 
Egyptian civilization. In speeches, pamphlets and newspapers, “black” intellectuals 
depicted and extolled an Ancient Egypt that embodied and exemplified the very notions 
of African humanity and intellectual achievement that white supremacists claimed were 
historically impossible (Ernest, 2004; Trafton, 2004). The Eurocentric trope of white 
supremacy and polygenetic doctrine thus came under immediate attack from the 
Afrocentric trope of “black” humanity and its new theoretical approach to the study of 
African identity and culture. By these mean “black” scholars linked the history and 
culture of Africans in America to Ancient Egypt much in the same manner German 
Romanticists linked Northern Europe to the Mediterranean civilizations of ancient Greece 
and Rome (Bernal, 1987; Dussel, 2000). With these reactionary and self-defensive 
 45
measures, antebellum “black” thinkers established the potentially proactive paradigm 
from which Afrocentric thought and discourse has developed over the course of nearly 
two centuries. 
In applying this particular prismatic lens—the view of Africa and Africans 
through the fractious sociohistorical constructions of “black” and ““white”” American 
intellectuals of the antebellum era—I have emphasized the centrality of Egyptology to 
Euro-American racist ideologies and African-American redemptive strategies in an effort 
to illuminate the dialectical power struggle convened and articulated between the 
oppressed and their oppressors over the founding modern illusion of human identity: 
race. Black liberation discourse came into prominence in the nineteenth century to 
challenge Eurocentric constructions of race. It succeeded in implanting in the minds of 
literate free “blacks” in the antebellum North the importance of African history in the 
black liberation struggle. Yet its founders were unable to perceive or avoid the 
contradictions and ironies inherent in using Eurocentric concepts of history, culture and 
civilization to combat white supremacy and scientific racism. Thus, from its inception, 
the smoke and mirrors of racial ideology infiltrated and compromised the radical and 
revolutionary intentions of Afrocentric discourse, and the liberationist narratives 
articulated by its founders and proponents.  
The problem of racial ideology in the theoretical assumptions and presuppositions 
of early “black” intellectuals has received wide and prominent treatment in recent studies 
(Appiah, 1992; Drake, 1987; Howe, 1998; Lefkowitz, 1997; Moses, 1998; Shavit, 2001). 
Such studies however have produced mixed results. Some critics, from the privilege of 
hindsight, have found it simply more expedient to accuse the early proponents of 
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Afrocentric thought of racialist and essentialist proselytizing, rather than view their 
discursive strategies against the background of their life-or-death struggles for their 
humanity. “Black” activists of the antebellum era—whether they were born free or stole 
themselves to be free, whether they resided in the nominally free north or the 
intransigently slave south, whether they were churched or unchurched, lettered or 
unlettered—lived in a world circumscribed by the one drop rule and the fictive taint of 
“blackness.” “Whiteness,” a pigment of the Euro-American imagination, was both the 
prerequisite and privilege of citizenship. It is neither hyperbole nor cant to claim 
therefore that racism exemplified the American experience or that Africans, as exemplars 
of race in the Eurocentric mind, were the principle targets of its social and political 
violence. Within this pathologically race obsessed environment the “black” pioneers of 
early liberation scholarship constructed their own theories of African identity, culture and 
history as tools of survival and weapons of resistance. From their lived experiences of 
racism, and from the racial concepts that defined and circumscribed their lives, they 
reconstructed and redeployed race for the sole purpose of self-defense.  
The failure of some scholars to contextualize the struggle of Africans in America 
for self-definition and self-preservation has produced unfair analyses and 
characterizations of their motives and marked them as victims rather than beneficiaries of 
their seminal intellectual achievements. This is not only a problem of presentism in the 
study of black intellectual history; it is also a failure to acknowledge and address the 
existential reality of antiblack racism. The advent of critical race theory and the 
propagation of arguments from ebony and ivory towers that race is a biological fiction or 
sociohistorical construction have not eliminated racism or its lived experience from the 
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American landscape any more than did the abolition of the slaveocracy system which was 
the root cause of its existence. It can be argued in fact that emancipation exacerbated the 
tendencies toward antiblack racism, and fostered the establishment of antiblack policies 
as the means to maintain social and economic control over “black” people. Lynching, 
“white” mob violence, and the proliferation of Jim Crow apartheid laws enacted in the 
wake of the passage of the 13
th
 Amendment codified and enforced the brutal reality that 
free “blacks” were an anathema to Euro-American society and a crime against white 
supremacy. Therefore, it is only within the contexts of the existential reality of racism 
that the use of racial or essentialist concepts by early “black” scholars can be fully 
comprehended. 
Despite much of the current literature’s focus on Afrocentric historiography, it is 
my contention that the best way to comprehend and critique African-centered thought is 
through a detailed examination of its rhetorical applications and discursive practices. 
Current scholarly preoccupation with the historical content of Afrocentric discourse 
problematizes its study and analysis by obscuring its role and purpose in the African 
liberation struggle. For example, the widely reported arguments from critics opposing the 
claims of some Afrocentrists that Cleopatra VII was “black” have been framed in 
historical debates that miss or ignore the larger importance of Afrocentric discourse in 
challenging the hegemony of pseudo-universal notions of whiteness. If the concept of 
race has no scientific basis or validity, any proposed answer to the frequently cited 
Cleopatra question or similar problems is valid or relevant only within the context of 
intellectual and ideological warfare over sociohistorical constructions of race and who 
has the power to form and inform them. Recognizing that the context of Afrocentric 
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thought—its specific orientation to and relation with Eurocentrism—often receives 
cursory or limited treatment in the existing literature, I shifted the critical analysis of the 
subject from the current focus on its historiographic methods and outcomes to its ongoing 
dialectical engagement with white supremacy.  
Scholarly and popular denunciations of Afrocentric thought as Afrotopianism, 
essentialism and historical fabrication, based mainly and not always accurately on 
criticisms and analyses of its use of racial theories or methods, deflect attention from the 
landmark achievements of “black” intellectuals in deconstructing and contesting 
Eurocentrism and decolonizing black studies. “Black” activist-scholars were among the 
first non-Europeans to challenge in practice and in print the ideology of white supremacy 
in all its complex social, political and economic manifestations and permutations. The 
interstitial space opened up by their resistance to European power and dominance created 
the ideological locus and intellectual opportunity for the emergence and articulation of 
non-racialist liberation discourses. Unlike Eurocentrists and white supremacists who 
promulgated and promoted discourses of racial difference and inequality to maintain the 
hegemony, status and privilege of “whiteness,” the architects of the Afrocentric idea—in 
their preoccupation with African cultural identity and ancient African civilization—did 
not preach the hegemony of “blackness”; instead, they were among the most vocal 
advocates of universal humanism and the monogenetic origins of the human species. 
The view of black liberation discourse articulated here starts from the position 
that its theories and methods originated and functioned in its nascent phase not as a 
school of history but as a critique of history that cohered within the socio-political 
struggle against the hegemony of “whiteness” and its physical and ideological 
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subjugation of non-whites. In tracing the trajectory of the Afrocentric idea, it is apparent 
that a critical distinction needs to be made between its early deconstructive role as a self-
defensive critique of Eurocentrism and its later performative role as a counternarrative 
with the explicative power to construct new forms of “black” subjectivity. Investigating 
this subtle shift in rhetorical and discursive practice reveals how Afrocentric engagement 
with Eurocentric history as an object of interrogation results in its self-referential use of 
history and the eventual production of its own forms of historicizing. It also further 
substantiates how Afrocentrism’s encounter with and response to antiblack racism fosters 
a type of vindicationist historicism, which in turn makes it the subject of a particular kind 
of reactionary and knee-jerk historical analysis that can and often has obscured and 
distorted its original hermeneutic mission and semiotic purpose.  
This analytical definition of Afrocentric discourse is open to criticisms of 
reductionism from both sides of the debate. In an intellectual environment where both its 
proponents and opponents tend to expand the definition and practice of Afrocentric 
thought beyond its original analytical and critical premises and functions, such objections 
are expected. Thus Afrocentric discourse is either celebrated or denounced for becoming 
a mirror image of the thing it was conceived to deconstruct. Like any other discipline, 
there is much to criticize in Afrocentric thought.  However, I maintain that it is an error in 
logic to apply current definitions and standards to the early theory and practice of black 
liberation discourse. David Hackett Fischer has identified this type of analytical flaw as a 
genetic fallacy: a failure to distinguish between the becoming of a thing and the thing it 
has become (Fischer, 1970). In this case, arguments designed to foster black unity in the 
struggle against slavery and antiblack racism have become a set of historical narratives 
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and theories about African identity and the role of Africans and Africa in human 
development and history. The two things are not the same, although it is easy to see how 
they are apt to become confused and conflated. 
In defining early Afrocentric thought as a type of strategic essentialism for self-
defense and self-preservation actuated by the existential reality of antiblack racism, I 
have attempted to reconstruct the cognitive path followed by early “black” activist-
scholars who took the “blackness” that “white” ideologues and oppressors invented and 
imposed on them and turned it into a weapon of liberation. Despite the prevailing 
nineteenth century Hegelian view that portrays Africans as lacking historical agency, 
their presence and struggle for survival in the Atlantic world helped to make and remake 
the history of modern Euro-America and modern Africa. Joseph Roach (1996), Paul 
Gilroy (1993) and others have argued that diasporan “blacks” were central to the 
development of modernity as both subjects and actors in its enactment and evolution. In 
the fight for freedom and identity in the world they helped to create, “black” people 
reconstructed and redeployed Western languages, literature, philosophy and science to 
express the values, ethics and ethos of “black” subjectivity and resistance. The diasporic 
African confrontation with and contribution to the West occurred during the rise of 
Eurocentrism and at the precise moment Europe’s pseudo-universal history (Bernal’s 
Aryan Model) was concocted, reified and disseminated to the peoples and nations it had 
conquered and subjugated. The clash and conflict of worldviews was immediate. As 
Eurocentrists sought to control the present and reinvent the future by colonizing the past 
with the modern myths of science and the ancient myths of the Bible, Afrocentrists 
responded using their own Sankofian strategy to reach back and bring forward an 
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African-centered view of humanity and human existence before the advent of the 
genocidal transatlantic slave trade, and before the presumed existence of Europe as a 
geohistorical construct. Their rhetorical appropriation and discursive use of Egyptology 
constituted the first ideological assault on the infrastructure of Eurocentrism from an 
“other-centered” perspective. With the dissemination of these radical and revolutionary 
ideas in print and public forums, “black” activists set about the monumental task of 
dismantling the master’s house.  This research study follows and builds upon the precepts 
and principles of those black liberation discourses founded two centuries ago.  
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Theoretical Problems: Trans-history/meta-theory 
The truth that was lost in the morning often comes home in the evening. 
—African Proverb 
 
The sections that follow discuss general theoretical problems and issues in 
historiography with particular attention given to the European conception of modern 
history and its ideological use by the West. Although the current vigorous debates about 
the relation of theory to history are not central to this thesis, the nature of the problems 
involved has important implications for the critique and analysis of Eurocentric and 
Afrocentric thought (black liberation discourse) herein proposed. Consequently, I think it 
is germane to discuss the theoretical and philosophical frameworks used to contrast and 
compare the rhetorical and discursive practices of African-centered though with the 
Eurocentric theories and structures of knowledge from which they emerged, and to view 
these two systems of thought against the larger problems of structuring and constituting 
knowledge and history in general. To achieve this expository goal I have imposed another 
frame of analysis within the larger frame of the basic critical theory approach of this 
study. This smaller frame or lens invites into this discussion forms of poststructuralist 
analysis that allow for the interplay of multiple voices and multiple perspectives to 
emerge within a given expository and interpretive context. This concern with multi-
vocality recognizes the global nature of Eurocentrism and its contestation from multiple 
sites of resistance in the form of “subjugated knowledges”—a term used by Foucault to 
link together those philosophical movements critical of the dominant Western episteme 
(Foucault et al., 2003, p. 7). It also recognizes and addresses the often less visible 
structures of oppression that exist within Afrocentric and other discourses of the 
oppressed. This study investigates these larger conceptual and structural problems within 
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the framework of its critique of Afrocentric theory, at the same time it goes beyond that 
critique to identify pluralistic and global solutions to the paramount issue of dismantling 
the master’s house. Such solutions and the liberation discourses they articulate arise from 
multiple sites of resistance, i.e., from feminist theories, Latino/Latina studies, Asian 
Studies, certain sectors in Euro-American academe, Africana philosophy, Pan 
Africanism, and other diverse sources. The basic idea that underscores this methodology 
is that these theoretical approaches can be universally empowering and liberating if 
conceptually and pragmatically grounded in the global nature of the problem of 
Eurocentrism and not the local nature of a particular perspective. 
My search for a critical perspective and framework to investigate Eurocentrism 
and black liberation discourse followed a path informed by Samuel Weber’s cautionary 
dictum: “a social historical critique which does not consider the conflictual structure of 
its own discursive operations will only reproduce the constraints it is seeking to displace” 
(cited in Young, 1990, p. 129). Weber’s statement made me more critically conscious of 
the philosophical baggage I brought to this study as a researcher. Equally important, it 
guided me in formulating and stating a fundamental problem in Afrocentric theory, as I 
perceive it, as follows: the essentialist premises of Afrocentrist discourse reproduce the 
conceptual fallacies and constraints it seeks to dismantle in its critique of Eurocentrism.  
The protracted struggle against white supremacy has focused “black” thought 
mostly on defining Afrocentric theory and locating its ideas in categories that purportedly 
oppose and resist Western ideology and dominance. The Afrocentric paradigm conceived 
from this process may be centered on Africa, but it has remained nonetheless 
conceptually grounded in Eurocentrism. The basis for this assertion is twofold. First, 
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when it appropriates and uses essentialist and historicist concepts to challenge and contest 
the hegemonic discourse of white supremacy, Afrocentric theory functions in theory and 
practice as a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism. Second, the purported “center” of 
African-centered thought—the theoretical template some Afrocentrists have used to 
construct “black” identity and reconstruct “black” history—relies extensively on 
representations of Africa and Africanity invented by Eurocentrists to enact and actuate 
European colonial power and epistemological dominance. It is this Africa of European 
imagination that was re-imagined in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by 
pioneering “black” intellectuals in their efforts to combat the black inferiority/white 
supremacy discourse that was both the pretext and context of the transatlantic slave trade 
and the racialization of slavery in the Americas. The liberationist intent of the vanguard 
cohort of antebellum “black” intellectuals who constructed Afrocentric discourse goes 
unquestioned in this analysis. Theirs was a strategic response to racism and white 
oppression at a historic moment when nine out of ten “blacks” in America were enslaved. 
The grounding of their discourse in the ontological/epistemological confusion of 
Eurocentric historiography, however, poses important problems for this study and for any 
effort to investigate the successes and failures of black liberation discourses in 
dismantling the master’s house: that is, in deconstructing and deracinating white 
supremacy and resisting the subversion and violence of the Eurocentric episteme that 
inscribes and reifies it. Hence, I have found it useful and productive to apply the same 
criticisms to Afrocentrism that Afrocentrism applies to Eurocentrism. This method helps 
to uncover the structural problems in Afrocentric discourse suggested by Samuel Weber’s 
axiom cited above. It also enables me to locate the overall critical perspective of this 
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thesis in the kind of “border thinking” Walter Mignolo refers to in his study of coloniality 
and subaltern knowledges: Local Histories/Global Designs (2000). 
Mignolo posits border thinking as a method to decolonize knowledge and expand 
it beyond its Western conceptualization and understanding. He cites Abdelkebir Khatibi’s 
concepts of “double critique” and ”other thinking,” and Valentin Mudimbe’s idea of 
“African gnosis” as integral to his formulation of this strategy (Mignolo, 2000, p. 6). 
Conceived as a site of resistance to the domination of the Western episteme, border 
thinking categorically rejects the idea that knowledges produced from non-European 
cultural perspectives are invalid and unscientific, and that the West alone produces 
science and is therefore unique in its capacity to know and understand “other” cultures.  
The term border gnosis, as proposed by Mignolo, denotes knowledges “conceived 
at the conflictive intersection of the knowledge produced from the perspective of modern 
colonialisms (rhetoric, philosophy, science) and knowledge produced from the 
perspective of colonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/Caribbean” (2000, 
p. 11). The Afrocentric paradigm roughly fits within the category of border gnosis: it was 
conceived from the perspective of colonial modernities in the Americas, and the border 
gnosis or knowledge it articulates developed out of the conflictive experiences of the 
colonized and includes knowledges of the pre-colonial past. However, its evolution 
within the margins of the modern world system has resulted in its opposition to 
colonialism often being expressed in ideas, terms and perspectives deeply influenced or 
subverted by colonialism. This situation complicates efforts to resist the domination of 
the Western episteme and avoid the vexing problem of conceiving and convening 
liberation discourses that remain complicit with various forms or categories of 
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oppression. Mignolo offers Khatibi’s idea of a double critique as a way out of this 
dilemma. Citing Khatibi’s research on Islam’s confrontation with the West, Mignolo 
argues that a double critique provides a unique locus at the intersection of knowledges 
produced from two fundamentally opposed historical traditions. This locus offers an 
independent site from which to analyze and evaluate such knowledges and their sources. 
Critical analysis of one tradition from the perspective of an “other” tradition implies that 
one thinks from both traditions. A double critique enables one to think from both 
traditions “and, at the same time, from neither of them” (Mignolo, 2000, p. 67). 
Specifically, a double critique becomes a way to overcome the territorial definitions and 
limitations of knowledge imposed, for example, by Afro- and Euro- centrisms, and to 
confront those different conceptions of history at the intersection of their confrontation 
with each other and within the context of their power relations. Mignolo offers this 
complex yet lucid explanation of how border thinking works with double critique to 
release and produce alternative knowledges (gnosis) and new forms of liberationist 
thought: 
This border thinking and double critique are necessary conditions for “an other 
thinking,” a thinking that is no longer conceivable in Hegelian dialectics, but 
located at the border of coloniality of power in the modern world system. Why? 
Because Hegel’s dialectics presuppose a linear conception of historical 
development, whereas “an other thinking” is based on the spatial confrontations 
between different concepts of history […] The epistemological potential of border 
thinking, of “an other thinking,” has the possibility of overcoming the limitation 
of territorial thinking (e.g., the monotropic epistemology of modernity), whose 
victory was possible because of its power in the subalternization of knowledge 
located outside the parameters of modern conceptions of reason and rationality. A 
double critique releases knowledges that have been subalternized, and the release 
of those knowledges makes possible “an other thinking” (2000, p. 67). 
 
The Afrocentric paradigm emerged at the intersections of the colonizers’ forms of 
knowledge (Eurocentric historicism) and the subalternized or marginalized forms of 
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knowledge of the colonized and enslaved (local and oral traditions). This juncture 
produced a disjuncture within which the rhetoric of modern history, philosophy and 
science (Western epistemology) became the means to express the narratives and 
knowledges of slavery and colonialism from a colonized or Pan African perspective. 
From the margins of American society, the pioneer thinkers of African-centered thought 
conceived “an other thinking” or alternative narrative of modernity and released that 
narrative within the contested space of the Euro-American ethos to make possible “an 
other thinking” about the nature and meaning of human freedom and, indeed, humanity 
itself. Thinking on the border they tried to shift the center of the debate about “black” 
identity and history from the dehumanizing ethos of their enslaved present to an imagined 
pre-colonial past, a past before European hegemony. In going back to the past they saw 
themselves moving forward to a future of freedom and equality. Going back to the future, 
in this specific instance, constitutes a Sankofian movement to rupture “the monotropic 
epistemology of modernity” and break with Hegelian dialectics and the linear conception 
of history described by Mignolo above. The lack of a double critique, however, resulted 
in “black” intellectuals re-conceptualizing the past with essentialist fallacies of 
presentism born out of the contemporary nature of their racial predicament. Thus “racial 
rhetoric” became an integral part of their “other thinking” and compromised its “other-
ness.” 
Border thinking mediates between the ideology of the oppressors and the 
pedagogy of the oppressed in the interstitial zone where the existential contests between 
local histories and global History are enacted and played out. It offers a locus of analysis 
and enunciation that identifies and addresses the subaltern nature of black liberation 
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discourse as a counter-narrative of modernity, while it also distinguishes the ways in 
which modernist/colonialist modes of thinking are implicated in Afrocentric thought. It 
provides a means to see Afrocentric discourse as inseparable from the modern world 
system it deconstructs, while accepting the gnosis or knowledge produced by the 
Afrocentric critique as a cognitive step on the path toward a trans-historical and meta-
theoretical liberation discourse that can fully and effectively resist the global tyrannies of 
sexism, racism, and capitalism.  
 
History, Centrisms and the Desert of the Real 
 
The measurement of the opinion and deeds of the past by these universal opinions 
of the present is called “objectivity” by these simple people. They find the canon 
of all truth here: their work is to adapt the past to the present triviality and they 
call all historical writing “subjective” that does not regard these popular 
opinions as canonical. (Nietzsche, 1957) 
 
In Discourse on Colonialism, renowned Caribbean writer Aimé Cesairé argues 
that all history is “white,” European and male (Cesairé, 1972). Referencing the texts of 
prominent French intellectuals (Ernest Renan, Roger Caillois, and Arthur Gobineau), 
Cesairé identifies and indicts the ethnocentric, geographic and gender bias of modern 
historiography and its ideological use as a tool of European hegemonic discourse. 
Cesairé’s anticolonial discourse and the Afrocentric critique both seek to expose the 
contradictions between the Eurocentric claim that European historiography constitutes 
and produces a universal History, and the reality of its genuinely parochial mode of 
production and ethnocentric products. Anticolonial and Afrocentric discourses contest the 
Eurocentric assertion that the local histories of the world are conceivable only as 
moments, repetitions, variations or validations of the History of Europe. Afrocentric 
discourse, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, has attempted to 
 59
intervene in the unicentric and monopolistic production of history through the production 
of its own narratives or counternarratives of modernity (and antiquity). This intervention 
has occurred in three stages. In the first stage, this liberation discourse operates as a form 
of resistance to the European appropriation and incorporation of the Other (non-
European) into European History by contesting the marginalizing, silencing and denial of 
the historical agency of the Other through its general critique of Eurocentric 
historiography. In the second stage, Afrocentrists convene various projects to rewrite 
African history from a purportedly African perspective. In the third stage, the 
(re)inscription of African history (re)inscribes European history, and, by inference and 
implication, the history of the modern world. These writing, over-writing and rewriting 
agenda of de- and re- centering equally reveal and conceal, describe and disguise, 
remember and erase the past as prologue and the past as present.  
The critical theory perspective of this research project views all forms of 
historiography as embodying various fallacies of presentism or anachronism. Afrocentric 
historicism, particularly in its use of essentialist or racial concepts, does not escape these 
problems. Yet the perspectivist approach of Afrocentric discourse—its form of border 
thinking—illuminates with stark contrast and sharp relief the ideological boundaries, 
differences and conflicts between the “center” of Euro-American discourse and the 
shifting “center” of non-European historicizing. The Afrocentric aim of decolonizing the 
past challenges the traditional epistemic foundations of historiography, its general 
organization and presentation in the form of the tripartite division of 
ancient/medieval/modern, and how various eras and epochs of human endeavor within 
those divisions are categorized and defined. Below, I will briefly examine how the status 
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quo of historical periodizing is ruptured by this critique. Here, I want to point out why the 
rupture is only partial and thus does not effectively dismantle the system in its entirety. 
The Afrocentrist critique falls short in deconstructing the theories of historical change 
that constitute Eurocentric historiography for two basic reasons. First, it consciously and 
unconsciously accepts and incorporates Eurocentric positivist and mechanistic 
explanations of historical processes into its discursive theory and practice. Second, rather 
than limiting its critique to the deconstruction and dismantling of Eurocentric history, it 
posits and constructs its own global history with its own set of universalizing premises as 
an alternative world system model. Because the two centrist systems of thought operate 
from commensurable epistemological premises and principles, Afrocentrism cannot 
effectively erase Eurocentrism without erasing itself. With Afrocentrism functioning 
more or less as a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism, its discursive efforts to de-center 
Europe and overcome the socio-political dominance and violence of its episteme are 
compromised and subverted from within. 
De-centering Europe breaks the hold of the Eurocentric matrix or virtual reality 
on the consciousness of its objectified and colonized subjects. But what are the 
theoretical implications of re-centering in a non-European locus? Rather than producing a 
genuine paradigm shift or the accession of an authentic historical consciousness, as some 
Afrocentrists believe, I would argue that the resulting epiphany could be described 
instead as the immersion of the colonized subject’s consciousness into yet another 
functional incoherence. Although an admittedly vague term, functional incoherence 
provides a useful label for the false ontology that instantiates and sustains centrist 
ideology. The incoherence of the centrist premise and its “we are the world” philosophy 
 61
is evident in its conversion and expansion of a single culture (i.e. Europe/European) into 
a statement of Universal Culture. To establish and maintain the autonomy and supremacy 
of its idealistic creation, centrist discourse then negates the existence, historicity, or 
validity of other cultures. Supremacy, or hegemony, however, does not equal 
universality. Nor does the act of negation erase the Other as much as it affirms the 
existence of the Other by its attempt at erasure. So despite its functional successes as an 
organizing principle of social perspective, belief and action, centrist ideology remains 
inherently illogical, incongruent and inconsistent, hence, incoherent.  
For Pan African scholars in and outside the Afrocentric School, the centrist issue 
raises important questions that challenge the current use of history as a discourse in the 
struggle against white supremacy. If in fact all history is “white,” European and male (i.e. 
produced within a European conceptual framework), then there is no history outside of 
History to retrieve. Seen in this light, the rewriting of African history from an African 
perspective becomes an exercise in tautology and circumlocution. What is rewritten 
becomes visible only through the same Eurocentric lens that privileges the idea of 
History and that refuses the narratives of the Other or other narratives. As Robert Young 
points out: “For the other to remain other it must not derive its meaning from History but 
must instead have a separate time which differs from historical time” (emphasis added) 
(1990, p. 15). Hence the shift from one centrism to another does not avoid the problems 
of Eurocentric historiography it merely duplicates or reproduces the ontological errors of 
Historical time within another socio-intellectual site. The centrist shift also reveals the 
fallacy of centrist thinking in general, with the logical result or outcome of this process 
being: things fall apart, the center cannot hold.  
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The center cannot hold because it exists only as a virtual reality, a smoke and 
mirrors concoction created from culturalist and materialist projects that define historical 
reality and verisimilitude according to social constructions of gender, race, geography 
and time. Once identified or established, such a center becomes yet another cognitive 
domain mapped and marked by patterns and practices of inclusion and exclusion that 
signify and denote notions of internal and external differences, and that condition and 
restrict human interactions and freedom. The geo-historical construction of Africa in 
contemporary discourses provides an instructive case in point. Regardless of the name we 
use to identify the immense continent in the center of the planet, which some say 
resembles a giant question mark, or how we classify its diverse human occupants with 
their complex societies, unquestionably, the place and the people who inhabit it are 
physically there. But when it comes to the question of locating and defining an authentic 
African identity or type, like Gertrude Stein once said about Oakland, California: “there 
is no there there” (Stein, 1971, p. 289). This statement does not deny the existential 
reality of African people or the relevance and specificity of their social actions and 
interactions. Instead it argues against the totalizing and homogenizing of African 
existence and experience. Whether Euro- or Afro- centric, such discursive strategies 
result in reductive rather than inductive analyses of human diversity and individuality and 
perpetuate the fallacies of essentialist differences by converting imagined ethnic 
archetypes and stereotypes into the virtual human phenotypes upon which History 
mediates and operates. Against the constantly shifting fields of time and space, and the 
changing patterns of human interactions with each other and their environments, the 
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phenotypic standard remains fixed and unchanging, invariably European or Other in its 
historically constructed identity, subjectivity and consciousness.  
The honest efforts and important contributions of well-intentioned “black” 
scholar-activists notwithstanding, historicizing Africa from an African perspective does 
not correct the problem of Africans being left out of History; it merely reinforces the 
specious claim that History, as currently defined and practiced, provides the only means 
to fairly and accurately represent the human experience in and through time. Addressing 
the specificities of the African experience (or indeed any local or regional experience) 
and integrating that experience into a global framework or narrative requires us to 
identify how human societies are interrelated beyond the illogic of centrisms, and the 
sociohistorical constructions of race, class and gender. Thus what is determined to be 
local or universal in the human experience is not projected outward from a central 
ideological site or conception of time or geography, but arises from multiple experiential 
and cognitive sites and traditions. 
The conceptual vacuum that exists (or non-exists) in the absence (or transparency) 
of sociohistorical constructions constitutes the groundless ground of reality that the center 
cannot hold. This is a rather Zen-like argument that what constitutes reality is, in reality, 
an unconditioned, groundless ground without boundaries, meaning or direction. But just 
as it is said that nature abhors a vacuum, human consciousness has set up shop in the void 
of reality and colonized it with the imaginary. The term “imaginary” as used here should 
not be taken to imply that what is imagined as reality does not have real consequences; on 
the contrary, race, a purely imagined concept of modernity, functions (or dysfunctions to 
be precise) as a definitive and constant force in determining global human relations. 
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Gender, and the inequities and violence it engenders, constitutes another virtual reality of 
modern society. The simulated nature of “modern” reality implied in this discussion (and 
by philosopher Slavoj Zizek’s notion of the “desert of the real” popularized in the 
Wachowski brothers’ film The Matrix), suggests that our passage across the horizon of 
human history unfolds from an imaginary past to an imaginary future (Zizek, 2002). 
Rather than deny the reality of the human journey through time and space, however, this 
statement refuses the totalized logic of that experience as articulated in linear and causal 
explanations of historical change and progress. How the human journey unfolds as 
history, and how it is described as History unfolding, is not the same thing.  
In the modern world system History serves to make the past intelligible, tangible, 
meaningful and manageable. It replaces the old mythic cycles of time and the 
mythological mysteries of human existence with a linear conceptualization of time as a 
progressive and teleological force that reveals the meaning of human history through its 
expression and fulfillment in the emergence and domination of the West. Time is both the 
currency and the commodity of this ideology. It is the argument for Western superiority 
and its proof. Yet for all the struggles of humanity to perfect, divide and structure 
systems of measurement and theories of change into calendars and historical periods no 
one currently knows what time it is. The fundamental question of historical orientation 
(what time is it?) is answerable only in reference to whose time it is. Whose time is it? 
The Christian calendar tells us it is the year 2007. But it is 6241 according to the first 
Egyptian calendar, 5765 in the Jewish calendar, 2549 in the Buddhist calendar, and 1425 
in the Muslim calendar (Duncan, 1998). Thus historical time functions as an ideological 
matrix, a system of belief and faith structured and organized to maintain and preserve the 
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cult in power and the power of the cult. Since the advent of the so-called modern world, 
the cult in power has been Eurocentric and its power has been white supremacy. 
Like the panoramas in anthropology books that purportedly illustrate human 
evolution from an ape-like ancestral specimen in Africa along an unbroken line to its 
apotheosis as a “white” man in Europe, the inexorable march of History is a trick of the 
mind’s eye, a mirage in the desert of the real, a solipsistic self-deception similar to the 
optical illusion of the sun rising and setting on the earth’s horizons. Human beings 
conduct their lives with this social illusion in the foreground and the material reality in 
the background. With the earth’s movement mistakenly perceived as the movement of the 
sun, we spend our days (and nights) in a state of functional incoherence convinced we are 
headed straight to the future while going around in circles. Functional incoherence also 
describes the state or condition in which modern History operates. As a totalizing 
scientific account of human events, History functions as a coherent statement of the 
incoherence of the human experience in time. It posits Europe as the nexus where History 
begins and ends (the horizons where the sun rises and sets), and thus makes time the 
servant of European ideology and socio-economic power. It convenes its narratives—
which do not conform to reality but to what reality is imagined to be—using pseudo-
scientific arguments steeped in the rhetoric of rationality and reason to simulate 
verisimilitude and universality. In this sense, History is a ruse instantiated and ratified in 
the imaginary of the West to establish and maintain the West’s epistemological 
dominance over the rest. As a hegemonic project of colonialism, its nature and function is 
to assimilate and integrate all local particularities and temporalities into the pseudo-
universality of the modern world system. By conceiving and convening the past in its 
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own image (the European imaginary) the past then becomes the representative means 
whereby the Euro-American polity controls the present and shapes the future. 
 
Periodizing and Theories of Change 
 
 Historical conventions or periodizations (paradigmatic stage conceptions of 
historical development) are products and producers of theory. They also serve as discrete 
systems of syntax and semantics that structure knowledge across vast distances and 
differences of human experience and existence. Terms such as Medieval, Dark Ages, and 
Renaissance have become so much a part of the common idiom of the dominant culture 
of Western Historiography that they hardly need defining or explanation. Thus, for 
example, it is not uncommon to see references to a medieval Japan or an African 
renaissance and assume such categorical descriptions are accurate and apposite. Applied 
universally to various stages of social change throughout the world irrespective of local 
differences, these epochal concepts are rooted in theories of historical change based on 
Europe’s own local stages of development. Unquestionably, theories of change have their 
expository and didactic purposes, but such theories should be organic. That is, they 
should arise out of local or regional conceptual ground rather than be transplanted or 
implanted by the violent episteme of Eurocentrism. As Cesairé has pointed out, however, 
and the Eurocentrists themselves proclaim, History is an invention of “white” men; 
therefore its theories of change reflect their experiences and orientation. William A. 
Green’s description of the theoretical orientations of “world historians” summarizes the 
parochial presuppositions that inform this process: 
In the main, modern writers of world history texts have adopted progressive, 
evolutionary, materialist theories of change. Their theoretical orientation 
corresponds to that of the leading progressive and evolutionary theorists of the 
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nineteenth century. Both have embraced human history from its origins to the 
present, trying to locate critical stages in humankind’s long transition from 
hunters and gatherers to modern world citizens. Both have assumed that there are 
common and universal qualities to human nature and that human nature inevitably 
generates social and cultural development. Both have considered change to be 
gradual and constant; both have identified the direction of change as evolving 
from homogeneous to heterogeneous, from simple to complex; both have believed 
that, on balance, change has occasioned betterment in the quality of human life 
(nineteenth century scholars were boldly confident of this; contemporary world 
scholars make this case more subtly, sometimes even apologetically). Both have 
asked the same kinds of questions: how do people become civilized (1995, pp. 
103-104). 
 
 Green is explicit and unapologetic in framing the work of contemporary world 
historians as an evolving discourse founded on the theoretical suppositions of their 
nineteenth century predecessors. Inferentially implicit in his statement is the fact that 
contemporary historiography is grounded in modes of thought established during the 
genocidal era of European colonial conquest. Nineteenth century Euro-American 
intellectuals assumed a progressive view that historical change “occasioned betterment in 
the quality of life” in part because they were the beneficiaries of the labor, productivity 
and genius of millions of non-Europeans whose enslavement and exploitation enabled 
Euro-America to expropriate and amass vast amounts of capital and wealth and 
significantly and simultaneously raise their standards of living and their expectations of 
life. From the perspective of the enslaved Yoruba woman shipped like cargo to the isle of 
Haiti in the eighteenth century to witness her compatriots decimated by the genocidal 
labor practices of French planters, the so-called Age of Enlightenment surely must have 
seemed like an Age of Darkness where decline, death and decay were the natural order 
and engines of historical change. But here, again, the critical question arises: what time is 
it? If all histories are mediated by European History, and historical thought functions 
almost exclusively as an agent of Eurocentrism, the local and regional histories of 
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Africans, Amerindians and Asians, their perspectives of change and periodicity, and their 
experiences before and after contact with Europeans exist only insofar as they are 
positioned within or oriented to the History of Euro-America. 
 The question— “how do people become civilized?”—cited above by Green as a 
common concern of historians past and present, demonstrates an inherent bias in the 
formulation of historical research and discourse. Implicit in this question is the notion 
that civilization is a desirable goal for human societies to attain and that it has been 
attained at some particular time or place. The idea that some people are civilized, hence 
modern, while others function at various lower stages of development or evolution 
coheres in the philosophy of Voltaire, Hume, Herder, Hegel and other founding fathers of 
modern historiography (Breisach, 1994). This hierarchical differentiation of societies and 
its historical explanation rests most often on pseudo-scientific theories of race and white 
supremacy that were codified and canonized in the wake of the era of European conquest 
and colonization. Theories of race and racism provided the ideological basis for 
classifying and ranking non-European societies as savage, barbarian or simply backward, 
and depicting them as temporally lagging behind Europe in invention and innovation, 
morality and intellect. Anthropologist Johannes Fabian refers to the Eurocentric notion 
that a temporal difference exists between Europe and the rest of the world as: “the denial 
of coevalness” (2002, 2006). Accordingly, Europe has progressed far beyond the rest of 
the world due to the unique genius and capabilities of Europe’s superior inhabitants. 
Euro-American culture, political economy, values and beliefs, therefore, comprise the 
future other societies evolve toward, with different regions, nations, or groups 
progressing at different rates according to their cultural/racial location or stage in the 
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sociohistorical continuum. Following this logic (or illogic), hunter-gatherers reside in the 
primeval and pre-historic past, the past before time was invented, and thus have not yet 
entered history. Arab societies (especially Islamic states like Saudi Arabia and Iran) exist 
at feudalistic or medievalist stages: terms denoting their comparative cognitive and 
material stagnation and backwardness, but implying that modernity is just around the 
corner. Modernity, of course, is western. Non-western societies become modern only by 
becoming westernized. Capitalism, industrialization and democracy constitute the 
engines that convey underdeveloped states from the historical stasis or retardation of their 
pasts forward to modernity and the future.   
The denial of coevalness demonstrates how Europeans, in colonizing the globe 
and filling in the blank spaces of terra incognito on their maps, colonized time and filled 
in the blank spaces of the past with the modern myths of History. Their colonizing 
mission also operated under the guise of a Christianizing mission and used the ancient 
myths of the Bible to subvert and supplant non-European belief systems and cosmologies 
in the name of advancing civilization and group and individual salvation. By these means 
colonialists sought to control the present (the now) and reinvent the future (the new) in 
their own images. Periodizations or stage theory in historiography, as paradigmatic 
projects that accompanied European expansion and colonialism, made the denial of 
coevalness theoretically possible. Stage theory, as promulgated by Condorcet, Hegel, 
Comte and others, marginalized Africa and Asia and provided the philosophical 
underpinnings for the temporal banishment of non-Europeans from the now and the new. 
Capitalism drove European global conquest, and conquest expanded the European 
capitalist system into a world economic model. Economic theories, in fact, dominate the 
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basic models of historical change that Western scholars have used to formulate stage 
theory or periodizations in the modern era. According to Green, division-of-labor models, 
neo-Malthusian demographic models, Marxism, and world systems models, “are 
compatible with tripartite periodization and with its sixth- and sixteenth-century epochal 
divide” (1995, p. 103). More than compatible, however, I would argue that materialist 
explanations of social change sustain stage theory in a feedback loop whereby the two 
reinforce each other in producing modern History and its underlying episteme.  
Economic theories in fact have surpassed ethnographic and anthropological 
analyses as the means to evaluate the central question raised above by William Green: 
“how do people become civilized?” It can be argued that the advent of modern era marks 
a break between the old deus ex machina explanations of social change and the 
emergence of new secular-materialist explanations. Part of this change in social analysis 
involves the conflation of capital with capitalism. Capital tends to mediate all forms of 
modern social production, but not all forms of production in the world can be described 
as capitalist, or, contrary to Marx and Engles, as linearly progressing through various 
stages of evolution to capitalism. In a sense it could be argued that the advent of 
postmodernism would entail a break with the materialist, and until that occurrence the 
world will remain completely in the acquisitive grasp of the modernist cultural 
imperative. But to posit this next step in social evolution suggests a moribund kind of 
thinking still trapped in the linear fallacies of periodizations or stage theory as 
explanations of social change.  
The tripartite division of history represents the broader conceptualization or 
guiding principle of periodization that has been used to transform the local particularity 
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of Europe into global History. The idea or concept of civilization constitutes the basic 
unit of observation that makes this system coherent. Civilization, defined from a 
European perspective and bias, thus becomes the abstract and arbitrary standard by which 
human societies are measured and evaluated. Green contends that, “all periodizations 
should be rooted in disciplined concepts of continuity and change,” and argues for 
methodological rigor in linking various local histories into a global framework or design 
(1995, p. 101). Green also describes the inherent difficulties in integrating regional 
histories in any practical way until after 1492: “A completely integrated world history is 
only possible after the hemispheres were in permanent contact” (1995, p. 101). The 
underlying assumption of this statement is that fragmentation is a problem before 
Columbus’ transatlantic voyage, and that after that decisive date an integrated history of 
the world is possible because the “rate and direction of change across diverse and distant 
cultures” can be studied and ascertained (Green, 1995, p. 101). What this means is that 
theories of change rooted in Europe’s own development can be imposed and 
superimposed as “an integrated history of the world,” once the local histories of the world 
have been fully integrated into the Euro-American hegemony and its elaborate cultural 
and human sacrificial cult of white supremacy. 
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The central question that confronts us in this inquiry into the cognitive 
developments of race and antiblack racism is: how and where did “black” people become 
black? Given the broad scientific consensus that there is no biological justification for the 
concept of race, this inquiry looks beyond the use of “black” as a term designating skin 
color or phenotype to its larger sociohistorical functions and implications. With the 
exception of a few people in Africa and India, human skin pigmentation that 
approximates the color black is uncommon. Similarly, “whiteness” too is more a pigment 
of the imagination than an accurate descriptor of human flesh tones. Given the lack of 
linguistic precision in the application of color terms to describe human individuals, and 
the subjectivity that comes into play in the descriptive process, it is essential we 
investigate what other factors contributed to the distinctions of social rank and status the 
notions of “blackness” and “whiteness” have come to denote and represent. 
The investigation of these factors leads inexorably to encounters with bizarre and 
foolish ideas about human diversity. From Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s invention of 
the Caucasian, to the popular notion of a “one drop rule,” to Thomas Jefferson’s founding 
of the American school of scientific racism in his Notes of Virginia with his mathematic 
formulas for calculating degrees of blackness, the postulates and paradigms of race, 
whatever their sources or contents, will not stand up to even the most cursory scientific 
examination and analysis. Further evidence of this can be adduced from the lack of 
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agreement among the founders and proponents of race theory as to the exact number of 
divisions of various races according to the principles and systems of taxonomic 
classification. Charles Darwin noted this fact in The Descent of Man: 
Man has been studied more carefully than any other animal, and yet there is the 
greatest possible diversity amongst capable judges whether he should be classed 
as a single species or race, or as two (Virey), as three (Jacquinot), as four (Kant), 
five (Blumenbach), six (Buffon), seven (Hunter), eight (Agassiz), eleven 
(Pickering), fifteen (Bory de St-Vincent), sixteen (Desmoulins), twenty-two 
(Morton), sixty (Crawfurd), or as sixty-three, according to Burke. This diversity 
of judgment does not prove that the races ought not to be ranked as species, but it 
shews that they graduate into each other, and that it is hardly possible to discover 
clear distinctive characters between them (1871, p. 174). 
 
Setting aside Darwin’s conflation of the ideas of race and speciation, and his 
mischaracterization of Buffon’s position on this subject, it is interesting to note that his 
conclusion about the lack of clear distinctions between races due to the manner in which 
they “graduate into each other” anticipates the contemporary use of the term “clines” by 
physical anthropologists and geneticists. That term is attributed to Frank Livingstone, 
who said—“There are no races, there are only clines.” Livingstone’s neologism is 
intended to describe the “gradations” in the distribution of individual human biological 
traits. The descriptive concept of clines, however, can only be understood by first 
dispensing with the notion of race (Livingstone & Dobzhansky, 1962, p. 279). If one is 
forced by the data to admit that individual biological traits “graduate into each other” 
then there also should be a willingness to recognize that in the socially constructed reality 
of the modern world the concepts of “blackness” and “whiteness” have much more to do 
with a person’s supposed sociohistorical categorization or status than their somatic 
characteristics or outward physical appearance. Nevertheless, despite the demonstrable 
fallacy of such propositions, ideas of racial classification continue to be accepted in Euro-
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America, where the notions of race and the racism it engenders have been regarded as 
verifiable facts or scientific truths that have remained constant and fixed throughout the 
entire course of human existence. According to such beliefs a person is “white” because 
his ancestors were “white” (and of European origin)—with the social status and privilege 
implied by that designation—just as his descendants should be “white” in the future. If 
this supposition were true we would expect to find in the documents and artifacts of 
antiquity evidence of these ideas as operative principles of social organization and social 
philosophy. Brace, 2005; Drake, 1987; Fredrickson, 2002; Hannaford, 1996; Snowden, 
1970, 1983; L. A. Thompson, 1989, and others have examined the history of racism and 
found it absent or lacking in antiquity. Even the recent massive study by Benjamin Isaac, 
The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity, still does not venture beyond the 
conclusion that only forms of so-called “proto-racism” existed in the Greco-Roman 
world, leading one to conclude that marketing, rather than scientific evidence, is 
responsible for the misleading title of his book (2004, p. 515). 
Recent studies like Noel Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White (1995), and 
Theodore Allen’s The Invention of the White Race (1994), delineate how the very ideas 
of whiteness and blackness developed out of a particular sociology of knowledge (or 
ignorance) derived from the sociohistorical interactions of specific human societies 
during the last few centuries. The popular beliefs or scholarly misconceptions that these 
socially constructed categories are grounded in biological or scientifically demonstrable 
facts of nature have given an aura of verisimilitude to the fiction of race as a valid 
classificatory scheme. The fact that Mother Nature has produced no biologic templates 
for race, and no predicates for white supremacy can be found in antiquity, has not 
 75
diminished the luster and attractiveness of racial theory, or the pathological desire to 
transmit the illusion onward across generations to preserve the status quo of white 
privilege in the form of the Racial Contract that Charles W. Mills has defined and 
described (1997). How then do we go about the task of navigating the labyrinthine 
psychohistory of an illusion? It is my contention that the false construct known as the 
negro comes first in the elaborate rituals of racialization that led to the ceremonial 
investiture of the white man as ruler of the known universe. Consequently, we must 
examine first the invention of the negro and the concomitant evolution of blackness.  
This thesis looks not only to the processes and procedures that led to the 
elaboration of the characteristics defined as negro or black, it also examines how these 
ideas were imposed on so-called black people, and how the people deemed black or who 
were thusly blackened responded to their racialization. While a number of scholars have 
tackled this problem, we will look briefly to the work of Frantz Fanon to ground this 
discussion and set us on a path to discover how blackness became a weapon in the arsenal 
of African American liberation discourses. In his landmark study A Dying Colonialism, 
Fanon offers a trenchant observation that illuminates the precise genealogy of modern 
“black” identity: “It is the white man who creates the Negro. But it is the Negro who 
creates Negritude” (1967, p. 47). Translated and updated for purposes of this essay, I 
would have Fanon say: It is the white man who creates the African. But it is the African 
who creates Afrocentrism. Fanon made this remark in the context of a discussion about 
the cultural resistance of the colonized to the colonizers’ interference with local 
traditions: specifically, French attempts to unveil Algerian women during the colonial 
period of occupation as a means of “destructuring Algerian society” (1967, p. 46). He 
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prefaced his statement about the invention of the “Negro” with this comment: “In an 
initial phase, it is the action, the plans of the occupier that determine the centers of 
resistance around which a people’s will to survive becomes organized” (Fanon, 1967, p. 
47). In the context of this discussion, it is analogous to say: the “action” of the enslaver in 
creating a commodity called negro from the human populations of the African continent 
determined the nature of “Negritude” (or Afrocentrism) as a center of resistance and 
survival.  
Although Fanon’s comment is grounded in an analysis of twentieth century 
colonialism it provides a useful lens for examining the complex issues and events 
surrounding the formation of black identity before, during, and after the cultural 
upheavals of transatlantic slave trade. Fanon’s generic “white man,” according to his 
analysis, created the dehumanizing conditions of racial slavery from which Diasporan 
African identities evolved. Hence the formation of modern black identity involves the 
confluence and transformation of two highly complex cultural templates: the negative 
European racial concepts of the ‘negro,’ and the positive ethnic attributes that constitute 
indigenous ‘African’ selfhood. To understand the nature of the composite and 
transcultural identity (the hyphenated Afro- Caribbean, Brazilian, Latin or American 
identity) that emerged out of this confrontation, and the antiblack racism that fostered it, 
we must first look at how the peoples of Africa became negroes in the Western mind, and 
negroes became slaves in the Western world. As historian William McKee Evans puts it: 
“For the purpose of understanding the rise of modern Western racial prejudices, it is 
important to consider the historical process whereby a people acquires or loses a slavish 
reputation, whereby slavery acquires or loses an ethnic identification” (1980, p. 17). 
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Evans’ comment returns us briefly to the constructionist nature of racial 
discourse. The idea of race as a sociohistorical construction has achieved wide 
acceptance in academic circles during the latter half of the last century. Yet no scholarly 
agreement currently exists concerning the etiology of this idea and its most virulent form 
of social expression: antiblack racism. Early modern racial theorists David Hume (1711-
1776) and Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831) posited an ancient pedigree for racism, 
citing their interpretations of the works of Plato and Aristotle for that purpose 
(Hannaford, 1996, pp. 216, 240). Herman Hoetink, Carl Degler and Winthrop Jordan are 
among recent scholars who have emphasized the role of skin color and somatic 
prejudices in the development of racist thought (Drake, 1987, pp. 43-62; Jordan, 1968, 
1974). Oliver Cromwell Cox (1948), Eric Williams (1994), and Walter Rodney (1974), 
using Marxist analysis, identified the transatlantic slave trade and the development of 
capitalism as the underlying forces of racial animus. These three general theories all fall 
conceptually short of the mark in identifying the precise origins of antiblack racism. The 
advocates of “ancient racism” looked backwards upon the ancient world through the lens 
of their own racist views and thereby confirmed the fallacies of their own 
presuppositions. Those who posit a universal antipathy to blackness and black people 
based upon a psychological fear and dread of the dark fail to consider the variability of 
skin color, the variability of responses to it in societies around the globe, and assume that 
what may be true in modern Western cultures is the norm for others. The Marxist critics, 
although correct in postulating a “modern” origin of racism, fail to consider how religious 
beliefs and modes of thought not founded or grounded in materialism or class struggle 
 78
could have inspired and informed essentialist and racialist views before the transatlantic 
slave trade and the development of capitalism.  
What other methods or theories then can be applied to this set of problems? 
Perhaps we can uncover significant cognitive traces of the origins of racism by tracing 
the origin and evolution of racial terms like negro. This method, however, requires 
attention to certain analytical problems. In moving backwards in time negro loses its 
significance and coherence as a foundation stone in the socially constructed edifice of 
modern racism. Jack Forbes in his groundbreaking study, Africans and Native Americans, 
raises an important point about the elasticity of the term: “We may think we know what 
the word ‘negro’ means today but do we know what it meant in 1800 in Virginia?” (1993, 
p. 3). Following Forbes’ lead we also might ask what it meant in late medieval Europe, in 
the mid-fifteenth century, when Portuguese raiders seized the first victims of the Atlantic 
slave trade from the coast of Upper Guinea for sale in Lisbon. Such an inquiry, however, 
no matter how problematic, may still help us determine why negro became a pejorative 
label for African people, how it became a synonym for slave, and where this confluence 
took place. 
Removing the pseudo-scientific connotations negro accrued during the invention 
of race in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leaves us with a generic term for 
“black” or “dark” that, when applied to human beings, referred indiscriminately to 
Europeans and non-Europeans alike based solely and arbitrarily on subjective perceptions 
of skin color. Its derivation from Latin (from niger or negri, meaning “black” or “dark”) 
reveals its deep roots in European culture centuries before its usage in medieval Spanish, 
Portuguese and Italian (Forbes, 1993; Snowden, 1970). Keeping Forbes’ warning in 
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mind, it is useful, nonetheless, to view medieval uses of negro as an integral part of the 
symbolism and allegory employed by European Christians in the construction of a 
Manichean distinction between themselves and ‘Others’ (specifically non-Christians they 
encountered or confronted). Manichaeanism (founded by Mani, c. 210-276 CE) describes 
an ancient Persian religious worldview that posits existence as an eternal struggle 
between the forces of Darkness and Light. It is borrowed here from Fanon’s analysis in 
The Wretched of the Earth (1965) of the implacable opposition between colonizers and 
colonized. From the Fanonian standpoint, and from the perspective of postcolonial 
analysis, Manichaeanism manifests and operates through the adoption of a binary 
ideological structure that polarizes the very being of the colonizer and colonized into 
explicit and irreconcilable allegorical categories of good and evil. JanMohammed 
popularized the use of this concept in postcolonial studies dealing with imperialism 
(1985). But it is applied here to the opposition between Christian and Muslim, and 
European and non-European. Christian is good, and non-Christian (Muslim, Jew, Pagan) 
is evil. Most important to this discussion, white is good and black is evil. Fanon describes 
this dichotomy in Black Skin, White Masks, as follows:  
In Europe, the Negro has one function: that of symbolizing the lower emotions, 
the baser inclinations, the dark side of the soul. In the collective unconscious of 
homo occidentalis, the Negro—or if one prefers, the color black—symbolizes 
evil, sin, wretchedness, death war, famine (1968, p. 40).  
  
Existentialism, Marxism and Freudian theory converge in Fanon’s Manichaean 
analysis of the black/white dichotomy. The problem with this formulation lies in its sense 
of absoluteness and universality. Although any English dictionary will confirm Fanon’s 
analysis of the negative meanings of the color “black” (and the same can be said of other 
European languages), its applicability to skin color is no more static than skin color itself, 
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and depends on the time, the place, and the circumstances. Forbes has documented the 
use of terms like nigri, preto, loro, rufo, olivestre in late medieval Italy and Iberia, citing 
their lack of specificity in describing skin color (1993, 66). He also provides examples of 
the use of negro by the Portuguese to describe Amerindians (Forbes, 1993, pp. 69-71). 
The issue of subjectivity cannot be overemphasized here. Different European encounters 
and interactions with non-Europeans—trade, warfare, conquest, and colonization—
influenced or determined the nature and perception of otherness. 
Sociologist St. Clair Drake has labeled Frantz Fanon, Roger Bastide, Carl Degler, 
Kenneth J. Gergen, Winthrop Jordan and others the “Modern Manichaeans” for their use 
of Manichaeanism as a “secularized metaphor” in their analysis of prejudice and 
antiblack racism (Drake, 1987, p. 63). Fanon limited his use of this metaphor to “homo 
occidentalis.” But others have used it to support their theory that prejudice against 
“black” as a color (and hence against “black” people) is grounded in a universal human 
fear and hatred of darkness. The proponents of this view contend that through a process 
of “unconscious association” negative ideas symbolized by the color black in the minds 
of white folk attached to ‘dark-skinned’ folk they encountered. In Drake’s opinion this 
argument amounts to nothing more than the theoretical essentializing of racial prejudice 
(Drake, 1987, pp. 67-75).  
While I accept Drake’s deconstruction of the Modern Manichaean theory and the 
falseness of its premise when it is applied to denote a universal antipathy to blackness, I 
contend the Manichaean metaphor can serve another analytical purpose. Its religious 
etiology and metaphysical dualism provide a useful frame of reference for identifying and 
describing the cognitive steps leading to the construction of race and antiblack racism, a 
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process it is argued here, in which the confrontation between Christianity and Islam, 
particularly in Iberia, constitutes a decisive stage. Anthropologist Roger Bastide’s 
description of the Christian variety of Manichaean dualism carries us a step further in that 
direction: 
The Christian symbolism of color is very rich … But the greatest two-part 
division is that of white and black. White is used to express the pure, while black 
expresses the diabolical. The conflict between Christ and Satan, the spiritual and 
the carnal, good and evil came finally to be expressed by the conflict between 
white and black, which underlines and synthesizes all others […] Whiteness 
brings to mind the light, ascension into the bright realm, the immaculateness of 
virgin snow, the white dove of the Holy Spirit, and the transparency of limpid air; 
blackness suggests the infernal streams of the bowels of the earth, the pits of hell, 
the devil’s color (1967, p. 314).  
 
Bastide captures the essence of the Manichaean metaphor in this passage; 
moreover, his claim that the conflict between white and black in Christian symbolism 
“underlines and synthesizes all others,” accurately describes the polemical use of 
symbolic “blackness” in Christian literature. Despite the widespread worship of Black 
Madonnas throughout Europe, other “black” presences in Christian iconography, and 
awareness in Europe of Christian communities in Africa from the religion’s historic 
beginnings, the negativity of “blackness” in Christian thought remains a salient feature of 
what New Testament scholar Gay L. Byron refers to as the “ethno-political rhetorics” of 
the early Christian writings (2002, pp. 1-2). The secular and universalized psychological 
notions of “blackness” and “whiteness” that inform the Modern Manichaean model, 
however, developed from the sociohistorical interactions of specific human societies, as 
stated above. Accordingly, since a “white” person is not “white” by nature, the very idea 
of “whiteness” must be born out of a particular sociology of knowledge (or ignorance). 
The proof of this theorem rests with the simple fact that Europeans had to come in 
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contact with other groups in other areas of the world to be able to perceive the phenotypic 
differences that thus enabled them to contrast their appearance with that of others. 
Moreover, they also would require some basic sense of the other ethnic attributes and 
characteristics (languages, customs, cultural institutions) of these various groups to make 
such differences comprehensible and meaningful. Bastide’s contention that the 
Manichaean symbolism ultimately acquired a somatic or racial significance and 
consequence is not in dispute. But the assumptions by Bastide, Degler, Gergen, et al. that 
the color symbolism of blackness and whiteness operated automatically throughout 
human existence as a secular metaphor for racial differences “when a white person finds 
himself in contact with a colored person” does not stand up to empirical analysis (Drake, 
1987, p. 62).   
How various peoples in the so-called ancient world defined and accounted for 
human diversity will receive some attention below. But here it is important to point out 
that the Modern Manichaeans—in their ambition to locate the metaphorical roots of the 
black/white dichotomy in the deep structures of human psychology—glossed over the 
religious ground from which these ideas emerged. They therefore missed an important 
opportunity to consider the role of the monotheistic religious dichotomy of believer/non-
believer in establishing a template for the conceptualization of essential ideological 
differences that later would become racial distinctions. This thesis identifies and 
examines the process whereby religious distinctions associated with the monotheisms of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam provided the critical frame of reference, terminology and 
social practice for the emergence of racial distinctions and racism. Returning the 
Manichaean metaphor to its original context re-establishes the religious pathways 
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whereby the black/white dichotomy enters medieval European thought and informs the 
psychosocial and economic processes and policies that fostered the establishment of 
racial slavery and colonialism that Fanon correctly describes. Centuries before European 
colonialism and before the natural philosophers of the Enlightenment era codified and 
canonized the pseudo-scientific tenets of modern racism, distinctions between Jews and 
Gentiles, Christians and pagans, Muslims and infidels provided a typology for racism and 
a theological justification for racial slavery.  
Although membership in a particular monotheistic faith often fostered a kind of 
group identity that transcended ethnic and linguistic boundaries—particularly as these 
faiths presented themselves as universalistic and sought to expand their power and reach 
through conversion—group identity or membership also was maintained and reinforced 
by mandating and perpetuating otherness through institutionalized intolerance and 
violence towards non-believers (Schwartz, 1997, p. 31). Thus ‘otherness,’ as defined by 
the believer/non-believer dichotomy, remained central to the group’s ability to define 
itself. Consequently, despite becoming genuine adherents to the faith, some converts still 
could not escape the taint of otherness that clung to them. This was especially true when 
those new converts were readily identifiable due to their outward physical appearance. 
Thus, as we shall see later, many dark-skinned Sudanese converts to Islam, despite their 
efforts to become exemplary Muslims, were not able to escape enslavement by Arab 
Muslims in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa. Being perceived as other, even 
within the brotherhood and sisterhood of a particular monotheistic faith, could and often 
did trump membership in the religious fraternity.  
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Somatic differences and prejudices, in this instance, also determined and 
amplified perceptions of otherness. Somatic prejudices alone, however, do not constitute 
racism. While such attitudes often lead to group stereotyping, as Lloyd Thompson 
documents in his detailed study of Romans and Blacks, the presence of “sensory aversion 
to nigritude” in Roman society, for example, did not prove to be an impassible barrier to 
social mobility despite the fact most Africans who lived in Rome were concentrated in 
the lowest and most menial of occupations (1989, p. 25). 
It is my contention, therefore, that the sociohistorical encounters of Africans with 
Europeans and Arabs within geographic and societal venues of conflict, conquest and 
enslavement, coupled with monotheistic religious antipathy toward nonbelievers 
(especially so-called pagans), and somatic prejudices against blackness, produced a 
cognitive template for the formulation of black and white identities, racial slavery, and 
the later emergence of antiblack racism. The othering of blackness thus proceeded first 
according to a monotheistic Manichaeanism that identified Africans as nonbelievers, and 
then progressed to incorporate other negative perceptions commonly associated with 
African phenotypic characteristics. Ignorance, fear, somatic prejudice, mistrust—all 
contributed in varying degrees to the construction of the Otherisms that formed and 
informed the construction of the negro. According to anthropologist C. Loring Brace: “Of 
all the various isms, this mistrust of the “other”—one could call it “otherism”—is 
arguably the most problematic. Otherism, elsewhere called “otherness,” in fact is the 
basis for racism” (author’s italics) (2005, p. 268). 
Perhaps at this juncture it is also useful to draw an important distinction between 
the concept of difference and that of otherness in the analysis of the evolution of racism 
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articulated in this thesis. My preference for the term “otherness” is that unlike 
“difference”—which in my opinion is best used to denote the natural phenotypic or 
somatic differences that constitute human diversity—“otherness” denotes something 
extremely different, so different that mere “difference” cannot accommodate the degree of 
distinction, hence it is “Other.” As “Other,” it is opposite the socially constructed and 
localized European norms. As “Other” it is the inversion of those norms, in its 
dehumanization, sexualization and stereotypic personification of evil. Hence it is “The 
Black One” (ho melas), a reference to the devil in Apostolic Christian discourse (Byron, 
2002, p. 60); or the “Black Stud” in medieval Spain, embodying all the signs and symbols 
of hypersexuality and fatal attractions (Piedra, 1993); or a “thing of darkness,” like 
Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest (Hall, 1995, p. 142). Otherness comprises all those 
negative “things” and more. In the chapters that follow I hope to demonstrate how 
“difference” (human diversity) began to be viewed through the lens of monotheist 
dichotomy of believer/non-believer to produce an “Otherness” so irredeemably different 
that it defined and labeled the majority of the world’s inhabitants as subhuman. 
Postcolonial theory has much to say about the construction of ‘Other’ as a means 
of defining ‘Self’ in the western cultural tradition. As is argued here, the roots of this 
metaphysical dualism are implicit in the monotheistic distinctions in Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam between believers and non-believers. The othering of ‘Africans’ 
follows this pattern before the racializing of ‘Africans’ occurred. Once labeled as pagans 
and infidels, this difference was extrapolated to form a constellation of “Other” 
characteristics (sexual, cultural, somatic) conceived as the polar opposites or inversions 
of monotheistic (Jewish, Christian or Muslim) norms. In constructing the negro as 
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inferior, ungodly and evil, Europeans and others constructed themselves as superior, 
godly, and good. Thus the stereotypic and Manicheanistic invention of the negro became 
the central means whereby white people invented themselves. Unarguably, in this 
“chicken or egg” process, the negro came first. 
The conceptual roots of the believer/non-believer monotheistic dichotomy are 
found in the sacred writings of Judaism: the religious nexus of Christian and Islamic 
doctrine and traditions. Judaism also figured significantly in the religious life and cultural 
wars of medieval Iberia. There, in the westernmost outpost of the European continent, 
three monotheistic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the Islamic and Christian 
trade in “black” slaves, converged and created the social contexts and sociology of 
knowledge that produced modern racial ideology and Eurocentrism. The term sociology 
of knowledge, as used here, refers to the social construction of reality from what generally 
is accepted as known and real within a given society irrespective of the truth or falseness 
of epistemology upon which it is founded (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The 
establishment of an existential view of “Self” and “Others” based on such knowledge is 
what concerns us in this thesis. The starting point for this discussion is Judaism and the 
role of its particular brand of monotheism in the formation of the “Other.” Two traditions 
in Jewish literature figure decisively in the invention of “black” identity in Europe. The 
first tradition involves what renowned Egyptologist Jan Assmann refers to as the “Mosaic 
distinction” (1996, 1997). The second tradition involves the biblical story of the sons of 
Noah and the curse of Ham. Both are found in the Hebrew Bible.
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Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman in their controversial study, The Bible 
Unearthed, describe the Hebrew Bible as “… a collection of legend, law, poetry, 
prophesy, philosophy, and history, written almost entirely in Hebrew (with a few 
passages in a variant Semitic dialect called Aramaic, which came to be the lingua franca 
of the Middle East after 600 BCE)” (2001, pp. 5-6). Recent biblical scholarship suggests 
at least four diverse source documents belonging to different epochs and known variously 
as J (Jahweh), E (Elohim), P (Priestly) and D (Deuteronomy) provided the materials from 
which the Hebrew Bible was composed. Some scholars contend their final reconstruction 
and compilation occurred during the fifth century BCE (Armstrong, 1993, p. 12). No 
biblical texts currently exist, however, that can be dated earlier than the third century 
BCE.  
Who wrote the Bible? William Schniedewind has tackled this popular question in 
his study of how the Bible was written. According to Schniedewind, the authorship of the 
Bible was not considered an important issue “until after the rise of Greek civilization in 
the fourth century B.C.E.—well after most of the books of the Bible had been written” 
(2004, p. 7). He cites “the fall of the Persian Empire to Alexander the Great” as ushering 
in an age of Hellenism in the Near East that spread Greek culture and language 
throughout the region and bringing with it the notion of authorship and its association 
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with the authority of a text (Schniedewind, 2004, p. 7). Schniedewind also notes that the 
Classical Hebrew language does not have a word for “author.” The closest term found in 
the language is sofer (scribe) (Schniedewind, 2004). The designation scribe more aptly 
describes the bureaucratic functions of the position and its role in passing on the 
traditions of ancient Israelite society, rather than that of the authorship of texts. With 
ancient Israel being a largely oral society, the stories and traditions that eventually made 
their way into written form were existent centuries before they were recorded for 
posterity. Thus scribes performed the principle tasks of collecting, recording and editing 
the common heritage of poetry, oral stories and traditions that were assembled and 
canonized over the course of many centuries (Schniedewind, 2004).  
As for the particular methods of writing employed and their instruction, 
Schniedewind discusses the existence and role of scribal schools in the Near East: 
“Scribes throughout the region learned the scribal arts in loosely connected pan-
Levantine scribal schools. The affinities between Ugaritic and biblical poetry—especially 
early biblical poetry—thus point to Canaanite tradition as the heritage of early Israelite 
scribes” (2004, p. 47). Mark Smith also sees the seminal influences of Ugaritic texts on 
the origins of Jewish monotheism and the composition of biblical texts. Smith, however, 
cautiously avoids the use of the term Canaanite as a geographical and cultural descriptor, 
citing problems in defining it (2001). Schniedewind and Smith both cite texts and other 
evidence showing clear relationships between the concepts of divinity found in the 
Ugaritic texts and those found in the Bible. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the 
cultural and literary origins of these traditions to even earlier sources in Africa and 
Mesopotamia. According to E.W. Heaton, the roots of this Ugaritic/Canaanite tradition 
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can be traced to the Egyptian scribal schools of the third millennium BCE: “To 
acknowledge the possibility that the scribes of Solomon’s court were indebted to 
Phoenicia for its literature no less than for its timber and technicians is not necessarily to 
abandon the hypothesis that they were primarily heirs to the classical tradition of Egypt” 
(1974, p. 163). Gray Greenberg also has explored the Ancient Egyptian roots of the Bible 
and concluded: 
The lack of attention to Egyptian influences on the Bible by both biblical scholars 
and Egyptologists is unfortunate. A conscious and deliberate effort exists to keep 
to the spheres separate, yet the Bible shows a long and continuous relationship 
between ancient Israel and Egypt. It places Israel’s formative years in Egypt, 
living an Egyptian lifestyle, educated in Egyptian ideals, and dwelling there for 
centuries before the Exodus…. Moses according to the biblical account, was 
raised and educated in the Egyptian royal court, and many members of his tribe, 
Levi, have Egyptian names (2000, p. x) 
 
Other scholars who have studied the literature of early Israel also see many 
influences in subject and style from the vast repository of sacred writings, wisdom 
literature, and popular tales that were created in Ancient Egypt and disseminated 
throughout North Africa and the Near East: Adamo (1986), Assmann (1996, 1997), 
Massey (1907a, 1907b), Thompson (1999), Zabkar (1954). And, as stated above, still 
others find the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia as an influential source of myths, 
legends and literature in the Near East: Applegate, (2000); Choksy, (2003); Graves & 
Patai (1983). 
The use of diverse source materials to compose the Bible, particularly the use of 
widely circulating myths, legends and tales from Africa and the Near East, raises critical 
questions about the fictional nature of biblical narratives. These questions go to the 
manner in which the biblical past is constructed in the various books of the Bible and 
how that past is interpreted and used in the eventual establishment of the monotheist 
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doctrines of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The view of biblical literature presented 
here is that it was conceived in the form of a fictionalized historical account of the 
Israelite past to convey a series of warnings and injunctions for the people of Israel to be 
pious and respect the moral authority of god’s law. Thus any attempts to read history into 
these accounts will be fraught with failure. Thomas L. Thompson analyzes the findings of 
modern archeology and compares those data to the purported ancient historical “facts” as 
presented in the Bible. He concludes that the Bible is constructed as a literary fiction of 
the past, rather than as a chronicle of a specific historical past: 
In writing about the historical developments of Palestine between 1250 and 568, 
all of the traditional answers given for the origins and development of ‘Israel’ 
have to be discarded. The patriarchs of Genesis were not historical. The assertion 
that ‘Israel’ was already a people before entering Palestine whether in these 
stories or in those of Joshua has no historical foundation. No massive military 
campaign of invading nomadic ‘Israelites’ ever conquered Palestine. There never 
was an ethnically distinct ‘Canaanite’ population whom ‘Israelites’ displaced. 
There was no ‘period of the Judges’ in history. No empire ever ruled a ‘united 
monarchy’ from Jerusalem. No ethnically coherent ‘Israelite’ nation ever existed 
at all. No political, ethnic or historical bond existed between the state that was 
called Israel or the ‘house of Omri’ and the town of Jerusalem and the state of 
Judah. In history, neither Jerusalem nor Judah ever shared an identity with Israel 
before the rule of Hasmoneans in the Hellenistic period. In short, the only 
historical Israel to speak of is the people of the small highland state which, having 
lost its political autonomy in the last quarter of the eighth century, has been 
consistently ignored by historians and Bible scholars alike (T. Thompson, 1999, 
p. 190). 
 
Perhaps nothing better underscores the fictional nature of biblical narrative than 
the attribution by tradition of the authorship of first five books of the Hebrew Bible 
known as the Torah (Law) or Pentateuch (“five books” in Greek)—to Moses, a legendary 
Jewish lawgiver and prophet of whom no historical traces have ever been found. Moses 
has been imagined as everything from a magician, to an Egyptian priest, to an Egyptian 
Pharaoh, to a Persian hero (Freud, 1967; Kilcher, 2004; Osman, 1990; Zlotnick-Sivan, 
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2004). Part of the controversy surrounding the identity of the legendary founder of 
biblical monotheism comes from his name: 
The only statement in the Old Testament itself concerning the origin of Moses' 
name comes at the end of the familiar story of Moses' birth presented in Exodus 
2:l-10. When the daughter of Pharoah [sic] opens the basket and finds the infant 
Moses, "She took pity on him and said, 'This is one of the Hebrews' children.' . . . 
and he became her son; and she named him Moses, for she said 'Because I drew 
him out of the water.' The etymology of Moses' name presented in the last line 
above seems to be suggesting that that name, which is pronounced "Mosheh" in 
Hebrew, is derived from the Hebrew root "masheh," which means "to draw out." 
Quite apart from the implausibility of an Egyptian princess who spoke Hebrew, 
many commentators (Daiches 1975:34; Gray 1971:38; Rylaarsdam and Park 
1952:861) have pointed out that while "Mosheh" might be stretched to imply the 
active label "one who draws out," it cannot be stretched to imply the passive label 
"one who is drawn out." For most modern Biblical scholars, of course, there is no 
great mystery about the meaning of "Moses"; it almost certainly corresponds to 
the suffix-variously spelled "moses," "mose," "mes," and so forth-appended to 
Egyptian names in order to denote "son of" or "descendant of." This suffix 
appears in the names of the Pharaohs: Ahmose, Thutmoses, Rameses, and so on. 
The Egyptian origin of Moses' name was, of course, a key bit of data adduced by 
Freud (1964 [1939]) in support of his hypothesis that Moses really was an 
Egyptian. In any event, most commentators suggest that the folk etymology in 
Exodus 2:l-10 is a fairly clumsy attempt to provide a Hebrew origin for an 
otherwise Egyptian name (Carroll, 1985, p. 775).  
 
Regardless of how Moses is viewed as a personage over the centuries, he is 
accredited with a signal achievement in the creation of the Bible and in the initiation of a 
spiritual revolution in the ancient world. Moses’ Torah embodies and articulates a 
religious ideology that marks a decisive break with all religious thought that preceded it. 
Egyptologist Jan Assmann has labeled this doctrine a “counterreligion.” He states: “We 
may call this a “counterreligion” because it not only constructed but rejected and 
repudiated everything that went before and everything outside itself as paganism” 
(Assmann, 1996, p. 49). Assmann applied George Spencer Brown’s “first Law of 
Construction,” a methodology of mathematics and logic, to formulate his analysis and 
explanation of the counterreligion’s social construction. According to Assmann, Brown’s 
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procedure operates as follows: “Draw a distinction. Call it the first distinction. Call the 
space in which it is drawn the space severed or cloven by the distinction” (Assmann, 
1997, p. 1). 
The monotheistic concept embodied in the Torah drew a distinction between the 
religion of the Israelites and all other existent religions. We will call this the “first 
distinction” or revelation of a “true” god. The cosmologic space of ancient religion is the 
space severed by the distinction drawn between believers in the “true” god (Jews) and 
non-believers (Pagans). The term “pagan” denotes not only anyone who is not a Jew, but 
also anyone who is not Christian or Muslim. It pejoratively connotes: a worshipper of 
“false” gods. This concept of “falseness” does not exist in paganism or so-called 
polytheism (referred to hereafter as cosmotheism). As Assmann points out, “the [pagan] 
gods were international because they were cosmic, and while different peoples 
worshipped different gods, nobody contested the reality of foreign gods and the 
legitimacy of foreign forms of worship” (1996, p. 49).  
The vital spheres of interactivity within which all humans exist—the sun, moon 
and stars, the natural world and the forces of nature—furnished cosmotheism with a 
semantic dimension from which developed a system of “translation” that negotiated 
religious distinctions through a mutually intelligible cosmic vocabulary and idiom. 
Assmann estimates the civilizations of ancient Africa and the Near East achieved 
“cosmotheistic compatibility” sometime during the second millennium BCE (1997, p. 
45). The Roman historian Plutarch, in his famous treatise on Isis and Osiris written 
during the first century CE, offers this lucid description of the philosophy and 
functionality of cosmotheistic translation: 
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Nor do we regard the gods as different among different peoples nor as barbarian 
and Greek and as southern and northern. But just as the sun, moon, heaven, earth 
and sea are common to all, though they are given various names by the varying 
peoples, so it is with the one reason (logos) which orders these things and the one 
providence which has charge of them, and the assistant powers which are 
assigned to everything: they are given different honours and modes of address 
among different peoples according to custom …(quoted in Assmann, 1997, p. 49). 
 
By introducing the true-false distinction in religion the counterreligion made 
intercultural estrangement normative. As Assmann puts it: “False gods cannot be 
translated” (1997, p. 50). Assmann labels this theological conception “the Mosaic 
distinction” because tradition ascribes the “revelation” of the counterreligion to Moses. 
As the legendary author of the Torah, Moses, more than Abraham, should be accredited 
as the founding father of Judaism. As lawgiver he reveals the Ten Commandments to 
god’s chosen people, the first of which—“Thou shalt have no other gods before me”—
instantiates the founding statement of the counterreligion (Exodus 20:3). This trope of 
divine revelation is central to Judaism and the spiritual and intellectual life of western 
civilization. Yet this intellectual and literary tradition is seldom considered within the 
African context in which it originated.  
Biblical traditions claim Moses was born in the Nile Valley and that the Israelite 
people sojourned there for over four centuries. Of greater significance is the fact that the 
“Mosaic distinction” came after a religious revolution led by Amenophis IV, the 
Egyptian king who called himself Akhenaten. This Eighteen Dynasty ruler—who was 
lost to history until Egyptologists rediscovered his capital city Amarna in the late 
nineteenth century—founded the first known counterreligion in the fourteenth century 
BCE (Assmann, 1997, pp. 23-29). Variously dubbed by Egyptologists “Atenism” or the 
“Amarna” religion, Akhenaten’s monotheism was a cosmotheistic monotheism that 
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identified the sun or solar disc, a cosmic symbol, as the theomorphic image of its one 
“god.” Using his power as head of the Egyptian state, Akhenaten inaugurated a 
fundamentalist crusade that banished all other forms of worship, excluded the practice of 
magical rites, and proselytized a religious dogma that was decidedly and defensively 
aniconic. Akhenaten’s inversion of traditional Egyptian religion led Egyptologist Donald 
Redford to label him the “Heretic King” (1984). Soon after Akhenaten’s death, however, 
his capital city Amarna was destroyed, his name was erased from historical records, and 
Atenism vanished from human memory. Lasting a mere sixteen years (circa 1350-1334 
BCE), the Amarna revolution was quickly swept away in the counter-reformation led by 
the cosmotheists in their return to power (Redford, 1984). However, the remnants of 
Akhenaten’s revolution survived in fragmented archeological remains and in cognitive 
sparks that may have influenced the ancestors of the Israelites, and through them, various 
traditions that informed Christianity and Islam (Zabkar, 1954).  
Scholars throughout the ages, from the Egyptian priest Manetho (third century 
BCE) to Sigmund Freud, have attempted to recover the Egyptian roots of the Mosaic 
distinction. Freud’s study, Moses and Monotheism (1967), is among the more notable 
efforts; in it he depicts Moses and his followers as Atenist refugees who fled the Nile 
Valley for the Land of Canaan. Freud’s work tapped into similar theories held by earlier 
European scholars John Spencer, William Warburton, Karl Reinhold and Friedrich 
Schiller (Assmann, 1997). In a more recent work, The Moses Mystery: The African 
Origins of the Jewish People, biblical scholar Gary Greenberg, using a method he 
devised to compare Egyptian King Lists with Old Testament genealogies, contends the 
Israelites originated during the reign of Akhenaten, and that the Torah is based almost 
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entirely on Egyptian history (1996). The Egyptian roots of the counterreligion 
notwithstanding, the concept is elaborated and transmitted through the sacralized texts of 
the Israelites, which depicted Egypt as the very icon of idolatry and iniquity while 
preserving and expanding the legacy of its failed monotheistic revolution through its own 
Jewish mythic traditions. 
Preceding the tale of Moses and the Jewish exodus, the Torah relates a prior and 
equally significant theological severing of the unity of the human family. This occurs in 
the form of a curse that divides one group of people from the rest of humankind by 
consigning them and their descendants to a permanent servile caste. We will refer to the 
curse and its consequences of “ethnic” slavery as the “Noachic distinction” because 
Jewish traditions attribute it to Noah, a legendary biblical patriarch. Noah’s curse on his 
son Ham authorized and justified the transgenerational enslavement of Canaan, the 
legendary ancestor of a number of notable Afro-Asian populations. Ham was the father of 
Canaan, and his alleged transgression is perhaps the most notorious example of the “sins 
of the father” being visited upon the son. Later interpretations of the curse furnished a 
definitive theological gloss in the construction of race and the racialization of slavery in 
medieval and modern eras. To understand the evolution of the Noachic distinction and its 
implications for generations of “African” people, we must now turn to the first book of 
the Torah: Genesis. 
According to the Hebrew Bible, after a mere nine generations including that of 
Adam and Eve, the god of Genesis destroyed his iniquitous creation, sparing only the 
lives of one pious family, that of Noah and his three sons, and selected male and female 
pairs of every living creature, all of whom were rescued and transported in a great ark. 
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Following this account of god’s genocidal wrath, Genesis 9:20-27 relates how Ham 
entered his father Noah’s tent and saw him naked, drunk and unconscious. When Ham 
told his brothers Shem and Japheth about their father’s condition, they hastened to cover 
him while averting their eyes. Noah then awoke from his stupor aware of what had 
transpired and inexplicably punished Ham by cursing his son and all his descendants: 
“Cursed be Canaan; a servant shall be unto his brethren ... blessed be the Lord God of 
Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in 
the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant” (Genesis 9:25-27). 
A common interpretation of this myth contends Noah reacted to Ham’s insult to 
his manhood by punishing Ham’s manhood through his progeny. The amorality of the 
curse—its disproportionate punishment for what seems like a minor infraction—has 
invited numerous other speculations and explanations. Robert Graves and Raphael Patai, 
in Hebrew Myths, typologically locate Ham’s conflict with Noah within the cycle of 
astronomical myths that recount a cosmic war for the throne of Heaven. The Greek myths 
concerning five brothers led by Cronus who conspire against their father Uranus, and the 
Hittite myths concerning the Supreme God Anu and his rebel son Kumarbi, are typical of 
these tales. Both stories involve castration. The divine sons castrate their father-gods to 
supplant them and seize control of their procreative functions (Graves & Patai, 1983). 
Seeing Noah as a mutilated and aggrieved divinity adds plausibility to both his authority 
to curse living and unborn generations and the curse’s severity. However, the biblical 
editors who converted Noah from a divine to a human father may have been compelled 
for ideological reasons to remove this literary motif. Patai and Graves cite Deuteronomy 
23:1—which forbids the membership of eunuchs in God’s congregation—as the reason 
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Noah’s castration was suppressed (1983, p. 124). Accordingly, Noah’s loss of manhood 
would have subverted his sacred patristic role in Jewish tradition.  
Several Midrashim (early rabbinic exegetical treatises on biblical texts) written 
between the second and sixth centuries CE theorize about castration and various other 
sexual offenses in attempts to explain Noah’s transgenerational curse on Ham’s progeny. 
The authors of these theoretical glosses speculate that Ham had sex with his wife in the 
ark despite Noah’s edict that all, including animals, abstain; that Ham committed acts of 
bestiality; or that he sodomized his father. These same biblical commentaries supposedly 
link Noah’s curse to Ham’s purported “blackness.” The following passage in the 
Sanhedrin 108b, a tractate of the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmud (circa 500—600 
CE), exemplifies this type of rhetoric in early Jewish writing: “The teachers say that three 
copulated with their females in the ark: the dog, the crow and Ham, and all were 
punished. The dog because it is stuck to its female when it copulates, the crow spits [and] 
copulates spitting, Ham because of this was cursed” (Goldenberg, 2003, pp. 291, n. 64). 
Blackburn offers a different translation of this tractate: “The dog was doomed to be tied, 
the raven expectorates (his seed into his mate’s mouth) and Ham was smitten in his skin” 
(1997a, pp. 88-89). Although the phrase “smitten in his skin” is rather vague, the Genesis 
Rabbah (compiled in Palestine circa 600 CE), and the Tanhuma Noah (circa fourth 
century CE) furnish more specific details of Ham’s punishment. Their authors assert that 
Ham’s alleged sexual depravities led to his being cursed with “ugly and dark-skinned” 
descendants or to his becoming “black-skinned” (Graves & Patai, 1983, p. 121). 
These rabbinic references to Ham or Canaan’s complexion have been the subject 
of much hermeneutic exercise and contention. Graves and Patai compiled and edited 
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several of these comments (including the two cited immediately above) into a single 
paragraph that is highly misleading in its construction and presentation. The controversial 
passage is as follows: 
Others say that Ham himself unmanned Noah who, awakening from his drunken 
sleep and understanding what had been done to him, cried: ‘Now I cannot beget 
the fourth son whose children I would have ordered to serve you and your 
brothers! Therefore it must be Canaan, your first-born, whom they enslave. And 
since you have disabled me from doing ugly things in the blackness of night, 
Canaan’s children shall be born ugly and black! Moreover, because you twisted 
your head around to see my nakedness, your grandchildren’s hair shall be twisted 
into kinks, and their eyes red; again, because your lips jested at my misfortune, 
theirs shall swell; and because you neglected my nakedness, they shall go naked, 
and their male member shall be shamefully elongated.’ Men of this race are called 
Negroes; their forefather Canaan commanded them to love theft and fornication, 
to be banded together in hatred of their masters and never to tell the truth (Graves 
& Patai, 1983, p. 121). 
 
Studies by Winthrop Jordan (1968) and Edith R. Sanders (1969), among others, 
have quoted and cited this emended text to varying degrees and with decidedly 
problematic results. However, the lack of clear attributions and dates for these various 
selected passages in Graves’ book does not alter the fact that taken independently they 
represent accurate quotes from well-documented sources. Benjamin Braude (1997), 
Werner Sollors (1997), and David Brion Davis (1984) stress that these few and scattered 
commentaries, whatever their intentions, should not be accorded a unique status or role in 
Jewish history and thought. While it is true that other commentaries on Genesis omit 
these particular glosses or convey different interpretations of Noah’s curse, the legacy of 
these Midrashim cannot be easily dismissed. In later Christian and Muslim thought they 
supplied a theological justification, no matter how spurious or misinterpreted, for the 
enslavement of people of African descent. 
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Most theories about Ham and Canaan, however, remained grounded in 
interpretations of biblical rather than extra-biblical texts. Graves and Patai point out that 
Ham—which they claim means “heat” in Hebrew—is “identified by a play on words in 
Psalms 105:23 and 106:22 with Kemi, ‘black,’ a name given to Egypt …” (1983, p. 122). 
Afrocentric scholar Charles Finch asserts Kam or Kemi: “is the strongest word in the 
Egyptian language for “black or blackness” (1988, p. 193). Hence the idea that Ham’s 
name contributed to his later racialization. However, David M. Goldenberg in his 
exhaustive study of the subject, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, refutes the contention that Ham originally meant “heat” or 
“black” or is related etymologically to the Egyptian word Kemi. Goldenberg states: “We 
don’t know when this assumption first occurred, but we begin to see the confusion with 
the word for “heat” in the first century and with the word for “dark, black” somewhere 
between the second and fourth centuries” (2003, p. 156). 
The Table of Nations in Genesis 10:6 lists Ham as the father of Cush (Ethiopia), 
Mizraim (Egypt), Put (Libya), and Canaan (Palestine). Thus Ham is identified 
typologically as the mythical progenitor of prominent groups in northeastern Africa and 
the Near East. Through these legendary genealogies and his later linguistic “blackening,” 
Ham eventually became the eponymous ancestor of all “blacks” in Africa or of “African” 
descent (see Sanders 1969 for another view of Hamites). 
The Israelites of the first millennium BCE were no strangers to domestic slavery 
and, as the Hebrew Bible attests, they even claimed to have been the slaves of their 
neighbors in Egypt. Common though slavery was in the ancient world, Noah’s curse 
drew a distinction between previous types of bondage and the form of Canaanite slavery 
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it authorized. Viewed in the context of George Spencer Brown’s “first Law of 
Construction,” the Noachic distinction severed the existing space (and forms) of slavery 
in the ancient world by introducing the concept of a divinely sanctioned, permanent and 
eternal servitude based on group-descent. In his comparative study, Slavery and Social 
Death, sociologist Orlando Patterson uses the concepts of “intrusive” and “extrusive” 
slavery to categorize two modes of social death: the condition or status of “nonbeing” 
that constitutes the social identity of a slave (1982). Patterson views Hebrew slavery as a 
“highly intrusive” form of bondage that regarded the slave as the “domestic enemy” or 
“quintessential enemy within” (1982, p. 40). Patterson’s intrusive mode, however, does 
not adequately account for the role of the counterreligion in determining the nature of 
Canaanite slavery as authorized and rationalized in the Hebrew Bible. The Mosaic 
distinction suggests a third modality of slavery that differs significantly in its 
consequences from Patterson’s existential idea of social death. For lack of a better term 
we will refer to this as the execrative mode because it introduced through Noah’s curse 
the notion of slavery as eternal damnation and enslavement as a kind of spiritual death. 
Thus, from the viewpoint of the counterreligion and its true/false dichotomy, Canaanite 
slaves were not merely affronts to the living god or “intruder[s] in the sacred space,” as 
Patterson’s intrusive criteria demands, they existed and forever remained outside the 
Israelite god and the “sacred space” of Israelite religion. It is important to note, however, 
that not all forms of Israelite slavery fit the Mosaic distinction. Jews enslaved their fellow 
Jews in accordance with traditions that sanctioned debt-slavery and other types of 
bondage. Patterson’s categorization best fits these forms of Hebrew slavery. The point of 
the foregoing argument is to distinguish the social consequences of the Noachic 
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distinction from those of other forms of slavery, and demonstrate that its rationale lies 
least in perceptions of ethnic or racial differences and foremost in the Mosaic distinction 
between believers and non-believers. Again, the underlying premise of this search for the 
formative roots of racial ideology is that essentialized religious distinctions came first and 
provided the template for later racialized distinctions. Other biblical sources also support 
this contention. 
Canaan clearly is the target of Noah’s opprobrium, a fact that leads most scholars 
to interpret Noah’s curse as a justification for the Israelite practice of enslaving 
Canaanites. Setting aside the psychological analysis suggested by the inferences of incest 
and sodomy that haunt the story, I contend its sexual symbolism functions principally to 
distinguish the religious beliefs and practices of the “counterreligionists” from other 
Canaanite populations. Leviticus, in the Hebrew Bible, which recounts legendary events 
after the Israelites’ mythical exodus from Egypt, reveals sexuality to be a flashpoint of 
divine wrath. In this third book of the Torah, god instructs Moses: “After the doings of 
the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do: and after the land of Canaan, 
whither I bring you, shall ye not do: neither shall ye walk in their ordinances” (Leviticus 
18:3). An impressive list of supposed Canaanite sexual offenses follows, along with stern 
admonitions to obey god’s commandments. Unlike the attitude displayed toward Adam 
and Eve in Eden, the post-exodus Israelite god seems singularly and inexplicably 
obsessed with nakedness and threatens to punish his followers, body and soul, for any 
infractions. The litany of sexual taboos in Leviticus suggests the orgiastic features of 
Canaanite rites and festivals were severely suppressed among the followers of Moses. 
These rituals and their use of “graven images” furnished moral and religious pretexts for 
 102 
the enslavement of Canaanite cosmotheists. Accordingly, Moses’ god sanctioned their 
bondage and oppression with his blessing: “Both thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids, 
which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you: of them shall ye 
buy bondmen and bondmaids” (Leviticus 25:44). In Leviticus 25:46, Moses’ god grants 
his Israelite followers the right to enslave heathens “for ever.” This restatement of the 
earlier Noachic distinction—which substitutes “heathen” for Canaan—emanates directly 
from the mouth of the monotheistic deity. Being a heathen or non-believer, therefore, 
meant the possibility of lifelong inclusion in an oppressed class in ancient Palestine. Thus 
the notion or condition of “heathen” established the precedent for slavery based on 
group-identity or group-descent, and hence was the forerunner of negro slavery. 
Nowhere does the Torah or Old Testament explicitly characterize Canaanite 
identity or behavior on the basis of race. Sexuality, nudity, polytheism justified the 
vilification and oppression of Canaanites, not race. Historian William McKee Evans 
argues Noah’s curse was a “family” curse: “… the enslavers and the enslaved were 
descended from brothers” (1980, p. 17). While Palestinian archeological findings may 
support McKee’s contention that the oppressed were ethnically related to their 
oppressors, mythic and religious interpretations of these familial relationships present a 
much different picture. The Israelites in Canaan constructed their national identity 
through their religious cult and used mythical genealogical schemas to locate and define 
themselves within existing worldwide networks of cultural and historical relationships. 
The “universal” god conceived by the Israelites created and governed the world and all its 
populations, thus the mapping and indexing of the known world and its diverse peoples in 
the Torah proceeded according to biblical tropology and ideology. From this perspective, 
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the “brotherhood” of the sons of Noah (Shem, Ham and Japheth) should be seen as a 
mythic rather than a genetic fraternity. This is because Old Testament genealogies do not 
refer exclusively to Jewish lines of consanguinity; they also delineate the divergence of 
various non-Jewish populations from a Jewish line of descent. This pattern begins with 
Adam the first male ancestor of all human beings. Adam, the father of the Israelites 
through his son Seth, is also the father of sons who represent non-Jewish populations. A 
convention other than strict patrilineal descent operates in the Torah to allow Jewish 
fathers to sire non-Jewish offspring. The theological premise that informs this 
genealogical method requires the Israelites to document their historical presence since the 
creation of human beings, and account for their historical difference from non-Jews over 
the same course of time. Divergence of non-Jews from the Jewish ancestral line makes 
this possible. In addition to this pattern of divergence, Old Testament genealogies also 
reflect a self-conscious pattern of inversion: Karin Andriolo in her insightful paper, A 
Structural Analysis of Genealogy and Worldview in the Old Testament, explains this 
process as follows: 
By virtue of the covenant, Israel views itself as a unique and special people. Its 
claim to be God’s contract partner, the sole representative of its laws, necessitates 
modification of the descent system—hence, the process of inversion. Within the 
general branching from the first ancestor which established the world’s 
population, Israel’s special role has to be marked by contrast. While branching 
continues, Israel remains a trimmed lineage. Just as there is only one people 
selected to represent God’s law, there can only be one son to represent the Jewish 
lineage in each generation (1973, pp. 1664-1665). 
 
The Jewish god’s destruction of humanity through the great flood of the Genesis 
myth casts Noah in the patristic role of Adam. Accordingly, all human beings are 
descended from Noah. But not all human beings are Jewish. Shem, Noah’s eldest son, 
continues the line of Jewish descent through his son Arpachshad (Genesis 4:25-26; 
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Genesis 5:3-32). But Noah’s sons Ham and Japheth diverge from the Jewish descent line. 
The sons of Ham are Cush, Mizraim and Phut, who are associated with the inhabitants of 
North Africa and the Southeastern Mediterranean. The sons of Japheth cover the 
Northern Mediterranean and are viewed biblically as ancestors of the Anatolians, 
Cyprians, Etruscans and Scythians. Geographic, historic, linguistic, political and ethnic 
considerations contributed to the configuration of this mythic map and its method for 
determining degrees of Jewish and non-Jewish kinship. But the concept itself is centered 
in the covenantal paradigm of Jewish religion. The genealogical distinction is conceived 
first and foremost as a religious distinction. The contract with god signifies the contrast 
between Jews and non-Jews. Thus Noah can curse Ham and his descendants through 
Canaan without cursing his own genetic (spiritual) progeny, and Shem and Japheth can 
conquer and enslave Canaanites without the taint of (spiritual) fratricide.  
The trimming of Jewish descent to a single lineal line posed the problem of how a 
lineage becomes a nation. Genealogical segmentation solved the problem of tribal 
filiation and affiliation by structuring Jewish lineal descent through the twelve sons of 
Jacob. Jacob receives the name Israel from god (Genesis 32:28) and his children become 
the “children of Israel.” The one becomes many and yet remains one. In a single 
generation, through one male of the Jewish line, the twelve tribes of Israel are born and a 
family becomes a heterogeneous nation. Andriolo summarizes how the processes of 
divergence, inversion, and segmentation supported the monotheistic Israelite worldview 
as follows: 
In ideologizing reality, descent and worldview are synchronized. Divergence 
projects a panorama of the world which is created and presided over by a 
universal God and which is populated by various peoples whose history, location 
and ethnicity weave them into a network of relations. Invergence confirms the 
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identity of Israel as a representative of God’s laws, chosen by him from among 
the peoples of the world. Segmentation explains how the homogeneous 
representatives of God’s laws grew into the heterogeneous people (1973, p. 1666). 
 
Andriolo’s comment helps to illustrate how the counterreligion structurally 
reinforces the exclusiveness of its religious ideology with the inclusiveness that 
membership in its polity of belief confers. Thus the god of ancient Israel can be the god 
of the universe and all mankind (inclusive), without the acknowledgement, consent and 
participation of any but the chosen (exclusive). To be chosen requires choosing the one 
god and denying all others. Israel’s covenant with god through Moses serves as the 
synthesis and manifestation of this union. The rite of circumcision, perhaps borrowed 
from Egypt, signs the contract between god and his people. The spiritual and 
genealogical compact begins with Adam. With the destruction/recreation of the Genesis 
flood, the genealogical process continues through the sons of Noah. But the Noachic 
distinction marks a significant disjuncture in the pattern of lineal divergence. Noah’s 
curse does not just call attention to the lineal divergence of Ham and his descendants 
through Canaan it also introduces a severe punishment that indelibly and permanently 
distinguishes this lineage from all others. The mythic execration of Ham, and the fictive 
map of nations derived from this episode, in time, proved disastrous for people of 
“African” descent.  
The Hebrew Bible embodies literary concepts, idioms and sagas from a literary 
world that stretches from Africa to India, and from the third millennium BCE to the end 
of the first century CE (T. Thompson, 1999, p. 284). The biblical view of the human past, 
therefore, is a spiritual, fictive and allegorical view that has little or nothing to do with 
actual human events. Hence the terms “biblical history” and “biblical archeology” grossly 
 106 
distort and misrepresent “biblical” scholarship. Accordingly, any attempts to explain the 
curse of Canaan in terms of “biblical history” must also be rejected. The approach to 
Noah’s curse presented here illustrates how it operated as a belief system or ideology in 
Israel’s quest to nationalize itself and its people through its literature and folklore. To see 
it otherwise is to accept the national myth—including the stories of the Ark, the burning 
bush, and the fallen walls of Jericho—as an authentic and verifiable account of the birth 
of a nation. 
This search for the ideological roots of “black” identity, antiblack racism, and 
racialized slavery locates the Mosaic and Noachic distinctions within the contexts of their 
mythic origins rather than posits for them a precise epistemology and historical pedigree. 
To do otherwise would reproduce the same errors of analysis and attribution that have 
been the focus of much criticism in this thesis. Given the xenophobic myths and 
phenotypic fictions embodied in the social construction of race, it should come as no 
surprise that key ideological cornerstones in its foundation were fabricated from ancient 
traditions that more often than not have been misinterpreted and misappropriated. Despite 
such dubious origins, however, the Mosaic and Noachic distinctions proved to be 
profoundly effective in their social transformations of the ancient world. What was more 
or less a localized phenomenon suddenly internationalized and dramatically intensified 
when these ideologies shaped and influenced Christian and Islamic thought in the first 
millennium CE. It is during this remarkable period that the counterreligion proliferated, 
achieved imperial power and effectively relegated pagan religions to the fringes of the 
emerging world system. 
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Through Egyptologist Jan Assmann’s theory of the cultural construction of 
difference we considered how the true/false dichotomy introduced by the counterreligion 
furnished a basis for the development of a prototypic racism: a racism of faith, a racism 
without race. Labeled the Mosaic distinction by Assmann, the distinction between true 
and false severed the existing religious space of cosmotheism, divided humans on the 
basis of believers and nonbelievers, and opened the door to successive and excessive 
theological bifurcations. Assmann sates: “Once the distinction is drawn, there is no end 
of reentries or subdistinctions. We start with Christians and pagans and end up with 
Catholics and Protestants, Calvinist and Lutherans, Socinians and Latitudinarians, and a 
thousand more similar denominations and subdenominations” (1997, p. 1). In this 
analysis of the social construction of race we start with Judaism and will continue with 
Christianity and al-Islam: two major monotheistic “reentries or subdistinctions” that 






Christianity, like Judaism, is grounded in the monotheistic tradition of the Hebrew 
Bible and the cosmotheistic traditions of Africa and the Mediterranean world. Although it 
posits for itself a new beginning with a New Testament, its revelation depends on 
spiritual beliefs and practices that came before it. Hence it is possible to speak of a 
Christianity Before Christ, as Afrocentric historian John G. Jackson does in his book of 
that name (1985). Jackson does not address the Judaic roots of Christianity, but 
concentrates instead on the pagan cults of various crucified saviors (Osiris, Bel, 
Prometheus, Krishna) whose mythology precedes the development of Christian belief. 
With this literary and iconographic evidence Jackson shows how the Christ-figure fits 
within a pre-Christian cosmotheistic typology and tropology. British Afrocentrist and 
autodidact Gerald Massey (1829-1907), in Ancient Egypt the Light of the World, lists 271 
tenets of Egyptian religion he argues were Christianized in the gospels of the New 
Testament. Massey’s complex analysis of Christianity’s pagan roots distinguishes the 
mystical Christ from the historic Jesus of Nazareth and delineates the separate paths of 
the two traditions and their convergences (1907a, pp. 907-914). Afrocentric scholar 
Charles Finch, following Massey, also posits the birth of Christianity within a 
predominantly Egyptian context. In Echoes of the Old Darkland: Themes from the 
African Eden, Finch concludes that the cult and funerary rituals of the Egyptian god 
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Osiris furnished Christianity with the conceptual framework and iconography upon which 
much of its savior-god’s identity and appeal was established (1992, pp. 179-216).  
Historian David Fideler, in Jesus Christ Sun of God, links Christianity to the 
teachings of the legendary Greek hero Orpheus (1993). Orpheus’ followers, the Orphics, 
believed the Greek god Dionysus—who was slain, dismembered and resurrected from the 
dead—rose to heaven. According to Fideler, this popular pagan belief facilitated Greek 
conversion to Christian doctrine: “The personal identification with a slain and resurrected 
savior divinity was out of place in the Jewish world; amongst the Greeks it was 
commonplace and readily acceptable” (1993, pp. 173-174).  
Jackson, Massey, Finch and Fideler’s comparative studies of myth and religion 
demonstrate how Christianity developed in part through the continuing engagement of 
Jewish religious thought with so-called pagan beliefs commonly held in the ancient world 
in the first century CE. While the Christian tradition readily acknowledges its Judaic 
roots, it does not accept or admit any connection to paganism. Christian doctrine posits 
the embodiment and personification of its savior-god “Christ” in Jesus of Nazareth, a 
legendary Palestinian Jew whose divine birth revealed a new religion and inaugurated a 
new era and covenant with the god of the Hebrew Bible. Yet the core components of this 
doctrinal statement, which purportedly is based on ‘historical’ rather than “mythical” 
events, reflect and recapitulate the common pagan heritage of the ancient world. Virgin 
birth in a stable or cave on or near the winter solstice (Christmas), crucifixion and 
resurrection, and commemoration by Eucharistic rites—elements commonly attributed to 
the cult of Jesus Christ—also characterized the earlier cults of the cosmotheistic savior-
gods cited above by Jackson (1985, pp. 39-41). These two traditions—the prehistoric and 
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pagan “Christ” before Christianity and the pseudo-historic Jesus of Nazareth—merge 
almost seamlessly into the singular sacred tradition that constitutes the Christian faith and 
its apostolic creed. This conflation of pagan myth and Christian history takes place in the 
New Testament. Like Judaism, Christianity defines, authorizes and transmits its system 
of beliefs and practices through a body of sacred texts. 
Ironically, the “sacred texts” of the New Testament depict Jesus not as the 
founder of a new religion but as an orthodox (literally, “straight thinking”) Jew. Given his 
identification with the Jewish Messiah, Jesus could be seen as the leader of a sectarian 
movement within Judaism rather than a cult movement outside it. Sectarian movements 
occur in times of chaos or distress to renew or uplift existing spiritual beliefs and 
traditions. A sect (internal schism) becomes a cult (distinct religion) when its 
membership breaks completely with the principal articles of faith that distinguish the 
founding religion’s ideology or creed. In the first century CE, Judaism was rife with 
competing and mutually hostile sects (Essenian, Pharisaic and Sadduccean). Despite 
different interpretations of Mosaic laws and customs, these sects remained essentially 
“Jewish” by adhering to the strict monotheism of Jewish tradition (Armstrong, 1993; 
Wilson, 1992). The followers of Jesus’ Jewish sect, however, eventually created the 
Christian cult through the introduction and adoption of two important theological 
distinctions: belief in the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Ghost); and 
the related notion that Jesus was the Son of God or god made flesh. These distinctions 
severed the strict monotheistic space of Judaism and marked the separation of the 
Christian church from the Jewish synagogue.  
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Whether Jesus’ Jewish sect became a Christian cult during his life or in the 
decades following his death remains the subject of much debate. Jesus, however, never 
wrote a word of the gospels, and those who did relied on oral traditions that were decades 
old before they were compiled and written down. The literary conception and 
construction of Christianity therefore rests with those who never knew Jesus in the flesh 
(Wilson, 1992, p. 31). Many scholars, including Gerald Massey, Karen Armstrong and A. 
N. Wilson, believe the Christian writer Paul, a Hellenized Jew, “invented” Christianity. 
Paul’s fingerprints can be seen all over the liturgical and canonical construction of the 
Christian Church. A. N. Wilson asserts: “The gospels of Mark and Luke, and to a lesser 
extent that of Matthew, are written under the heavy influence of Paul’s ideas” (1992, p. 
7). A diasporan Jew, Paul was a native of Tarsus, a cosmopolitan and Hellenized city in 
Cilicia, Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey). After his conversion to Christianity, Paul 
carried his version of the Christian message or “good news” to the port cities of Asia 
Minor, to Greece, and eventually to Rome. The Jews in his audiences, most of whom 
were diasporan like him, would have identified Paul’s Jesus with the Jewish Messiah. 
Whereas, the Greeks in his audiences, who were far greater in number, would have seen 
Paul’s Jesus as a demigod or divine incarnation, in accordance with their cosmotheistic 
ideas and beliefs.  
In his evangelical drive to universalize the Jewish sect and attract non-Jewish 
converts, Paul discarded the Judaic practice of circumcision and Jewish dietary 
restrictions. This action alienated many of Jesus’ Jewish followers. But Paul’s belief in 
the “Gospel of Christ,” a phrase he often repeated, authorized a new covenant with god, 
one that could be signed and ratified through baptism and Eucharistic rites (Wilson, 1992, 
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p. 18). Thus it can be argued that Paul, with his Jewish origins and wide-ranging 
knowledge of Greek literature and culture, served as a link between Judaic and Hellenic 
worldviews, and that he ultimately fused those worldviews in the enduring icon of Jesus 
Christ—whose very name represents the merger of Jewish (Yeshu) and Greek (Christos) 
cultures. The singular trope, Judeo-Christian, signifies the union of these essentially non-
Western ideologies that profoundly influenced the construction of modern Western 
identity and the identities of those under Western domination. 
Christianity posits its tradition as a continuation of the counterreligion introduced 
by the Mosaic distinction and its true/false dichotomy. Hence the authors of the New 
Testament, of whom Paul was the most prolific, constructed their gospels according to 
the literary traditions and conventions of the Hebrew Bible, and conceived their texts as 
the next chapters in the “history” of the “true” god and “his” covenant with “his” chosen 
people. Although the Gospel of Mark (70 CE) is believed to be the earliest written 
account of the life of Jesus, the New Testament begins with the Gospel of Matthew (90 
CE) (Armstrong, 1993, p. 80). Matthew opens with a traditional Jewish genealogical line 
of descent that connects Jesus’ ancestry to the patristic lineage of Abraham (Matthew 1:1-
17). This genealogical motif bridges the gap of five centuries or more that exists between 
the authoring of Hebrew Bible and the New Testament; it also delineates Jesus’ Jewish 
ancestry from Abraham to David and from David to Joseph. By this means Jesus, the Son 
of God, is given a royal lineage through his human “father” Joseph in accordance with 
the Jewish messianic tradition. With this mythic preamble, Christianity presents itself as 
the fulfillment of biblical prophesy and Jewish eschatology despite the fact that Matthew 
immediately violates Judaism’s strict monotheism by introducing the idea of Jesus’ 
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divine conception and birth (Matthew 1:18-25). The Gospel of Mark lacks this 
genealogical trope. Moreover, as Karen Armstrong points out in A History of God, 
“[Mark] presents Jesus as a perfectly normal man with a family that included brothers 
and sisters. No angels announce his birth or sang over his crib. He had not been marked 
out during his infancy or adolescence as remarkable in any way” (1993, p. 80).  
For Paul and his followers, the gospel of Jesus constituted a new revelation of the 
Mosaic distinction—the only “true” religion. This new revelation necessitated acceptance 
of Jesus as the Messiah not in the Jewish sense of a god anointed savior of the Jews, but 
in the new Christian sense of the spirit of god made flesh whose “historical” death and 
resurrection constituted a spiritually redemptive act for all humanity. Paul’s Epistle to the 
Romans, which A.N. Wilson regards as one of the most influential books ever written 
(1992, p. 28), expresses the inclusiveness of his Christian mission in its opening 
passages: 
I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians; both to the wise, and the 
unwise. So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at 
Rome also. For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of 
God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the 
Greek (Romans 1:14-16). 
 
Paul’s division of the world between “civilized” Greek-speakers and inarticulate 
non-Greeks in the first line of this quote reflects a Hellenic view of the ancient world. But 
the phrasing of the last verse, “to the Jew first, and also to the Greek,” maintains the 
priority and centrality of the Jewish revelation in Christian dogma. Paul’s message 
reflects the tension and frisson between the historical significance of Judaism and the 
Jews as the chosen people, and his effort to recruit the vastly larger numbers of non-Jews 
to the Christian faith. As a Jew, Paul saw himself as part of a tribe or nation bound by a 
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common law and genealogy. As a Christian, Paul placed salvation above all cultural 
practices and customs. This message of salvation and eternal life shifted attention from 
the vicissitudes of this world to the promise of everlasting peace in the next. It often has 
been claimed that this promise of a reward in heaven for the faithful followers of Jesus 
influenced many slaves in the ancient world to convert to Christianity (Patterson, 1982, p. 
70). But salvation, like baptism, meant redemption from sin not slavery. For Christian 
slaves this generally meant freedom in the next life rather than manumission in the 
present one. When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the 
fourth century CE, it continued the existing Roman slave regime without disruption. 
Brent D. Shaw, in a critical introduction to Moses Finley’s book Ancient Slavery and 
Modern Ideology, describes “the centrality of slavery to the Christian world order in the 
Roman Empire” as follows: 
It is not just the fact of whatever accommodation was reached between 
Christianity and slavery (to speak merely of ‘accommodation,’ however, would 
surely misjudge the actual relationship), but rather the plain fact that the core 
message of Pauline and post-Pauline Christianity was calqued on the model of the 
slave-holding family. The centrality of slavery—with its paradigm of the slave-
holding ‘lord’ at the head of his patriarchal family, and the concomitant image of 
the ‘savage discipline’ of the whip—was a critically important template in the 
development of Christian ideology, especially, it seems, in the last quarter of the 
fourth century. It was an age of the most intense creation of ideas that were to 
have a profound impact on the West, not the least on the prevalent theodicy 
whose origins and development were to be found in the models provided by 
chattel servitude (Shaw, 1998, p. 51). 
 
Shaw sees slavery as a central metaphor of Christian theology. Patterson, citing J. 
G. Davies, argues three key words in Paul’s theology—redemption, justification, 
reconciliation—also reveal “the extraordinary role of the slave experience as a 
metaphoric source” (Patterson, 1982, p. 70). Patterson contends redemption means 
emancipation from sin; justification symbolizes the slave’s manumission and his 
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restoration from social death, while reconciliation restores the former slave’s membership 
in the community (1982, p. 70). These three ideas evolve directly from the Christian 
belief in salvation from sin—the “master concept” that unifies Christian theology 
(Patterson, 1982, p. 70). Jesus’ human sacrifice through crucifixion saves (liberates) his 
followers from the wages of sin, which is spiritual death. But emancipation from sin 
means divine enslavement and submission to god through his son Jesus. Divine 
enslavement—accepting Jesus as Lord and Master—emancipates the sinner from death 
and rewards him with life everlasting. Patterson concludes his analysis of the slavery 
metaphor in Christianity with this observation:  
Whatever other factors explain Christianity’s conquest of the Roman world, there 
seems little doubt that the extraordinary way in which its dominant symbolic 
statements and meanings are informed by the experience of slavery was a major 
contributing factor. For the same reason too, Christianity was to provide 
institutional support and religious authority for the advanced slave systems of 
medieval Europe and of the modern Americas (1982, p. 72). 
 
Once Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire it became the 
official religion of a slave society. Moses Finley, using Immanuel Wallerstine’s 
conceptual framework, labels the Roman Empire a “world-empire” and not a “world-
system,” to note its structure was organized politically rather than economically or 
socially and thus allowed “different labour-regimes and modes of production” to co-exist 
(1998, p. 147). With this distinction in mind, Finley restricts his analysis of Greco-
Roman slavery to Greece, Italy and Sicily. Finley’s cautious approach notwithstanding, it 
is appropriate to state that slavery existed, functioned and flourished for centuries as a 
religiously sanctioned institution under Christian authority in the Roman Empire 
regardless of the locale or the mode of production employed. Whether a particular Roman 
province was a slave society or a society with slaves, Christian authorities did not disturb 
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the status quo. Instead, as has been pointed out, Christian exegetes saw in slavery a potent 
metaphor for their religion’s theodicy and theology, and spoke of its abolition in 
otherworldly rather than worldly terms. Robin Lane Fox in Pagans and Christians 
summarizes the Christian view of slavery as follows:  
On the conduct of slaves, Christian texts were unanimous. The Pauline epistles 
stated very clearly that slaves must submit, and for most Christian authors their 
words sufficed. If they were expanded, they were emphasized: slaves must obey 
their masters as the ‘image of God’ (1986, p. 297).  
 
Slavery was not determined by race in the Greco-Roman pagan world or in the 
early Christian culture that supplanted paganism. Race is a modern social construction 
unknown to the people of late antiquity. Hannaford, referring to texts by Hesiod, 
Herodotus and Hippocrates states:  
Close examination of these early Greek works, however, uncovers no assumptions 
about the major divisions of mankind based upon the idea of biologically 
transmitted characteristics, and hence no theoretical notion of biological similarity 
or dissimilarity except in a crude humoral sense. There were no physically 
differentiated types, no word that approximates or resembles ‘race’ (1996, p. 20). 
 
Early Christians accepted the Hebrew Bible’s creation story of Adam and Eve as 
evidence of the singular origin of the human family. Thus the Christian position 
emphatically stated by Paul was that God: “hath made of one blood all nations of men for 
to dwell on all the face of the earth ...” (Acts 17:26). Like their pagan predecessors and 
contemporaries, early Christians believed the phenotypic (outward physical) 
characteristics of diverse human groups were caused by different environmental 
conditions. Frank Snowden in Blacks in Antiquity states: “The first anthropological 
contrast of blacks and whites—Thracians and Ethiopians—is found in Xenophanes, a 
contrast that was later to appear frequently in a Scythian-Ethiopian commonplace and in 
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the environmental theory of the origin of racial differences” (1970, p. 25). Snowden’s use 
of the term “racial differences” is anachronistic and highly misleading in this context. 
The ancient environmental theory cited by Xenophanes, Herodotus, Pliny and a host of 
widely known classical writers accounted for differences in physical appearance without 
the suggestion or theory that immutable or inherent biological differences separated or 
distinguished human groups. Thus the term “Ethiopian”—used generically in the Greco-
Roman world to refer to dark-skinned people—means, “burnt face” in Greek, and 
suggests a derivation from the idea that dark skin is caused by the sun (Hannaford, 1996, 
p. 19). The environmental ideas embodied in the Scythian-Ethiopian trope found their 
way into early Greek art in the form of Janiform vases that depicted and juxtaposed the 
heads of blacks and whites to illustrate and contrast differences in their facial features and 
skin color (Snowden, 1970, pp. 24-25). According to Snowden, this Scythian-Ethiopian 
formula also “appears in various forms in early Christian writings,” to dramatize the 
spread of Christianity to all corners of the known world (1970, pp. 196-197). Using this 
trope, Christians proclaimed the global diffusion and universality of their faith. But it was 
the Ethiopian component of this formula that held the most significance in early Christian 
exegesis and symbolism. The New Testament perhaps best illustrates the centrality of 
Ethiopians to early Christian exegesis. Acts 8:26-40 relates the conversion and baptism of 
an Ethiopian eunuch who was a prominent figure in the government of the Candace 
(Queen) of Ethiopia. This Ethiopian was the first Gentile to convert to Christianity, and 
thus allegorically represented the first successful evangelizing of the faith to non-Jews 
and the very establishment of the Christian church. Ironically, this conversion of the 
Ethiopian eunuch occurred before Paul’s legendary epiphany and conversion on the road 
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to Damascus. Hence it can be said that an African accepted the gospel of Jesus before the 
purported “inventor” of Christianity received his calling to the faith. 
Christians also were familiar with various Jewish traditions concerning 
Ethiopians. The numerous references to “black” persons in the Old Testament and in 
rabbinic commentaries, including those related to Ham, demonstrate the pervasive 
“black” presence and influence in the Near East and constitute important sources for the 
abstract and symbolic use of “blackness” in Christian literary motifs. David Brion Davis 
in Slavery and Human Progress, citing Ephraim Isaac, notes that: 
… in some Jewish sources both the children of Shem (including the Israelites) and 
the children of Ham [Cush, Mizraim, Put and Canaan] were described as black; 
the first as ‘black and beautiful’, the latter as ‘black like a raven.’ Rabbis spoke of 
the beauty of Moses’ Kushite (or Ethiopian) wife, of the black Queen of Sheba, 
and of Solomon’s Kushite scribes. The famous passage in the Song of Songs “I 
am black but beautiful, O ye daughters of Jerusalem,” appears to have read, in the 
Hebrew and earlier Greek versions, “I am black and beautiful” (author’s italics) 
(Davis, 1984, p. 36). 
 
Byron (2002), Davis (1984), and Snowden (1970) credit the influential Christian 
writer Origen (185?-254 CE), who was head of the catechetical school in Alexandria in 
the third century CE, with establishing an allegorical framework central to early Christian 
exegesis based on the Jewish traditions cited above. Origen—who Snowden describes as 
a “pioneer in exegesis and in textual criticism of the Bible”—used those themes and 
motifs to illustrate both the struggle and victory of the Christian Church in universally 
evangelizing the faith, and to present a complex imagery of spiritual blackness and 
whiteness (1970, p. 198). Accordingly, Origen depicted Moses’ marriage to an Ethiopian 
wife as symbolically prefiguring the union of the Jewish Torah (Law) with the Gentile 
nations. For Origen, the bridegroom (Moses) personified the transmission of the Mosaic 
distinction and Jewish monotheism to the “black bride,” who symbolized the universal 
 119 
(or Catholic) church and its Gentile congregation (Davis, 1984, p. 36; Snowden, 1970, 
pp. 198-199). Similarly, Origen’s commentary on the Queen of Sheba’s statement “I am 
black and beautiful” illustrates his hermeneutic and discursive use of this tropology to 
explicate Christian doctrine: 
Moreover we ask in what way is she black and in what way fair without 
whiteness. She has repented of her sins; conversion has bestowed beauty upon her 
and hence she is sung as “beautiful.” But because she is not yet cleansed of all the 
uncleanness of her sins nor washed unto salvation, she is said to be “black” but 
she does not remain in her black color—she becomes white. . . . But if you repent, 
your soul will be “black” because of your former sins, but because of your 
penitence your soul will have something of what I may call an Ethiopian beauty 
(Snowden, 1970, p. 199). 
 
Implicit in Origen’s statement is the Christian belief in the fallen state of 
humanity into sin. Thus Origen sees all humans as “black” or sinful by nature. They 
become “black and beautiful” upon repentance, and white upon salvation. This whitening 
of blackness as an allegory for salvation became a common motif in Christian literature, 
frequently repeated by Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine and a host of early fathers of the Latin 
Church (Byron, 2002). The color-coding of this allegory of sin and salvation, while non-
racial in its inception, established a paradigm that proved disastrous for “black” people 
with the advent of the African slave trade and the social construction of race theory and 
antiblack racism in Europe. The Christian convention of depicting demons with “black” 
or Ethiopian features ultimately figured into the demonizing and dehumanizing of 
“black” people in later Muslim and European thought. Davis argues that this “color 
symbolism is derived in part from astrology, alchemy, Gnosticism or various forms of 
Manichaeism” (1984, p. 37). Regardless of the sources or combination thereof, it is clear 
Christian writers established a religious convention based on color that would remain 
decisive in human relations for countless generations. It is crucial to the proper 
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understanding of this allegorical framework to grasp its religious and its proto-racist 
significance. The failure to do so results in an inability to recognize how these early 
abstract and symbolic forms of thought led to the development of the concrete idioms of 
modern racism. The slippery slope that separates the thin line between proto-racism and 
modern racism can be difficult to negotiate. Snowden’s comments are illustrative of this 
point: 
The early Christians in their view of the Ethiopian continued the Greco-Roman 
tradition not only in sentiment but also in language and imagery. For Christian 
writers of the first centuries after Christ, it made no difference whether one was as 
racially different as the Scythian or the Ethiopian; of no importance was the 
region of the world or the cultural group from which a man came. Color was 
inconsequential; in fact, we have seen that they regarded as black all men who 
had not been illumined by God’s light and considered all men, regardless of the 
color of their skin as potentially Christians (1970, p. 205). 
 
Snowden, in his emphasis on the symbolic aspects of this form of early Christian 
ethno-political rhetoric, fails to consider the social consequences of these ideas on dark-
skinned peoples within and without the early Christian world. Gay L. Byron provides an 
insightful critique of Snowden on this point. She also makes clear that the uses of these 
tropes of blackness that involved Egyptians/Egypt and Ethiopians/Ethiopia served as 
shorthand or iconic devices to define sexual threats, vices and sins, as well as the basic 
binary of insider/outsider (2002).  
As the self-proclaimed heirs of the Mosaic distinction, Christians ratified and 
reified the true/false dichotomy in religion and posited and proselytized their creed as the 
only “true” faith. Thus the principal distinction that mattered to early Christian 
theologians was whether one was a believer or non-believer. In this primary sense, a 
person’s skin color was irrelevant. But in daily social interactions this color-coding of 
sin, vices, and sexual threats must have had an impact on ethnic relations. By the fourth 
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century CE, Christianity was firmly established in North Africa. Accordingly, during its 
formative first four centuries many “Africans” assumed key leadership positions in the 
Church. For many Christians this development signified the fulfillment of the Old 
Testament prophecy: “Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out 
her hands unto God” (Psalms 68:31). For other Christians, those with dark skins, the idea 
of whitening blackness as a way of removing sin must have posed severe challenges to 
their acceptance and pursuit of Christian ideals. Once the center of Christian authority 
shifted from Alexandria to Rome in the late fourth century and Christians achieved 
political power in the Roman Empire, a dramatic transformation of the ancient world 
began to take place. Instead of Christians feeling the wrath of pagan rulers, non-believers 
(pagans and Jews) became the objects of Christian persecution or prosecution for 
resisting or failing to convert to the new world order (Fox, 1986).  
Christian acceptance and canonization of the Hebrew Bible also made them heirs 
to the Noachic distinction. Few references to Noah’s curse, however, are found in early 
Christian writings. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.) is a notable exception. Armstrong 
describes Augustine as “the founder of the Western spirit,” and states that: “No other 
theologian, apart from St. Paul, has been more influential in the West” (1993, p. 119). In 
Book XVI of his renowned exegetical work The City of God, which was written and 
serialized from 413-426 CE, Augustine explores the story of Noah and his three sons in 
some detail. Augustine uses Noah’s curse on Ham to present a complex analogy that 
equates nakedness to the passion of Christ and the entire episode as a fulfillment of 
Christian prophecy (Augustine, 1987, pp. 422-423). Augustine’s discursive gloss makes 
use of the names of Noah’s sons to drive his point home: “Shem, of whom Christ was 
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born in the flesh, means ‘named.’ And what is of greater name than Christ …” Japheth 
means “enlargement” and Ham means “hot” (1987, p. 422). For Augustine, Ham, as the 
middle brother, is neither Jew (Shem) nor Gentile (Japheth), but represents: “the tribe of 
heretics, hot with the spirit, not of patience, but of impatience, with which the breasts of 
heretics are wont to blaze, and with which they disturb the peace of the saints” (1987, p. 
422). Where Shem represents the Jewish line of descent and the Christian theological 
lineage through Jesus, and Japheth the “enlargement” of the Christian congregation 
through the conversion of the Gentiles, Ham remains the “hot-headed” heretic, the 
proverbial outsider whose intransigence marks him and his work or fruit (his son Canaan) 
as cursed. What follows in Augustine’s analysis is an explicit endorsement of Canaan’s 
enslavement in an allegorical sense: “But the wicked brother is, in the person of his son 
(i.e., his work), the boy, or slave, of his good brothers, when good men make a skilful use 
of bad men, either for the exercise of their patience or their advancement in wisdom” 
(Augustine, 1987, p. 423). Here, Augustine suggests that the example offered by the 
enslavement of Ham’s descendants furnishes an opportunity for Christian meditation and 
enlightenment. More importantly, however, the Noah scenario foreshadows for 
Augustine events that led to the manifestation of Christ, and the establishment of 
Christian Church as the City of God (1987, p. 423).  
In Book XVI, Augustine also comments on the genealogical mapping of the 
world according to the various lineages established by the sons of Noah. This theory, 
however, did not become a prominent feature in Christian literature until the medieval 
period. The writings of the Hellenized Jew Flavius Josephus (37?-100 C.E.) served as the 
principal vehicle through which this genealogical mapping achieved wider significance 
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and notoriety in Christian and Muslim thought. Josephus, in his popular work Jewish 
Antiquities, identified Shem as Asian, Ham as Afroasian and Japheth as Eurasian 
(Braude, 1997, p. 111). This interpretation of the sons of Noah circulated widely in the 
Christian and Muslim worlds, but the concept of the three continental divisions of 
humanity did not gain currency in Europe until the oceanic voyages of Iberian explorers 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries provided a more realistic view of global and 
human geography. Afterwards, in conjunction with the escalation of transatlantic slave 
trade and the rapid colonization of the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Noah’s curse acquired a specific racist meaning and purpose within the new 
ideological structures that created and supported Eurocentrism and its emerging capitalist 
systems. Although Josephus’ work constitutes a central source from which this concept 
was disseminated, Muslim scholars deserve much of the credit for preserving and 
transmitting this tradition during the medieval period. Accordingly, it is to al-Islam and 
Muslim literary traditions that we now turn to examine their role and contributions in the 






 Islam constitutes the next major subdistinction in the evolution of the 
counterreligion. Muslim tradition cites Muhammad ibn Abdallah (c. 570-632), a 
merchant who became a reluctant prophet, as the person who revealed Islam to the 
Arabic-speaking people of Southern Arabia in the seventh century CE. Muslims believe 
Islam is the uncorrupted and restored monotheistic faith of the biblical patriarchs Adam 
and Abraham. Muslims also believe Muhammad’s recitation of the poetry, homilies, and 
stories that comprise the Quran constitute a direct revelation of the word of god (Peters, 
1991, p. 293). Toby Lester’s vivid summary of the traditional Islamic view of how 
Muhammad received and revealed god’s words helps to locate his purported revelation in 
the context of Muslim faith and how that faith is presented as Muslim history: 
Muhammad had developed the habit of periodically withdrawing from Mecca’s 
pagan squalor to a nearby mountain cave, where he would reflect in solitude. 
During one of these retreats he was visited by the Angel Gabriel—the very same 
angel who had announced the coming of Jesus to the Virgin Mary in Nazareth 
some six hundred years earlier. Opening with the command “Recite!” Gabriel 
made it know to Muhammad that he was to serve as the Messenger of God. 
Subsequently, until his death, the supposedly illiterate Muhammad received 
through Gabriel divine revelations in Arabic that were known as qu’ran 
(“recitation”) and that announced, initially in a highly poetic and rhetorical style, 
a new an uncompromising brand of monotheism known as Islam, or “submission” 
(to God’s will). Muhammad reported these revelations verbatim to sympathetic 
family members and friends, who either memorized them or wrote them down 
(2002, p. 117). 
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Muslim traditions record Muhammad’s recitations as having occurred over a 
period of twenty-two years, from 610 to 632 C.E., and that these recitations were “finally 
assembled or collected” from various sources, some recollected and some written, no 
more than fifteen years after the Prophet’s death” (Peters, 1991, p. 293). F. E. Peters 
describes the compilation of the Quran as follows: 
The Quran as we now possess it is arranged in 114 units called suras connected in 
no obvious fashion, each bearing a name and other introductory formulae, of 
greatly varying length and, more appositely to our present purpose, with little 
internal unity. There is no narrative framework, of course, and within the 
unconnected suras, there are dislocations, interpolations, abrupt changes of rhyme 
and parallel versions, a condition that has led both Muslim and non-Muslim 
scholars alike to conclude that some of the present suras or sections of them may 
once have been joined to others … Nor do we know the aim of the persons who 
arranged the suras in their present order, which is, roughly (the first sura apart), 
from the longest to the shortest. They are not, in any event, placed in the order of 
their revelation, as everyone agrees. (1991, p. 297). 
 
The stories surrounding the compilation of the Quran, however, are both 
confusing and contradictory. Instead of there being only one account of the Quran’s final 
compilation, there are numerous traditions involving several personages who were 
contemporaries or successors of Muhammad. Such accounts cite the involvement of Abu 
Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, men who served as Caliphs (successors to Muhammad and 
temporal leaders of the Muslim community); Hafsa, the daughter of Umar; Zaid ibn 
Thabit, the former secretary of the Prophet; and other Companions of the Prophet 
(Warraq, 1998a, p. 13). All existent traditions agree that the Quran was collected from 
human memory and “from pieces of papyrus, flat stones, palm leaves, shoulder blades 
and ribs of animals, pieces of leather and wooden boards” and then copied on “sheets or 
leaves” (Warraq, 1998a, p. 13). As many as fifteen different primary codices and a 
number of secondary ones eventually emerged from this process, a situation that resulted 
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in an order from Uthman (the third Caliph) to destroy all other texts but his own (Warraq, 
1998a, pp. 14-15). Nevertheless, three systems prevailed: “those of Warsh (d. 812) from 
Nafi of Medina, Hafs (d. 805) from Asim of Kufa, and al-Duri (d.860) from Abu Amr of 
Basra” (Warraq, 1998a, p. 16). Of those three, two remain in use in modern Islam: “Asim 
of Kuf through Hafs” … “and that of Nafi through Warsh” (Warraq, 1998a, p. 16). The 
number of early versions of the Quran and the struggles of the followers of Islam to 
reconcile what were often contradictory accounts and texts undermine any efforts to 
assert the singularity and consistency of Muhammad’s revelation and the manner in 
which it was recorded and passed down. Despite this fact most Muslims and some non-
Muslim scholars still accept and rely on these traditions uncritically and without 
questioning their premises and provenance. Similar to the way fundamentalist Christians 
regard the gospels, Muslims claim and believe their holy book the Quran, the Sira (the 
biography of the Prophet) and the various Hadith (traditional stories told about the life of 
Muhammad and his Companions) contain eyewitness accounts of every aspect of the life 
of Muhammad. The following quote cited by Ibn al-Rawandi from a “contemporary 
introduction to Islam aimed at young people” illustrates this point: 
The life of Muhammad is known as the Sira and was lived in the full light of 
history. Everything he did and said was recorded. Because he could not read and 
write himself, he was constantly served by a group of 45 scribes who wrote down 
his sayings, instructions and his activities. Muhammad himself insisted on 
documenting his important decisions. Nearly three hundred of his documents have 
come down to us, including political treaties, military enlistments, assignments of 
officials and state correspondence written on tanned leather … Within a few 
decades of his death, accounts of the life of Muhammad were available to the 
Muslim community in written form. One of the earliest and most famous 
biographies of Muhammad, written less than (a) hundred years after his death is 
Sirat Rasul Allah by Ibn Ishaq (2000, pp. 89-90). 
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Despite the tone of authority and verisimilitude with which the above passage 
presents its historical case for the documentary evidence pertaining to the life and deeds 
of Muhammad, none of it can be taken as factual. Ibn Ishaq did produce the earliest 
known biography of Muhammad, but he was born about 717 CE, eighty-five years after 
Muhammad’s death, “and would have reached his teens only as much as one hundred 
years after the events he affects to have portrayed” (al-Rawandi, 2000, p. 91). Moreover, 
no copies of Ibn Ishaq’s Sira exist in its original form nor has it been preserved as a 
single work. Instead, only a redacted form survives, based on the editorial work of Ibn 
Hisham (d. 833), who was born in Egypt, and who removed from the text “things which 
it is disgraceful to discuss, matters which would distress certain people; and such reports 
as al-Bakka’i told me he could not accept as trustworthy” (cited in al-Rawandi, 2000, p. 
91). Other works by other early Islamic scholars and historians are equally problematic. 
The authenticity of hadith, or books of tradition, collected by al-Bukhari (d. 870), 
Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (d. 875), Ibn Maja (d. 887), Abu Dawud (d. 889), al-Timidhi (d. 
892), and al-Nisai (d. 915) have been subjected to close analysis and found to be highly 
questionable by a number of scholars (Warraq, 2000a, p. 37). It is from such works, 
however, that the traditional paradigm of Islam and Islamic studies is derived. These 
sources suggest Muhammad was born in Mecca circa 570 CE to a poor but respected 
clan, the Banu Hashim of the Quraysh tribe, at a time when South Arabian civilization 
was in a state of turmoil. In the north of the region, the Christian Byzantine Empire 
centered in Constantinople waged a centuries-old war with the Zoroastrian Persian 
Empire. In the south, Abyssinian-led Yemenites threatened the independence of the 
Hijaz, the stony valley between two mountains near the coast of the Red Sea where 
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Mecca was located. Islamic traditions state that pre-Islamic Mecca was an important 
depot on the spice and incense trade route that connected South Arabian and Indian 
Ocean trade with the civilizations of North Africa and the Mediterranean world (Aslan, 
2006, p. 27). Those sources also cite Mecca as the economic beneficiary of regular 
pilgrimage traffic to the Kabah, a sacred shrine, which, at that time, in addition to its 
famous Black Stone (possibly a meteorite), purportedly contained an image of the moon-
god Hubal and was a center for the worship of the three “pagan” goddesses 
(Brockelmann, 1960, p. 12). Patricia Crone in her book, Meccan Trade and the Rise of 
Islam, challenges both of these traditions, however, and argues:  
Mecca was not located on the incense route, still less at the crossroads of all the 
major routes in Arabia … The site was barren, devoid of a fertile hinterland 
except for Ta’if, ill-equipped for maritime trade, and much too far away for a 
caravan trade with Syria of a kind that the sources describe (Crone, 1987, p. 194).  
 
Such geo-historical controversies notwithstanding, Mecca and South Arabia did 
constitute a minor crossroads of religious faiths. Judaism entered the Saudi Arabian 
peninsula along the major trading routes, much like it had penetrated North Africa. Many 
of the first Christians in the region came from Jewish synagogues and communities after 
the gospel of Jesus spread throughout the Jewish diaspora. Much of the Christian 
influence in South Arabia, however, came from across the Red Sea via Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) or from Yemenite Christians to the south. In Mecca, in particular, Judaism and 
Christianity were practiced and represented by a small minority of its citizens; the vast 
majority of Arabs still followed the traditional Arab pagan religion (Aslan, 2006). 
Tradition has it that Muhammad eventually ran afoul of his fellow Meccans due 
to his efforts to reform the local religious practices. Under pressure from his enemies, he 
fled into exile in Medina, a nearby Arab city, where he and his followers dedicated 
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themselves to winning over the Arab tribes to the Islamic faith through conversion and 
conquest. Mohammad’s migration to Medina constitutes an epochal event in the Islamic 
faith. According to tradition, his exile from Mecca marked the official establishment of 
the Muslim community (umma) and the politicization of Muhammad’s leadership. 
Consequently, the Islamic era begins in 622 CE with Muhammad’s migration, known as 
The Hijra (Flight), rather than his birth year or the year the faith was first revealed 
(Armstrong, 1993, p. 155; J. A. Williams, 1962, pp. 69-75). 
 According to various hadith, Muhammad acquired a smattering of knowledge of 
Christianity in Mecca and a much better familiarity with Judaism in Medina. Armstrong 
argues that Arabs both respected and resented the two monotheistic faiths that some 
among them considered “superior to their own traditional paganism” (1993, p. 136). 
Inspired by Judeo-Christian doctrine, and by earlier Arab monotheists known as hanifs, 
Muhammad, tradition says, presented his religious vision as a continuation of the 
“Abrahamic” tradition. The biblical patriarch Abraham—claimed by Jews and Christians 
as the ancestral founder of their faiths—is accorded the same role in Islam. Muslims 
recognize and venerate Abraham as both the purported first prophet of Islam and the 
ancestor of the Arab people. I. Ephal notes: “According to the Bible, Ishmael the son of 
Abraham and Hagar was the ancestor of certain nomadic tribes who dwelt in the deserts 
between Palestine and Egypt and North Arabia” (1976, p. 225). This genealogical 
tradition, recorded in Genesis 25:13-16 and 1 Chronicles 1:29-31, follows the Jewish 
lines of invergence and divergence previously discussed. In this case, the line of descent 
from the (Jewish) father Abraham remains Jewish through his son Isaac and becomes the 
non-Jewish ancestor of certain nomadic groups through Ishmael, Isaac’s brother. Ephal 
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dates this tradition that links Israel and these desert tribes to the second millennium BCE 
(1976, p. 226). The term “Arab,” however, does not appear in any biblical genealogy. 
Ephal suggests that “Arab” was the term certain nomads devised to designate themselves 
(1976, p. 228), and that Arabs became associated with the “Sons of Ishmael” not on the 
basis of a genealogical relationship but simply through the generalized notion that they 
were desert-dwellers (1976, p. 232). Ephal argues that the “Arab” designation originally 
applied to the populations in the northern deserts near Palestine and not to the inhabitants 
of Southern Arabia, and cites later traditions that distinguish the two groups:  
The classical Arab genealogies, formulated during the first century of Islam, 
divide the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula into two distant groups: those to 
the north, descended from ‘Adnan, who claimed to be the son of Ishmael, and 
those of the south, descended from Quathan (to be identified with the biblical 
Joktan), descendant of Shem, the son of Noah (see Gen. 10:1, 21, 25-29; 1Chron. 
1:4, 17-23) (1976, p. 234). 
 
 Judaic and Christian biblical traditions entered South Arabia generations before 
the birth of Muhammad and were widely known to the Arab populations of Muhammad’s 
time. These Judeo-Christian doctrines and beliefs clearly inspired and influenced the 
development of Islam (Armstrong, 1993; Peters, 1991; Reinking, 2005). It is from their 
identification with and acceptance of biblical sources that Muslims began to define their 
belief system as a continuation of the Mosaic distinction and its establishment of the 
“true” religion. Accordingly, the Quran iterates in its own voice and from its own 
monotheistic perspective biblical stories and traditions that explain and support its 
teleology, its eschatology and its authority to present Islam as the latest revelation of 
god’s word and Muhammad as god’s prophet. Much like Moses rebuked the Jews for 
their lapse into worshipping the Golden Calf, Muhammad purportedly exhorted the Arabs 
to forsake their cosmotheistic conceptions of Allah and submit and conform to a strict 
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monotheism. Hence Muslims do not regard Islam as a new faith but as the restoration and 
continuation of the faith revealed by Allah first to Abraham, Moses and Jesus, and finally 
to Muhammad. Armstrong notes: “The Koran teaches that God had sent messengers to 
every people on the earth: Islamic tradition says there had been 124,000 such prophets, a 
symbolic number suggesting infinitude (1993, p. 152). The following passage from the 
Quran (2:136) illustrates this belief:  
We believe in God, and in that which has been sent down on us and sent down on 
Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, and the Tribes, and that which was given to 
Moses and Jesus and the Prophets, of their Lord; we make no division between 
any of them, and to Him we surrender.  
 
From the above example it can be seen that Muslims adopted the Judaic prophetic 
tradition and used it to authorize an Islamic religious movement closely modeled on 
Judaism. According to Islamic traditions, after the Jews in Medina rejected and mocked 
Muhammad’s interpretation of biblical prophecies and his spiritual leadership, he 
declared the independence of Islam, and in January 624 commanded his followers “to 
pray facing Mecca instead of Jerusalem” (Armstrong, 1993, p. 155). Muhammad 
purportedly then established what has come to be known as the “five pillars” of Islam, 
which stressed the Arabic character of the religion. Much of Islam’s organizing genius is 
revealed in the simplicity of this creed: First, Muslims (“those who submit”) are required 
to profess: “there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah.” Second, 
believers are required to pray five times a day. Third, all believers are obliged to provide 
support of the poor. Fourth, Muslims are expected to endure an annual thirty-day fast 
called Ramadan, during which no food or drink is consumed from sunrise to sunset. And 
fifth, the faithful are required to undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their 
lifetimes if they possess the means to do so (Aslan, 2006, pp. 145-155). In a further 
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departure from Judeo-Christian traditions, Muslims also preached the equality of the 
sexes and introduced in the Quran legal rights for women including inheritance and 
divorce. Armstrong states: “Western women had nothing comparable until the nineteenth 
century,” and argues that Islam “was later hijacked by the men, who interpreted texts in a 
way that was negative for Muslim women” (1993, p. 158).  
According to the Quran, Muhammad viewed Christians and Jews as having fallen 
into error regarding the hanifiyyah, the pure religion of Abraham. Muslims accept Jesus 
as a great prophet and teacher, but categorically reject the idea of the Trinity, and Jesus’ 
supposed divinity, as blasphemous. Muslim traditions indicate Muhammad viewed 
biblical episodes like that of the Golden Calf in Exodus as historical evidence of Jewish 
impiety and intransigence. Yet the refusal of the Jews of Medina to recognize him as the 
prophet of god brought “his whole religious position into question” and threatened his 
spiritual authority (Armstrong, 1993, p. 154). Moreover, according to the traditional 
accounts, Medina Jews eventually formed a military alliance against Muhammad with the 
Meccans. A series of bloody holy wars supposedly followed during which Muhammad’s 
Jewish enemies were decimated. Various traditions indicate that it was during this period 
that many Arab tribes converted to Islam, and that in 630 a victorious Muhammad 
entered Mecca with an army of Muslims after the bloodless surrender of the Meccan 
forces. Islamic tradition holds that Muhammad then removed the pagan icons from the 
Kabah, the House of Allah, rededicated the site to Islam, and incorporated the tradition of 
hajj or pilgrimage to the shrine as the fifth pillar of the faith. Muhammad thus furthered 
strengthened the appeal of his Islamic creed by preserving important elements of 
traditional pre-Islamic Arab beliefs. By the following year (631 CE), as tradition would 
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have it, most of the Arabian Peninsula had come under Muhammad’s authority. Various 
accounts also indicate that at height of his career as a religious reformer, Muhammad did 
not envision extending his message to non-Arabs and saw Islam as the Arabs’ religion. 
Armstrong notes:  
Nobody in the new empire was forced to accept the Islamic faith; indeed, for a 
century after Muhammad’s death, conversion was not encouraged and, in about 
700, was actually forbidden by law; Muslims believed that Islam was for Arabs as 
Judaism was for the sons of Jacob. As ‘the people of the book’ (abl al-kitab), 
Jews and Christians were granted religious liberty as dhimmis, protected minority 
groups. When the Abbasid caliphs began to encourage conversion, many of the 
Semitic and Aryan peoples in their empire were eager to accept the new religion. 
(1993, p. 159). 
 
The traditionally authorized versions of Muhammad’s life state that his sudden 
death on 8 June 632 precipitated a crisis among his followers, as no provisions had been 
made for a successor (Aslan, 2006, p. 110). The lack of a clear heir or charismatic figure 
to lead the followers of Islam threatened to unravel the fragile alliance of Arab tribes that 
had been forged by the Prophet. A solution purportedly was found in the appointment of 
Abu Bakr as Successor of the Prophet (Khalifa: Caliph). Abu Bakr, however, did not 
receive the support of all the tribes. Tradition records two years of bitter warfare before 
his authority was fully established in Medina. To quell further dissension and reunite the 
tribes, Caliph Bakr and his successor Caliph Umar launched a series of campaigns against 
the Byzantine and Persian empires. These foreign wars resulted in the conquest of 
Damascus (635), Egypt (639), Persia (640), and constituted the first successful stages in 
the establishment of a global Islamic empire (Brockelmann, 1960, p. 525; J. A. Williams, 
1962, p. 81).  
In presenting the broad outline of key points in the traditional and authorized 
history of Islam, I have had to qualify nearly every sentence by stating that such and such 
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is known “according to tradition.” None of these events cited above can be verified by 
any sources other than the Quran, the sira, and the hadith. However, most scholars agree 
that the sira and hadith are not independent of the Quran and mostly rely on it for their 
content. As Henri Lammens points out: “The Koran provides the only basis for the sira” 
(1910, p. 169). Coupled with the fact that the primary use of hadith (whether some pre-
date the Quran or not) is in interpreting and embellishing the verses of the Quran, what 
we are left with are sources for the life of Muhammad and the origins of Islam that are 
self-referential and lacking in outside corroboration. The degree to which this circular 
process has unfolded in the creation and authorization of Islamic doctrine is evident in 
this comment about the lack of historical material available in the Quran from Michael 
Cook:  
Taken on its own, the Koran tells us very little about the events of Muhammad’s 
career. It does not narrate these events, but merely refers to them; and in doing so, 
it has a tendency not to name names. Some do occur in contemporary contexts: 
four religious communities are named (Jews, Christians, Magians, and the 
mysterious Sabians), as are three Arabian deities (all female, three humans (of 
whom Muhammad is one), two ethnic groups (Quraysh and the Romans), and 
nine places…. Identifying what the Koran is talking about in a contemporary 
context is therefore usually impossible with interpretation…. Without it we could 
probably infer that the protagonist of the Koran was Muhammad, that the scene of 
his life was in western Arabia, and that he bitterly resented the frequent dismissal 
of his claims to prophecy by his contemporaries. But we could not tell the 
sanctuary was in Mecca, or that Muhammad himself came from there, and we 
could only guess that he established in Yathrib. We might indeed infer a more 
northerly location altogether, on the grounds that the site of God’s destruction of 
Lot’s people (i.e., Sodom) is said to me one which those addressed pass by 
morning and night (Koran 37 verse 137-38) (cited in Warraq, 2000a, pp. 36-37). 
 
Cook’s comment casts doubt on the traditions that cite Mecca as the locale where 
Islam originated and as Muhammad’s birthplace. We will return to this point 
momentarily. First, it is important to address one more issue related to the origins and use 
of various hadith. Much of Islamic law, customs and history are founded in these 
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traditional stories that supposedly originated as the oral anecdotes of the Companions of 
the Prophet and other eyewitnesses to the events surrounding his life and his revelation. 
The hadith thus serve as appendices or addenda to the Quran in that they address issues 
important to Muslims that the Quran does not, particularly in the matter of Islamic law. 
But even devout Muslims are forced to admit that over time the chain of transmission, or 
isnad that is supposed to authenticate such accounts: 
 … grew longer and more convoluted, so that in less than two centuries after 
Muhammad’s death, there were already some seven hundred thousand hadith 
being circulated throughout Muslim lands, the great majority of which were 
unquestionably fabricated by individuals who sought to legitimize their own 
particular beliefs and practices by connecting them with the Prophet. After a few 
generations, almost anything could be given the status of hadith if one simply 
claimed to trace its transmission back to Muhammad (Aslan, 2006, p. 67). 
 
In the ninth and tenth centuries Muslim scholars made a “concerted effort” to 
evaluate, eliminate and authenticate hadith, but one must imagine what standards and 
criteria were used to tackle such a complicated, convoluted and intentionally deceptive 
body of literature (Aslan, 2006, p. 68). 
 A new paradigm of Islamic studies, one that differs drastically and remarkably 
from the established and official religious history of Islam, has emerged in recent years. 
Some of this new revisionist scholarship was influenced by the methods and theories 
developed by John Wansbrough in the 1970s and 1980s. Wansbrough’s research 
generated a firestorm of controversy and criticism when he claimed, “neither the Koran 
nor Islam is a product of Muhammad or even of Arabia” (Berg, 2000, p. 494). 
Wansbrough brought a rigorous method of critical analysis to the study of isnads and the 
texts and traditions they are supposed to authenticate. His methodology included “form 
criticism, redaction criticism, and literary criticism, just as they had been [applied] in the 
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study of early Christianity and Judaism as pioneered by Rudolph Bultmann and Jacob 
Neusner” (Berg, 2000, p. 492).  With his insights into classical Arabic language, Middle 
Eastern archeology, Judeo-Christian literature and traditions, and accounts of the Muslim 
conquests written by non-Muslims, Wansbrough proposed a drastic, yet “provisional” 
revision of Islamic history (Berg, 2000, pp. 494-495). Berg summarizes Wansbrough’s 
key findings as follows: 
During the early Arab expansion beyond Arabia, there is no evidence that the 
conquerors were Muslim. Almost 200 years later “early” Muslim literature began 
to be written by the Mesopotamian clerical elite. The implications may be that the 
hitherto secular polity discovered and adopted a new movement, which, though a 
non-Jewish, non-Christian movement, was the product of a Judeo-Christian 
sectarian milieu. This movement and its history were soon Arabicized. The 
Koran, however, took somewhat longer to be canonized—not until circa 800 C.E. 
(2000, p. 495). 
 
A number of scholars have pursued the new paradigmatic approach to Islam 
initiated by Wansbrough, and several of his predecessors. Most of them generally accept 
the existence of a historical figure named Muhammad, but continue to debate the origins 
of the Quran and the development of Islam. The principle criticism regarding Islam itself 
is that it did not emerge from the desert as a fully defined and self-reflexive system of 
belief and way of life (al-Rawandi, 2000, p. 71). Linguistic, literary, and archeological 
evidence indicate that it took several centuries for Islam to develop: 
The development of Islam as a potentially universal religion, capable of absorbing 
non-Arabs in large numbers, followed only after the emergence of Arabic as a 
literary language during the first half of the eight century. It happened only after 
the centre of Arab military and political power had shifted away from Arabia, first 
to Syria and then to Iraq. Few of the first men of Arabic letters were themselves 
Arabs by birth. Most were descended from the educated Greeks or Persians 
enslaved in the wars of conquest, who were recruited as bureaucrats by the 
Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs for their knowledge of earlier systems of law and 
administration. It is increasingly widely recognized by modern Islamicists that the 
way these men went to work was by codifying the law and custom of their own 
times and then authenticating their findings by attributing them to the oral 
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tradition handed down from the Prophet and his contemporaries. The literary 
culture of Islam was thus a much more sophisticated and broad-based system 
than could ever have emerged from the seventh century Hijaz, and it was only 
after it reached this form that men of learning began to migrate to Egypt and 
Tunisia to establish schools of theology and law capable of attracting an educated 
Christian population into the Islamic fold (emphasis added) (Oliver, 1991, p. 85). 
 
This new paradigm of Islamic studies, however, does not change the resulting 
impact of the Arab conquests of the so-called Middle East and northern Africa. Over 
time, these bands of horse and camel-mounted warriors adopted the new faith and added 
to their mission of conquest one of conversion. With conquest and conversion came 
immense power and wealth and the opportunity for Muslims to interact with and 
influence diverse cultures in Africa, Europe and Asia. Their strategic geographic location 
also afforded them the advantage of being in the center of the flow of goods and ideas 
from Europe and Africa in the West, to India and China in the East. Thus, Muslims found 
themselves and their empire at the very heart of the world, as they knew it. Yet religion 
and warfare were not sufficient to sustain and maintain Muslim hegemony. To keep the 
heart of this new faith-based political regime running, Muslims invested heavily in 
slavery and the slave trade. As David Brion Davis puts it: “The Arabs and their light-
skinned converts from Morocco to Iran were the first modern people to create a 
continuing demand for large numbers of foreign slaves, a demand that persisted from the 
seventh century until well into the twentieth” (1984, p. 47). Most of this traffic in human 
beings was centered on Africa. And, as will be discussed below, Muslims grounded and 
founded their justification for the enslavement of “others” in the Mosaic and Noachic 
distinctions: the Mosaic distinction and its true/false dichotomy divided the world into 
Muslims and infidels, and the Noachic distinction established a scriptural basis for 
viewing “black” people, in particular, as divinely selected and sanctioned for servitude.
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After the establishment of Islam, Muslims, like their Christian and Jewish 
predecessors, continued the existing systems of slavery that had been prevalent in the 
ancient world for centuries. In the traditions of the Old and New Testaments, the Quran 
recognized the legitimacy of the institution of slavery and offered practical guidance 
regarding the treatment of slaves. Ronald Segal in Islam’s Black Slaves notes:  
The Koran, while upholding the distinction between owner and slave as part of 
the divine design, also expressly encouraged the freeing of slaves as an act of 
piety, whose merit might explicate particular crimes. And Muslim slaves were 
especially recommended for emancipation, in a celebrated saying attributed to the 
Prophet: “The man who frees a Muslim slave, God will free from hell, limb from 
limb” (2001, p. 35). 
 
Muslims did not always follow the Quranic edicts regarding the benevolent 
treatment of slaves or their manumission. Instead, as Islam grew through trade and 
conquest, and as the slave trade became an integral part of Islamic societies and their 
economies, its conduct was carried out with a brutal inefficiency and inhumanity. The 
brutality of Muslim slavery was especially true in sub-Saharan Africa, where slaves were 
“punished at will,” treated as “sacrificial victims,” and rarely freed from bondage (Oliver, 
1991, p. 119). Davis sees the growth of the long distance trade in African slaves as 
initially dependent on “the westward spread of the camel and the North Arabian saddle” 
(1984, p. 35). Camel-breeding nomadism spread throughout the region, creating caravan 
traffic and commercial networks that stimulated the growth and development of trading 
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cities along their routes. Davis states: “Despite the paucity of direct evidence, it is 
probable that well before Islam these desert caravans included black slaves who traveled 
mainly on foot but who were dependent on food and water carried by camel-riding 
merchants” (1984, p. 35). 
The inclusion of slaves who were “black” in the pre-Islamic slave trade does not 
mean that only “blacks” were enslaved or that the enslavers were necessarily “white” 
Arabs. Given the African origins of certain Arab populations, and the Ethiopian conquest 
of South Arabia in the century before Muhammad’s birth, it can be argued that the 
presence of “black” slaves in pre-Islamic Arabic societies also reflects a “black” 
component in the indigenous population of the Arabian Peninsula. Modern systems of 
racial classification and ideology, including the so-called “Hamitic Hypothesis” (see 
Edith Sanders 1969), permeate and distort the research and scholarship on such questions 
and issues. The use of scare quotes around the word “black” throughout my thesis reflects 
my concerns about the term’s ideological origins and the tendency to interpret it 
according to the racialist and racist connotations it has accrued since the Islamic and 
Atlantic slave trades. With that being said, it is also clear that color distinctions and color 
prejudice did exist in pre-Islamic Arab culture. Tradition records Muhammad as making 
this comment in his last sermon: “No Arab has any priority over a non-Arab and no white 
over a black except in righteousness” (cited in Segal, 2001, p. 46). Ethnocentrism and 
color prejudice must have been common social phenomena to warrant the attribution of 
this statement to Islam’s prophet. To what degree such attitudes existed in early Islamic 
Arabia is a matter of debate. What can be stated with a greater degree of certainty is that 
the conquest of the Near East and North Africa fostered the idea of Arab superiority. 
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Moreover, the ensuing large-scale importation of millions of African slaves into Muslim 
lands from previously unknown regions of Africa probably exacerbated and increased 
Arab ethnic hostility and contempt. 
The Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 provided the staging ground for the North 
African jihad and the eventual conversion of millions of Christians and cosmotheists to 
Islam. Although African resistance to Arab incursions was fierce and protracted, this 
chapter of North African history often has been overlooked. The region’s Berbers, 
Christians, and Jews, however, mounted major campaigns against the invaders. When 
faced with defeat, some chose martyrdom rather than submit. Others converted to Islam 
at the point of a Muslim sword. Afrocentric scholar J. C. deGraft Johnson in African 
Glory describes this neglected episode in African history as follows: 
The Arab conquest of North Africa was no walk-over except perhaps in Egypt, 
where the Arabs were received as deliverers from the cruel rule of Byzantium. 
The resistance put up by Kuseila of Mauritania and by his relative Kahina 
reflected the African mood of the period. In fact, so determined were the African 
counterattacks that an Arab governor once remarked that the conquest of Africa 
was impossible; and that scarcely had a Berber tribe been exterminated when 
another came to take its place. However, after Kahina’s defeat and death in 705, 
African resistance eventually weakened (1954, p. 68). 
 
The dramatic expansion of the Arab slave trade into Africa followed in the wake 
of North African defeats. Oliver notes:  
The trans-Saharan slave trade was, in fact, the key to the politics of medieval 
North Africa. Slaves were required first and foremost as soldiers. Locally 
recruited slave soldiers enabled small groups of immigrants, like the Ibadis, to 
create small states, some of which later grew larger (1991, p. 86).  
 
The impact of the Arabs and Islam on continental African cultures often has been 
treated and regarded as a “civilizing” mechanism rather than the source and cause of a 
human catastrophe. The connection between jihad and the growth and perpetuation of the 
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Islamic slave trade in Africa is indisputable. Nevertheless, Islam’s role in the expansion 
of “black” slavery throughout the world has not been accorded the prominence it 
deserves in the West and particularly among Pan African scholars. The Great Sahara, a 
popular study of the vast North African desert and its exploration, offers this blunt 
comment on the Arab role in the globalization of African slavery: 
This was the slave trade which, under the efficient direction of the Arabs, was 
soon to involve the whole civilized world from the end of the Middle Ages to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The ancient world, of course, was based on 
slavery, but not on African slaves. The exploitation of black labour was the 
contribution of the Arabs to mankind, for it was they who organized the traffic in 
human merchandise out of Africa to the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. In 
short, the slave trade became the cornerstone of Saharan economy for the next 
thousand years (Wellard, 1964, p. 113).  
 
The total numbers of African slaves traded by Islamic states over the thirteen and 
a half centuries of the Muslim slave trade remains a topic of much debate. Segal cites 
various estimates ranging from 7,220,000 (Paul Lovejoy) to 14,000,000 (Raymond 
Mauvy) (2001, p. 56). The vast expanse of space and time and the lack of data for the 
early centuries of Islamic trade make these figures hardly reliable. Nevertheless, they 
suggest that the Islamic trade was comparable in numbers to the Atlantic trade overall 
and, when broken down and viewed by centuries, they indicate a marked increase in 
activity after the Atlantic trade was abolished. Segal, citing Lovejoy’s data, notes:  
The nineteenth century exceeded any of the previous twelve centuries in the 
volume of this trade, and the related documentary evidence is more extensive and 
exact than it is for any previous century. Some 1,200,000 have been estimated for 
the trans-Saharan routes, 450,000 for the Red Sea route, and 442,000 for East 
African coastal exports: an annual average of 20,000, or more than 2,000,000 in 
all (2001, p. 56). 
 
Contrary to the old cliché, these numbers do not speak for themselves. Export 
data alone cannot convey a complete or accurate picture of the slave trade’s demographic 
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consequences for African societies or its economic and social benefits for Islamic states. 
The slave trade involved several brutal activities: raiding, capturing, transporting, storing 
and selling slaves. Each stage resulted in the significant loss of African lives in addition 
to those lost during their exportation by force. The quantitative analyses of the Atlantic 
slave trade performed by H.S. Klein (1999), M. Klein (1992) Manning (1992), Miller 
(1988) and Curtin (1969) include estimates of mortality rates for each step of the trade 
listed above. The numbers in those studies vary, and their authors do not fully agree in 
their evaluations of the data, yet a general consensus exists that the trade—through its 
inhumane and brutal practices—killed millions. When viewed as an aggregate, the related 
losses in the Atlantic trade appear greatly disproportionate to the numbers of captives 
who actually reached the final steps of purchase and forced labor. Similar data or analysis 
of data for the Islamic trade has been lacking, and much of what has been available for 
study is anecdotal rather than systematic or dispositive. Segal cites such an example:  
One late nineteenth-century writer held that the sale of a single captive for slavery 
might represent a loss of ten from the population—from defenders killed in 
attacks on villages, the deaths of women and children from related famine, and 
the loss of children, the old, and the sick unable to keep up with their captors or 
killed along the way in hostile encounters or dying of sheer misery (2001, p. 62).  
 
The arduous and brutal nature of the Sahara traffic in the Islamic trade offers a 
situation for study and analysis comparable to the Middle Passage of the Atlantic slave 
trade. Such desert crossings often covered distances of a thousand miles or more as the 
slave coffles made their way to Mediterranean trading centers in Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi 
and Cairo from Lake Chad, Timbuktu, and Kano. Medieval Muslim scholars Ibn 
Khaldun, Ibn Battuta, and Leo Africanus (who later converted to Christianity), and 
modern European explorers and adventurers Frederick Hornemann, G. F. Lyon, Henry 
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Barth, and Rene Callie recounted personal observations of the trans-Saharan trade. Such 
anecdotal reports have been important sources of information given the lack of detailed 
studies of this commercial traffic. Few contemporary scholars, however, have performed 
statistical and demographic studies of the Arab slave trade. Patterson cites a study by 
Ralph A. Austen that estimates a total of 6,850,000 slaves were transported in the Sahara 
trade from 650 CE to the nineteenth century, and suggests that perhaps as many as five 
million Africans were transported in the Arab East African trade over the same period 
(Patterson, 1982, p. 159). These numbers support the growing consensus that the Islamic 
trade was comparable to the Atlantic trade in the export of enslaved Africans.  
In a rather diffuse essay on the formal demography of the slave trade, Manning 
calculates an average mortality rate of twenty percent or more for the global slave trade 
(Occidental and Oriental), and projects an estimated loss of “some 5 million people over 
three centuries” (1992, pp. 120-121). The Islamic or Oriental trade, however, operated for 
over thirteen centuries and continues today in the Sudan, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia. 
While it is perhaps impossible to enumerate with any degree of certainty the annual and 
aggregate mortality rates associated with the North and East African Islamic trade, when 
combined with the estimated numbers of slaves who survived and were incorporated into 
the Muslim slaveocracy system (12 million according to Austen’s data cited by Patterson 
above) a general picture of the demographic disaster perpetrated on the African continent 
begins to emerge. For example, Manning points out: “In 1600 Africans at home and 
abroad were clearly a minority of the world’s slaves; in 1800 they were the 
overwhelming majority of all slaves” (1992, p. 121). Manning also describes the 
demographic results of this trafficking as follows:  
 144 
From 1700 to 1850, the population of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole stagnated or 
declined in size because of the mortality of captives, the drain of slaves, and 
continued high mortality resulting from social insecurity. This was precisely the 
period in which the populations of Europe, the Americas and Asia began to grow 
rapidly. So while the African proportion of Atlantic basin population was perhaps 
30% in 1650, it had declined to roughly 10% in 1850: adding in the African-
descended populations of the Occident and Orient would bring the African 
population up to 15% in 1850 (1992, pp. 121-122). 
 
 The lack of data for the early years of the Islamic trade in Africa problematizes 
any effort to quantify the human and social costs of this enterprise. Despite such 
difficulties, however, a study on the order of Walter Rodney’s How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (1974) or Chinweizu’s The West and the Rest of Us (1975) is 
sorely needed to address how Muslim Arabs and their converts systematically looted, 
exploited and undermined traditional African societies in their efforts to foster and 
sustain Islamic hegemony. Such a study also would give particular attention to those 
aspects of Islamic slavery that distinguish it from Occidental and New World 
slaveocracies. Segal’s Islam’s Black Slaves offers an important step in that direction. But 
Segal’s study is more noteworthy for its broad and general overview of the subject rather 
than providing a deeper analysis of Islam’s intolerance of traditional African belief 
systems, its systematic exploitation and destruction of African societies, and its decisive 
role in the development of antiblack racism. Segal, however, does make important 
distinctions between Islamic and Occidental slavery: 
Slavery in Islam was very different. A system of plantation labor, much like that 
which would emerge in the Americas, developed early on, but with such dire 
consequences that subsequent engagements were relatively rare and reduced. 
Moreover, the need for agricultural labor, in an Islam with large peasant 
populations, was nowhere near as acute as in the Americas, where in some West 
European colonies, conquest had led to the virtual extermination of the indigenous 
peoples from disease and forced labor. Slaves in Islam were directed mainly at the 
service sector—concubines and cooks, porters and soldiers—with slavery itself 
primarily a form of consumption rather than a factor of production. The most 
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telling evidence of this is found in the gender ratio. The Atlantic Trade shipped 
overall roughly two males for every female. Among black slaves traded in Islam 
across the centuries, there were roughly two females to every male (2001, p. 4). 
 
The “dire consequences” for early experiments with plantation slavery alluded to 
by Segal above refers to the use of East African slaves known as Zanj in massive land 
reclamation projects in Southern Iraq in the ninth century. The Zanj, taking advantage of 
political turmoil in Iraq, led a revolt that lasted for fifteen years (868-883 CE) and that 
threatened the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. In the end, the Zanj were brutally put down 
and the practice of concentrating large numbers of slaves was discouraged (Irwin 1977, 
77-78). African slaves also were used in palmeries or date plantations in northeast Arabia 
and the Sahara, for agricultural work in fifteenth century Morocco, for cotton production 
in nineteenth century Egypt, on clove plantations in nineteenth century Zanzibar, and for 
growing grain in Mombassa and Malindi on the East African coast (Segal, 2001, pp. 44, 
60). The vast majority of Islam’s African slaves, however, were forced to labor as 
porters, soldiers and domestic workers. The most sought after and prized domestic 
workers were female concubines and male eunuchs.  
The value Muslims placed on female slaves resulted in a significant difference in 
gender ratios between the Atlantic and Islamic slave trades, as noted by Segal above. 
Many of the African women victimized by this human trafficking wound up as 
concubines in Muslim households. Some of them became Muslim wives. Segal offers this 
quote from the twelfth century geographer al-Idrisi (1110-65), which vividly describes 
the physical attributes and appeal of Nubian women in particular: 
Their women are of surpassing beauty. They are circumcised and fragrant-
smelling . . . their lips are thin, their mouths small and their hair flowing. Of all 
black women, they are the best for the pleasure of the bed … It is on account of 
these qualities of theirs that the rulers of Egypt were so desirous of them and 
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outbid others to purchase them, afterwards fathering children from them (2001, p. 
50). 
 
Concubinage was not always a socially degraded position, as Muslim masters 
often married their female slaves without scandal or disrepute. Many such women, 
however, wound up in the enormous harems of the ruling elite. Segal cites two extreme 
examples: the harem of ‘Abd al-Rahman III (2001, 912-61) in Muslim Spain which 
contained “some six thousand concubines” and that of the Fatimid palace in Cairo with 
“twice as many” (2001, p. 39). “Black” and “white” female slaves also were employed as 
singers, dancers and musicians. Several famous schools in Medina, Baghdad, and 
Cordoba provided specialized training in musical and literary arts for female artists. The 
vast majority of female slaves, however, performed domestic duties as cooks, 
nursemaids, and household servants. Not all “black” women in Muslim societies were 
slaves, and some fortunate few were celebrated for their artistic talents or intellectual 
achievements. Israq as-Suwaida, a “black” woman who lived in tenth century Moorish 
Spain, achieved great recognition for her grammar and prosody (Segal, 2001).  
The wealthy elite generally divided the living spaces in their homes into separate 
quarters for men and women. Male domestics, who also worked in these households as 
servants, grooms, messengers, porters and guards, generally were kept away from the 
women’s apartments. Given the Muslim preoccupation with codes of honor and chivalry, 
much effort was expended protecting and secluding women. To this end eunuchs became 
a prominent feature in Muslim households. These castrated slaves were believed to pose 
no sexual threat (or temptation) to household women, although books like Sheikh 
Nefzawi’s Perfumed Garden and the more widely known One Thousand and One Nights 
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relate stories suggesting that all eunuchs were not equally “unmanned” or devoid of the 
desire or the ability to satisfy a woman.  
 The creation and use of tens of thousands of eunuchs remains one of the most 
horrific and detestable features of Islamic slavery. Segal points out: “In ancient Arabia, 
castration seems to have had no place; and when it subsequently did acquire one, the 
practice was roundly condemned by early Muslims” (2001, p. 40). Muslim law forbid 
mutilation of any type, but the law was circumvented through the purchase of slaves 
castrated outside the borders of Islamic states: 
In the Middle Ages, Prague and Verdun became castration centers for the supply 
of European eunuchs; Kharazon, near the Caspian Sea, a center for the supply of 
Central Asian ones. Further circumventions, on Islamic territory, were pursued on 
the basis that the operations were conducted by non-Muslims. In tenth century 
Islamic Spain, Jewish merchants reportedly performed the operation. In the 
nineteenth century, Christian monks ran a castration center at their monastery of 
Deir al-Jandala near Abu Tig, a small town in Upper Egypt (2001, p. 40). 
 
From the above statement it seems that commercial castration of males for 
Muslim markets enjoyed the dubious distinction of being perhaps the only genuinely 
ecumenical enterprise practiced in the so-called Middle Ages. Muslims also must be 
included in the foregoing list. Despite the purported Islamic aversion to mutilation, 
Muslim slave traders in Africa regularly performed castrations while en route to North 
African slave markets. Wellard describes the hazards of the procedure and the journey: 
Since the survival rate was one in ten for the castration operation and one in ten 
for the trans-Saharan journey, the odds against a young castrato reaching the 
Tripoli market were, theoretically, only one in a hundred. But the slave merchants 
could not afford to risk such odds even in the transportation of human beings who 
were easier to capture and transport than civet-cats. So the castrati probably 
received the preferential treatment accorded the especially beautiful virgins who 
were carried in cages on the backs of camels. The other slaves, of course, walked 
and were driven from well to well, arriving at the coast in the form of living 
skeletons, there to be fattened up before being sold at the auctions (author’s 
emphasis) (1964, p. 122). 
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Davis points to the racially discriminative manner in which the operation was 
performed on “black” youth: “The frequent castration of black males for Muslim masters 
has been described as ‘a complete and barbarous amputation, level with the abdomen.’ 
On whites the operation was performed with more generosity” (1984, p. 44). White 
victims of this practice were left with their testicles intact. Segal, citing the same sources, 
adds the further note that African males were forced to endure the extreme procedure 
“based on the assumption that the blacks had an ungovernable sexual appetite” (2001, p. 
52). This obsession with black penises and libido appears often in Arabic literature. In 
Moorish Spain it also appears to have contributed to medieval Spanish concepts of the 
“black stud” (Piedra, 1993, pp. 820-846). A pathological fear of the black penis also can 
be observed in the peculiar American practice of castrating black males during lynching, 
especially those accused of raping or “reckless eyeballing” white females. Orlando 
Patterson’s comments on the ritualistic psychological and social nature of American 
lynching in Rituals of Blood seem applicable and apposite to the earlier Muslim attitudes 
herein discussed: 
The castration of many of the Afro-American victims was indeed a kind of 
communal rape … It may well have been indicative of sexual jealously and 
castration anxieties on the part of the Euro-American oppressors and their need to 
deny any hint of manhood and independence to Afro-American males (1998, p. 
174).  
 
The idea of castration as a sexual act may seem farfetched, but in Islamic societies 
it often served as a prelude to rape in that it created male concubines for Muslim harems. 
Thus eunuchs were prized not only as domestic servants and guards who were 
theoretically unable to have sex with household females, but also as the sexual objects 
and partners of Muslim males. Segal cites a tradition of homosexual love poetry in Persia 
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that underscores the commonplace nature of same-sex intercourse in some Islamic 
societies. The Muslim participants in these liaisons, however, were not necessarily 
exclusively homosexual; such relations often occurred between married men and their 
passive male lovers or concubines. In the specific case of eunuchs, the young male, 
“regardless of his sexual inclinations,” was forced to accept the receptive “female” role, 
and the attendant dishonor that accompanied such a situation in the aggressively 
masculine Muslim culture (Segal, 2001, p. 42). Thousands of African boys found 
themselves suddenly captive in this system of mutilation, rape and degradation. Yet, 
ironically, accounts from inside and outside the Muslim world abound with countless 
references to the respect bestowed upon “black” eunuchs and the many examples of their 
prominence and power in Muslim societies in North Africa and the Near East. The 
reported great esteem accorded to them perhaps was in recognition of their physical and 
mental capacity for survival. According to A. B. Wylde, a British official who served as 
consul in Jedda in the late nineteenth century, every eunuch who survived represented “at 
the very least, 200 Soudanese done to death … say there are 500 eunuchs in Cairo: 
100,000 Soudanese had died to produce these eunuchs” (cited in Segal, 2001, p. 156). 
The massive mortality rate and the insatiable demand for these domestic slaves kept their 
market prices high throughout the thirteen centuries of the Islamic slave trade. On 
average, in the sixteenth century, a eunuch would sell for twice as much as a female 
concubine or male slave. The castration of male slaves continued openly in Arabia into 
the early twentieth century (Segal, 2001, p. 156). After 1910, international attention 
forced Muslim slave traffickers to conduct their operations in secret. Given the 
intractable nature of this odious institution in Islamic society, it is not unreasonable to 
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assume that eunuchs continue to exist and serve in elite Muslim households in the Sudan, 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Mauritania and elsewhere in the Islamic world. 
The Islamic slave trade transported millions of Africans to the Near East, India 
and China. Arabs and their Muslim allies in Africa also served as middlemen in the 
Atlantic slave trade. And Arabs and their Afro-Arab partners enslaved millions of 
Africans in Africa. Muslims certainly did not introduce slavery to Africa, but they created 
new sources of slaves through jihads and transformed local slavery regimes into global 
supply chains that ultimately depopulated and devastated vast areas of the continent. 
Despite the frequency with which “blacks” in Africa converted to Islam for religious 
sustenance and protection from the depredations of jihads and slave raids, “black” 
Muslim converts remained the victims of Islamic slave traffickers. Many Arabs, 
regardless of their own “African” ancestry, saw “black” Africans, regardless of their 
religious affiliation, as commodities to be bought and sold. A nineteenth century 
Moroccan historian, Ahmad ibn Kalid al-Nasiri (1834-97), incensed by the regular 
importation of thousands of enslaved ‘black’ Muslims, and proclaiming them to be 
“among the best peoples in regard to Islam, the most religiously upright, the most avid of 
learning and the most devoted to men of learning,” wrote this searing protestation of their 
treatment: 
Thus it will be apparent to you the heinousness of the affliction which has beset 
the lands of the Maghreb since ancient times in regards to the indiscriminate 
enslaving of the people of the Sudan and the importation of droves of them to be 
sold in the market places in town and country where men trade in them as one 
would trade in beasts—nay worse than that. People have become so inured that, 
generation after generation, that many common folk believe that the reason for 
being enslaved according to the Holy Law is merely that a man should be black in 
colour and come from those regions. This, by God’s life, is one of the foulest and 
gravest evils perpetrated on God’s religion, for the people of the Sudan are 
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Muslims having the same rights and responsibilities as ourselves (cited in Segal, 
2001, p. 65). 
 
Al-Nasiri’s statement underscores the paradoxical nature of Islam’s relationship 
to “black” Africans. Although they were among the first converts to the faith, led Muslim 
armies to victories across the globe, and through intermarriage and intermixture became 
the mothers, fathers, wives, husbands, children of Muslims throughout the Islamic world, 
they often remained marked by an indelible “otherness” in the Arab imagination. Given 
the Muslim belief that the Quran constitutes the indisputable word of Allah, its sanction 
of slavery authorizes and justifies the maintenance of the institution in perpetuity. As 
noted above, as slavery declined in the west in the nineteenth century, the Muslim slave 
trade showed a dramatic increase. Slavery continued openly in Muslim lands into the 
twentieth century, where it operated with the acquiescence of the European imperialist 
powers that had conquered and colonized those territories. It continues today, mainly as 
concubinage and other forms of domestic slavery. Segal devotes a chapter of his book to 
the “survivals of slavery” (2001, pp. 199-223) in twenty-first century Islamic states. 
Ironically, millions of African slaves exported to Muslim countries were absorbed 
through intermarriage and intermixture with their Arab, Persian and Turkish masters and 
mistresses. Their assimilation through conversion to Islam, their frequent manumission, 
the different gender ratios, the documented low birth rate of black females slaves in the 
Arab world, the massive numbers of black male slaves who were unable to procreate due 
to castration, and the high mortality rate for slaves overall in Muslim lands, accounts for 
the fact that very little visible evidence exists today of the legacy of an Islamic trade that 
was equal to or greater than the Atlantic trade. Conversely, in the Americas, with its 
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highly institutionalized systems of apartheid and racial oppression, “black” people remain 
a highly visible and unassimilated presence.  
Finally, it is the human factor on both sides of the equation—the enslaved African 
and the Muslim enslaver—that adds an incalculable element to the business of human 
trafficking and its social consequences and legacy. The only constant in all of this is the 
persistence of slavery in Islamic societies and the lack of scholarly and political attention 
it has received in the west and from the Pan African world. A systematic treatment of this 
failure in scholarship and intervention is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, we will 
now turn our attention to Islam’s role in the formation of proto-racist and racist theories 
regarding “black” people and the transmission of those ideas to the west. 
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Islamic religious ideology grounded in the Mosaic distinction (the true/false 
dichotomy of monotheism) and influenced by the Noachic distinction (the curse of Ham) 
provided a crucial context and content for the social construction of Arab identity and the 
Arab view of “others.” Arabs also assimilated and reworked the Hellenistic, Semitic and 
Iranian ethnological conventions from the Mediterranean world they conquered. With 
this sociohistorical background in mind, I selected the following four points with which 
to examine further the social construction of “black” identity and “blackness” in Islamic 
thought: (1) the grounding of Islam in an uncompromising monotheism that expresses the 
true/false and believer/infidel dichotomies in their most extreme forms—jihad; (2) the 
creation of a vast Arab empire through the Islamic conquest of large sections of the Near 
East, Africa, Europe and Asia; (3) the Islamic slave trade in Africa; and (4) the “mulatto 
problem,” a term taken from the work of Chancellor Williams (1974) and used here to 
describe the antiblack attitudes of Afro-Arabs to their “African” heritage, and the 
manifestation of such attitudes in the social construction of “black” identity and the social 
treatment of “black” people. 
Issue (1)—the Islamic adoption and reformulation of the Mosaic distinction—was 
introduced and examined above. The additional discussion offered here specifically 
focuses on how the ideology of monotheism influenced the development of certain 
stereotypic notions of ethnicity that later informed concepts of race and practices of 
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racism. Islam’s purported founding in Arabia by Arabs fundamentally changed the Arabs 
view of themselves and “others” in part by enabling them to confront the powerful 
institutions of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism with their own monotheistic 
ideology. The same religious ideology that fostered a common Arab social identity rooted 
in the local Arab ethos also reified that identity and made it a potent and authoritative 
force in expanding Arab socio-economic power. For Muslims, the consummate Muslim 
is the Prophet Muhammad. His life exemplifies Muslim comportment, piety and social 
responsibility. As the Prophet of god and revealer of the Quran, Muhammad links the 
Arabs to Allah in the same way Moses links the Jews to Yahweh. It is this image of 
Islam’s prophet, and the Islamic culture that instantiates it, that solidified the 
decentralized fragments of the great empires conquered by Arabs and the new Islamic 
states that emerged in regions as remote and different from each other as Senegal, Bosnia, 
India and Indonesia. Despite the globalization of Islam, and the fact that Arabs now 
constitute a small minority of its adherents, the faith remains Arab-centric in several key 
respects: in the sacred language of the Quran; in the location in Saudi Arabia of the 
primary Islamic religious sites (Mecca and Medina); and in adoption of Arab manners 
and customs by some non-Arab Muslims. By these means Islam retains at its core key 
components of “Arab” character and ethos.  
In contravention of Muhammad’s admonitions to treat all believers as equal 
members of a religious fraternity, the Arabic origin and character of Islam facilitated the 
development of discriminatory policies and practices by Arabs against non-Arab Muslim 
converts. Irwin succinctly states: “Non-Arab Muslims were regarded as inferior and 
subjected to whole series of fiscal, social, political, military, and other disabilities” (1977, 
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p. 123). According to Irwin, the term mawla (pl. mawali), which means “freedman” or 
“client” in Arabic, applied to non-Arab Muslim converts and appeared in a variety of 
sayings denoting the second-class status that accompanied this distinction. Mawali were 
addressed by their personal names without the honorific kunya (the name an Arab derives 
from his or her oldest son); they were not allowed to precede Arabs in processions; walk 
alongside them; sit at table with them during meals unless seated at the end to denote 
their status; or pray at a funeral if an Arab was present. Even a “half-breed” with a free 
Arab father and an enslaved mother of another ethnicity ranked higher than non-Arab 
Muslims (Irwin, 1977, p. 123). Irwin asserts that the result of such attitudes and customs 
meant: “The struggle for equal rights of the non-Arabs was one of the main themes of the 
first two centuries of Islam” (1977, p. 124). In time the intermarriage of Arabs and non-
Arabs mitigated or submerged ethnic distinctions and class barriers. More importantly, 
many of the conquered non-Arabs converted to Islam, adopted Arabic as their language, 
and became Arabs in their customs and manners. This assumption of Arab identity was 
especially common in parts of Africa. 
If discriminatory practices based on ethnic origins and the fact of recent 
conversion existed within Muslim ranks, it should be obvious that non-Muslims would 
comprise an even lower status in Islamic societies. Non-Muslim monotheists (Jews and 
Christians) ranked below non-Arab Muslims, but pagans or cosmotheists generally 
comprised the absolute bottom tier in the Arab social hierarchy (the exceptions being the 
ancient and powerful civilizations of India and China). Muhammad saw his mission as 
one of restoring hanifiyyah, the “pure” faith of the Abrahamic tradition, and himself as 
the last chosen prophet of god. Muslims therefore share with Jews and Christians a 
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common identification with the Abrahamic lineage and the Mosaic distinction that 
emerges from it and a common heritage of “sacred” literature as “people of the book.” 
Consequently, Muslims of the imperial era of Islamic expansion tolerated the continued 
presence of Jews and Christians in conquered Muslim lands as long as they refrained 
from proselytizing and paid the onerous taxes that were levied on non-Muslims. The 
exception to this general policy was the city of Mecca from which non-Muslims were 
banned. Lewis describes Muslim policies toward non-believers as follows: 
For atheists or polytheists the choice was clear—Islam or death. For Jews and 
Christians, possessors of what were regarded as revealed religions based on 
authentic though superceded revelations, the choice included a third term—Islam, 
death, or submission. Submission involved the payment of tribute and the 
acceptance of Muslim supremacy. Death might be commuted to slavery. Those 
who submitted, according to Muslim law and practice, could be accorded the 
tolerance of the Muslim state. The resulting relationship was regulated by a pact 
called, in Arabic, the dhimma (1982, p. 63). 
 
The Arab opinion and treatment of African peoples depended on the religious and 
social variables discussed above. The centuries-old traditions of Judaism and Christianity 
in Ethiopia, and the region’s ancient and enduring reputation for civilization and learning 
set them apart in the Arab mind from other, less-developed cultures they encountered in 
Africa. And, as Irwin explains: “During the lifetime of the Prophet the good reputation of 
the Ethiopians was further increased by the kindly welcome afforded to Muslim refugees 
from Mecca” (1977, p. 126). The following comment from the eminent Pan Africanist 
Jan Carew, underscores the centrality of this region of Africa in the development of 
Islam:   
When the Prophet Muhammad fled to Medina, some of his most devoted 
followers crossed the Red Sea and began to proselyte in Ethiopia. So, the first 
significant groups of the converted were Africans. The Muslim religion, therefore, 
was filtered through the great African civilizations of the Nile Valley—the 
Ethiopian, the Nubian, and the Egyptian—in its earliest stages (1992, p. 252). 
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 Again, with the notable exceptions of India and China, Muslims had no tolerance 
for pagan cultures. Triumphant jihads in North Africa resulted in the massive 
enslavement of pagan Africans under the auspices and sanction of Quranic tradition. The 
rigorous application of this religious mandate to eliminate pagan cultures changed the 
course of African history, and decisively predisposed European perceptions of the 
continent’s inhabitants long before they pursued their own imperialist ambitions in 
Africa. The Noachic curse also appeared frequently in medieval Arabic literature to 
justify and rationalize the Islamic trade in “black” slaves. The centuries preceding the 
revelation and formulation of Islam witnessed a major elaboration of Noah’s curse in 
rabbinic treatises. From the fourth to the sixth centuries several aforementioned rabbinic 
commentaries “darkened the face of Ham and made the curse of Noah read: ‘Your seed 
will be ugly and dark-skinned’” (Evans, 1980, p. 26). Two factors perhaps explain this 
development. First, the racial stereotyping of slaves by Jews may have reflected an 
increase in the trade in “black” slaves in the region. Second, as Evans puts it: “During the 
Middle Ages the Jews became to a larger extent a European as well as a Near Eastern 
people, and they came to share the stereotypes of both regions” (1980, p. 27). Evans goes 
on to note: “After the sixth century, it was those less Europeanized sons of Shem, the 
Arabs, who further developed the tradition of Ham” (1980, p. 27). Werner Sollors in his 
incomparable study of interracial literature, Neither black nor white yet both, offers the 
following version of Noah’s curse, recounted by Muhammad al-Tabari (circa 838-923), a 
renowned Persian historian: 
Noah begat three, each one of whom begat three: Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Shem 
begat the Arabs, Persians and Byzantines, in all of whom there is good. Japheth 
begat the Turks, Slavs, Gog, and Magog, in none of whom there is good. Ham 
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begat the Copts, Sudanese and Berbers […] Ham begat all those who are black 
and curly-haired, while Japheth begat all those who are full-faced with small eyes, 
and Shem begat every one who is handsome of face with beautiful hair. Noah 
prayed that the hair of Ham’s descendants would not grow beyond their ears, and 
that wherever his descendants met the children of Shem, the latter would enslave 
them … (1997, p. 90). 
 Evans refers to this same quoted passage as “typical of the form it [Noah’s curse] 
had assumed by the later Middle Ages” (1980, p. 33). The influential Tabari’s rendition 
of the curse reflects its common and frequent appearance in medieval Muslim literature 
despite the fact the Quran makes no mention of it in its sparse treatment of the story of 
Noah (see Suras 49:13, 30:22). Ironically, al-Tabari, in the above quote, directs his 
harshest remarks to Japheth’s descendants. What is more noteworthy, however, is the 
decidedly “racial” tone of his exegetical treatment of the myth. As Sollors points out: 
“This [passage] is an example of a genealogy that is moving into the direction of 
identifying peoples by ‘racial’ features …” (1997, p. 90). 
The Quran, a seventh century composition, does not equate slavery with 
blackness in its rendition of the Noah story or elsewhere in its texts. Yet, as noted by 
Davis, increasingly after the eight century: “Arabic literature was already merging 
blackness of skin with a variety of derogatory physical and characterological traits” 
(1984, p. 42). The eighth century marks the true beginnings of Arabic literature. Prior to 
Arab imperialism, poetry was the most common form of Arabic writing. Thus the very 
beginning of the Arabic prose tradition saw the establishment of a tropology that not only 
commonly linked blackness to servitude, but also to sin, evil, licentiousness, and bestial 
behavior. By the late medieval era the designation Banu Ham (the “sons of Ham”), with 
its decidedly pejorative connotations, had become a synonym in popular Arabic literature 
for Sudan, “black” people (Evans, 1980, p. 29). 
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The biblical genealogy delineated in the Noah story (and shared by Jews and 
Christians) underwent important revisions in medieval Muslim hands. Evans points out 
that Egyptians and Berbers—who were clearly identified in the Genesis “tables of 
nations” as descendants of the accursed Ham—were exempted from the curse because: 
“they were the products of cultures more urbane and sophisticated than that of their 
conquerors” (Evans, 1980, p. 33). This important cultural distinction between Arab 
conquerors and certain societies they defeated in Africa and the Near East will be dealt 
with below in issue 2. Here it worthwhile to note that Arabs sought to reprieve the 
citizens of those of ancient centers of culture and learning from Noah’s curse through 
revising the genealogy or by simply absolving them of the “sin committed by their 
ancestor” (Evans, 1980, p. 33). So-called sub-Saharan Africans did not receive this 
generous exemption. Instead, Arab writers generally depicted and characterized them as 
the lowest of human beings or sub-human in nature, mentality and temperament.  
The examples cited above illustrate how the Mosaic distinction influenced and 
amplified the ethnocentrism, religious bias and color prejudice that informed the Islamic 
Arab worldview. The true/false dichotomy in monotheism and its manifestation in the 
social construction of believers/infidels achieved its most violent expression in the form 
of jihad or holy war. Those unfortunate pagan cultures that found themselves in the path 
of this unprovoked onslaught often had to choose between the decidedly limited options 
of enslavement or extermination. The Noachic distinction or curse of Ham provided 
Arabs with a convenient religious justification for the perpetual exploitation of certain 
“black” people within and outside the Muslim sphere of influence. Such beliefs and 
attitudes and the policies that institutionalized them in Muslim societies, in time, came to 
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encompass nearly all “blacks” regardless of their ethnic origins or religious beliefs. The 
explanation for this can be seen, in part, in the transformation of the slave trade. Evans 
contends: “the reason Muslim slavery became Negro slavery was because the rise of 
Islam eliminated from the Mediterranean slave trade an important source of light-skinned 
slaves” (1980, p. 28). With freeborn Muslims exempted from slavery, and dhimmis (Jews 
and Christians in Muslim states) afforded the protection of Islamic law: “Lawful captives 
had to be taken either north of the Mediterranean or south of the Sahara” (Evans, 1980, p. 
28). Although many European slaves entered the slave markets in the early centuries of 
Islam, after the tenth century most slaves in Muslims lands were “black” by popular 
demand and due to simple supply-side economics. The color-coding of slavery—an 
outgrowth of the merger of the believer/infidel dichotomy and the Noachian curse—
fostered and facilitated the color-coding of prejudice and the formation of antiblack 
racism. Nevertheless, intermarriage, intermixture and conversion often meant that “color” 
posed no permanent or impenetrable barrier to advancement in the Islamic world. 
Countless examples from all periods in Islam’s growth and development support this 
fact—although it must be emphasized that over time the overwhelming majority of 
“blacks” in lands dominated by Arabs, Persians and Turks eventually came to occupy the 
lowest strata of those societies.  
Issue 2—the role of Arab imperialism in the development of antiblack racism—of 
necessity, has been addressed in the sections above. In light of the rapid Arab successes 
in conquering vast portions of the globe, the fact often gets lost that many early Muslim 
armies were composed of fractious desert tribes who were united only by Islam and a 
common desire to plunder their neighbors. Given the initial perceptions of Islam as a 
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tribal Arab religion and its early non-canonical ban on the conversion of non-Arabs, the 
original impetus for jihad was warfare to expand Arab hegemony rather than Islamic 
theology. The desert nomads who comprised the bulk of the Arab military forces were 
not enlightened bringers of science, technology or literate culture; they were, instead, 
raiders, plunderers, pillagers and killers (Bostom, 2005; Fregosi, 1998). Therefore, it was 
through military occupation and military rule over ancient centers of learning in North 
Africa and the Near East that Arabs acquired and assimilated the accoutrements, customs 
and skills of civilizations materially and intellectually more developed and sophisticated 
than their own. Within a few generations of establishing a far-flung global empire an 
international network of Arabic scholars and institutions of Islamic learning developed 
and flourished. Thus the great Islamic centers of research and education were located not 
in Medina or Mecca in Arabia, but in Cairo in Egypt, Baghdad in Iraq, Timbuktu in Mail, 
and Cordoba, Grenada and Seville in Moorish Spain (Pimienta-Bey, 1992). 
The nearly instantaneous triumph of Arab armies over a vast portion of the 
Hellenistic and Roman empires—filtered through Arab ethnocentrism and chauvinism—
no doubt strengthen their belief that they were the legitimate possessors and heirs of 
classical civilization. That they built a unique Muslim civilization on the foundation of 
ruined empires is indisputable. Arabic scholars translated and preserved great works of 
antiquity and used them to expand the frontiers of human knowledge. Jan Carew’s 
description of Arab and Moorish contributions to the medieval world best summarizes 
this point:  
Muslim scholars had found a particular fascination in the philosophy and science 
of the early Greeks (not realizing their debts to the Egyptians) and after 
translating the texts of Aristotle, Plato, Ptolemy, Euclid, Heracleitus, Galen, 
Hippocrates and others, they analyzed and improved upon them, drawing from 
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their wide-ranging intellectual experiences and observations in the vast territories 
they ruled, and the polyglot races and peoples with whom they traded in 
knowledge, ideas and goods. Muslims scholars absorbed, synthesized and 
expanded upon the knowledge of the Ethiopians and Egyptians, the Phoenicians, 
the Greeks, the Chinese, and the Indians. A new and momentous forward leap in 
the theoretical and applied sciences evidenced itself in Moorish mathematics, 
medicine, astronomy, navigation, and new concepts of world geography and 
philosophy. The popularity of Moorish scholarship was such, that for centuries 
Arabic was commonly accepted as the language of scholars from Europe, Asia 
and Africa, and the Moorish intellectual centers in Toledo, Cordova, Seville and 
Granada became Meccas of learning (1992, p. 254). 
 
Carew’s analysis of the development of the Islamic intellectual tradition 
emphasizes in this particular quote the transmission from and through Africa, and 
through the Moorish culture that flourished in North Africa and Spain, research and 
scholarship that ultimately would bring Europe out of its Dark Ages. The central location 
of Muslim strongholds in the Near East and Egypt facilitated the creation and sustenance 
of a vast network of scholars who could publish and exchange works from China in the 
east to Spain in the west. The immensity of this empire also provided the context and 
conditions for the emergence of an Arabic ethnographic tradition and furnished the 
opportunity for Arab scholars, travelers and geographers to contrast and compare a vast 
array of human societies and cultures. Using the earlier scientific works of the ancient 
Greeks rediscovered in Egypt and translated into Arabic mostly by non-Arab scholars, 
Muslim writers developed a standard ethnological discourse pertaining to “blacks” and 
“others.” Arabic ethnological discourses, combined with additional source materials from 
travel tales, slave traders’ manuals, and folklore, comprised a popular literary genre 
devoted to mirabilia (accounts of the fantastic) that circulated widely among Islamic 
literati. Mirabilia reflected a taste for exoticism and tall tales, but contributed 
 163 
nevertheless to the Arabic ethnographic conventions that emerged after the eight century 
(Al-Azmeh, 1992, p. 5).  
Aziz Al-Azmeh in his article, Barbarians in Arab Eyes, examines and details how 
Arabs “construed that consummate emblem of otherness and exoticism which is the 
barbarian” (1992, p. 3). Al-Azmeh uses the term barbarian to present and represent a set 
of complex ideas governing the objectification of the objectified “other” in the social 
construction of difference. He defines and describes this cultural mode of identity 
formation as follows: 
States, civilization and cultures expend much energy, not commensurate with 
size, fixing moral boundaries, consolidating their difference from outsiders, and 
otherwise encircling themselves with frontiers impermeable to the exotic; and this 
energy intensifies in circumstances of commotion, instability and conflict, turning 
to a frenzy of positive hostility most dramatically represented by theoretical and 
practical racism. It is unclear why the internal cohesion of historical masses and 
their construction of identities appear to be sustained by exclusivity as if by a 
force of nature, but it is demonstrable that a sense of normality, continuity and 
affinity is invariably sustained by conjuring contraries and indices of difference. 
For it is the case that these historical masses do not theorize ethnological 
difference, but rest upon inverting the normal self and construing the other as 
pathological (Al-Azmeh, 1992, p. 3). 
 
Al-Azmeh’s suggestion of a natural tendency in human societies to construct 
social identities which in turn produce racial theories and racist practices that define and 
sustain cultural “normality, continuity and affinity” falsely assumes that what may be 
common in recent “historical” experience is true in the totality of human existence. 
Consequently, al-Azmeh’s analysis is presented here specifically to address the Islamic 
mode of constructing self and ‘other,’ and not as a paradigm of racial theory. Barbarism, 
after all, is a term fraught with terminological problems, and is clearly a matter of the 
“eye of the beholder.” The nomadic Arab tribes that swept out of the Arabian Peninsula 
in a frenzy of jihad most likely appeared as “pathological” barbarians to the urbane 
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cultures they conquered and dominated. This irony seems to have escaped Al-Azmeh’s 
attention, although he is mindful of just such a viewpoint expressed in Eurocentric studies 
of Arabs and Islam in the last two centuries (1992, p. 3). In establishing the cognitive 
roots of Arabic ethnography, Al-Azmeh also argues: “Religion played little or no role in 
this construal of the other, except in so far as the inversion of normality implies an 
absence of religion properly speaking, or barbarous forms of idolatry and animism” 
(1992, p. 4). His use of the terms “idolatry” and “animism”—in minimizing the role of 
religion (Islam) in the construction of Arab ethnological discourse—reveals his own 
monotheistic bias or conception of “normality.” In a similar vein he insists: “The topoi 
and cognate representatives of others were shared by Muslim and non-Muslim authors 
alike” (Al-Azmeh, 1992, p. 4). The cross-cultural presence of ethnic stereotypes—the 
fact Muslim and non-Muslim authors “shared” them—in no way supports the contention 
that they were somehow devoid of religious context or content. Instead, their shared 
traditions of monotheism and the Mosaic distinction provided a common vernacular and 
idiom within which such negative ethnic notions about pagans and their cultures could 
evolve and gain currency. These criticisms aside, however, Al-Azmeh identifies and 
analyzes key concepts and texts that influenced the Arab perception of barbarism: the 
Greek notion of barbaroi; the Jewish notion of the goyim; well-known treatises by Pliny, 
Strabo and Galen; and the lesser-known work of Bardaisan, a Mesopotamian Syriac 
writer (1992, p. 4). Al-Azmeh excludes northern European influence from this confluence 
of ideas, and concludes: “Arabic authors imbibed notions that had been widely 
disseminated, orally and in writing, around the Mediterranean basin and in the 
syncretistic seats of Hellenistic, Iranian and Semitic trade and culture … as well as from 
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representations of direct Chinese and Indian provenance” (1992, p. 4). The juxtaposition 
of these diverse ethnographic concepts with popular stereotypes and folklore that 
developed in the Arab world produced the complex and composite image of the barbarian 
in Arab eyes. But that image and its accompanying rhetoric ultimately came to be 
dominated by emerging scientific theories and thinking in Islamic culture. Al-Azmeh 
states: 
Arabic ethnology, including the ethnography of barbarism, was governed by a 
natural-scientific ecological determinism mediated through the notions of humoral 
medicine. Briefly stated, medieval Arabic culture followed the Greek conception 
of the inhabited world as consisting of seven latitudinal zones that began slightly 
north of the equator and ended in the realms of perpetual darkness in the north. 
Beyond the zones (aqualim, from the Greek klimata) human habitation was not 
possible, and within their boundaries the nature of the changing environment 
prescribed different temperaments to the inhabitants. The four primary qualities of 
dryness, humidity, heat and cold, that attached to the four elements, entered into 
four combinations that yielded the basic somatic humours of blood (hot and 
humid), phlegm (cold and humid), bile (hot and dry) and atrabile or black bile 
(cold and dry). Embryonic growth was the result of the “cooking’ together of 
these four humours (1992, p. 6). 
 
The notions of humoral medicine described above figured heavily in Muslim 
experimental science, particularly chemistry and alchemy, and, through the global 
dissemination of Islamic scholarship, entered the West and influenced the development of 
science in Europe. The rediscovery in Egypt of the works of Galen, a second century C.E. 
medical authority who lived for a while in Alexandria, provided a conceptual framework 
for Arabic ethnology, especially the ethnography of barbarism as applied to “black” 
peoples. Galen posited ten traits purportedly characteristic of African “blacks” that in 
addition to blackness of skin included: “kinky hair; thin or sparse eyebrows; wide 
nostrils; thick lips; sharp, white teeth; ‘chapped’ hands and feet; an offensive odor; eyes 
with large black pupils; inferior intelligence; and an oversized penis” (Davis, 1984, p. 
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42). The notion that “black” penises could be typically “oversized” says much about 
Hellenistic concepts of somatic normality, and perhaps contributed to the pathological 
need of medieval Muslims to castrate “black” males. Penis size and the other stock 
elements of Galen’s infamous laundry list of “black” traits formed a constellation of 
stereotypes that operated in tandem with Muslim theories of ecological determinism to 
produce a “scientific” paradigm of “black” identity—or what later has come to be known 
as “scientific racism.” The Islamic scholars who innovated and eventually canonized this 
literary convention rejected the explanation of “black inferiority” suggested by Noah’s 
curse and sought instead—like many Enlightenment-era scientists and scholars of Europe 
centuries later—to explain and justify their beliefs in black “disnature” and intellectual 
incapacity through the natural phenomena of climate and environment. Ibn Khaldun (d. 
1406) the famous Tunisian-born historian who also lived in Egypt, categorically rejected 
Noah’s curse as an explanation for the origins of “blackness.” His famous work the 
Mukaddima challenged and contested Muslim and Jewish writers who ascribed to this 
widespread theory as follows: 
Certain genealogists, ignorant of the nature of things, imagined that the Sudan, 
who are the descendants of Ham b. Nuh (Ham, son of Noah), are set apart (from 
other men) by their black color as a result of the curse (which Noah) laid upon 
their father Ham. According to them, Ham’s black color as well as his slave 
condition were decreed by that curse of God. Noah’s malediction of his son Ham 
is reported in the Tawrat (Torah). In that book this is not at all a question of black 
color. The curse has no other aim than to make Ham a slave of his brother’s 
descendants, and that is all. To connect the black color of the Sudan with (the 
curse laid upon) Ham is to fail to understand the nature of heat and cold, and of 
their influence on climate and on the condition of animal life (cited in Sollors, 
1997, p. 91). 
 
Ibn Khaldun took the Greek term “Ethiop” (meaning, “burnt face”) at face value, 
and championed an environmental explanation for the apparent differences in human 
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phenotypes. But he and his scientific-minded colleagues also used environmental theories 
to explain and rationalize what they claimed were congenital cognitive deficiencies, 
behavioral abnormalities, and physical defects in “blacks” (and in northern Europeans) 
(Dover, 1952). The Greek theory of seven latitudinal zones of human habitation ascribed 
different temperaments to each zone’s inhabitants. This template of human geography 
assigned the first zone to the equatorial regions and described it as barely habitable due to 
excessive heat (B. Isaac, 2006; B. H. Isaac, 2004). Arabic writers found in this paradigm 
a ready explanation not only for the physical appearance of “blacks” (and others), but 
also for their behavior. Thus the sun, which was deemed responsible for a catalog of 
psychosocial pathologies and physical deformities in the tropics, made “blacks” erratic, 
cunning, lascivious, over-sexed and incapable of learning because their brains retained 
little humidity due to excessive heat. Additionally, their snub noses, big lips, bug eyes, 
burnt skins and big penises caused them to resemble in appearance and habits the animals 
that shared their environment. In the Arab mind these combined characteristics 
constituted the types of human beings who were “consummately barbarous.” Thus the 
extreme environmental conditions in these zones of habitation--whether in the extreme 
north or south--produced extremes in human disnature, temperament and appearance (Al-
Azmeh, 1992, pp. 7-11). Al-Azmeh summarizes the manner in which such statements 
appeared in Arabic texts as follows: 
This fashioning of ethnological stereotypes through natural scientific determinism 
coexisted, without any apparent sense of unease, with detailed ethnographic 
descriptions of various African and northern societies, not only in the same 
cultural ambience, but also within one and the same text, where ethnological 
typification and ethnographic description served different purposes. This was 
particularly the case with peoples having territorial states, which caused the 
Ethiopians to be regarded as the most exalted of Negroes — so exalted, indeed, 
that it was from them that kings chose their eunuchs, thus underlining power 
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relationships which underpinned ethnological types locally in Muslim domains 
and at large in a world organized by and for these domains (1992, p. 12).  
 
Neither “whiteness” nor “white” people seem to have attracted the kind of intense 
intellectual preoccupation or social animus in the Arabic mind as “blacks.” Lewis 
identifies Banu’l-Asfar, which means “sons of the yellow [one],” as the term used in 
medieval Arab texts “to designate the peoples of Europe” (1982, p. 141). Apparently this 
label, which the ancient Arabs first applied to Greeks and Romans, later expanded to 
include “the natives of Spain and then to Europeans in general” (Lewis, 1982, p. 141). 
The term is derived from biblical genealogies. Asfar, the grandson of Esau, is the father 
of Rumil the purported ancestor of the Greeks and Romans (Rum). The following 
observation from Lewis about the rhetorical use of Banu’l-Asfar reveals a crucial 
distinction in the Muslim social construction of “blacks” and “whites”: 
Some scholars have explained the terms as referring to the lighter skin color of the 
Europeans, seen as yellow, i.e., blonde, in contrast to the brown and black of 
Africa and Asia. This seems unlikely. Arab and Persian authors usually call 
whites, white, not yellow. Moreover they rarely speak of Europeans in terms of 
race or color. While aware, sometimes sharply, of the contrast between 
themselves and their darker-skinned neighbors to the south and east, they attach 
much less importance to the somewhat lighter complexions of their neighbors to 
the north (emphasis added) (1982, p. 141). 
 
Derogatory references to Europeans did appear in association with the ethnic 
stereotypes prescribed according to the theory of seven latitudinal zones of climate and 
environment. Terms like “blanched” and “leprous” in Arabic ethnography convey a 
contemptuous view of the skin color of northern European groups. Nevertheless, the 
crucial point to be gleaned from Lewis’s comment above is that “whites” were mostly 
exempt from notions of “racial” difference because “whiteness” itself did not generally 
constitute a separate category of identity in the Muslim mind but was viewed instead as 
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the normative human condition or state. Given this orientation “whites” could be 
barbarians, but as Al-Azmeh puts it: “they were merely barbarous, and not consummately 
barbarian” (1992, p. 7). Unlike “blacks,” they could overcome their social and moral 
deficiencies if given the proper socialization and religious training.  
 Although the rhetoric expressed by Arabic ethnographers went a long way in 
laying the foundation for the emergence of modern racist thought, Muslim scholars, 
unlike their later Euro-American counterparts, never developed the concept of 
polygenesis (the theory that “blacks” evolved separately) to explain the purported 
savagery and barbarism of Africans. Their strict adherence to the Quranic teachings that 
all humans descended from a single soul prevented them from questioning the underlying 
unity of the human family. Yet what Arabic writers like Al-Idrisi, Said al-Andalusi, Ibn 
Khaldun, Al-Masudi, Ibn Battuta, Ibn al-Faqih, Nasiri al-Din Tutsi and others said about 
“blacks” could provide a primer for Racism 101, and did, in a sense, for the masses of 
literate Muslims and non-Muslims educated in the Islamic world. Arabic ethnographic 
discourse was disseminated throughout the Islamic empire in the form of adab—urbane 
secular Arabic writing that included history, geography and popular literature. According 
to Al-Azmeh: “Adab was the means of cultivating a common cultural identity, and the 
mirror-image of this identity and its shades, which was barbarism in its many gradations, 
was a mode in which exclusion buttressed and sharpened the social boundaries of a 
reflexive culture” (1992, p. 18). What Al-Azmeh benignly refers to as “the social 
boundaries of a reflexive culture,” hardly describes the religious ideology and 
ethnocentric ethos that dictated and governed the social constructions of “self” and 
“other” in Islamic society. Through the literary vehicle of adab, Arabic writers 
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popularized and institutionalized stereotypic notions of “black” barbarity that eventually 
became widely adopted tropoi in Western literature. Arabic ethnography infiltrated 
European thought through the internationally renowned centers of learning in Moorish 
Spain. Carew states: “At the zenith of Moorish power, al-Andalus [Spain], that land of 
many cities, attracted scholars from England, France, Germany, Italy, the rest of Europe, 
as well as from distant parts of the Muslim empire” (1992, p. 258). The translation and 
dissemination of Arabic ethnographic discourse throughout Europe from the widely 
studied and imitated corpus of Arabic literature provided an intellectual foundation and 
impetus for the development of antiblack racism and Eurocentrism in the late medieval 
and early modern eras.  
Imperial power gave Arabs the opportunities to transform themselves from 
“barbarian” hordes into sophisticated and urbane global entrepreneurs and purveyors of 
Islam. Like the Greeks and Romans who ruled vast empires before them, Arabs 
conquered those who became their teachers. Unlike their predecessors, however, they 
used religious ideology and military prowess in tandem to establish a slaveocracy 
partially based on race. Thus the Islamization of the African slave trade constituted a 
decisive step toward the establishment of a pigmentocracy—the kind of racially 
structured slave society that became a fixture in the New World. 
Issue (3) — the role of the Arabic slave trade in Africa and in the Islamic 
construction of race—also, of necessity, has been dealt with in some detail in the sections 
above. A few points need amplification in addressing how Islamification of the slave 
trade led eventually to the racialization of slavery. Muhammad, who according to 
tradition owned slaves, explicitly rejected color prejudice in a number of widely quoted 
 171 
remarks attributed to him. Muslims, however, often expressed attitudes and beliefs that 
did not conform to his teachings and strictures. And, as the Islamic slave trade in Africa 
shows, even “dark-skinned” Muslims frequently found themselves subjected to captivity, 
sale and forced servitude in contravention of Quranic tradition. The terms Arabs used for 
slaves also denoted color consciousness and racial distinctions. In medieval times the 
term abd designated “black” slaves, while mamluk—“an Arabic word meaning 
‘owned’”—became the typical appellation for white slaves (Irwin, 1977, p. 127). 
Eventually abd came to represent a “black” person whether enslaved or free. In North 
Africa and Moorish Spain, khadim, a word that means servant, commonly was used to 
refer to “black” slaves or concubines (Irwin, 1977, p. 127). Thus a lexicon developed to 
differentiate amongst the millions of slaves of diverse ethnic origins that entered the 
newly acquired Muslim empire. These labels demonstrate that slavery was never 
exclusively identified with “blackness” in the Muslim world, as it would be later in the 
Americas. Nevertheless, Muslims made clear and crucial distinctions in the treatment and 
employment of “black” and “white” slaves. The practice of totally castrating black males 
for the slave market versus the partial castration of “whites,” furnishes a salient example. 
More importantly, “black” slaves typically filled the most menial, onerous and dangerous 
positions in the Muslim work force. Other than domestic work, “black” slaves labored in 
mines, on plantations and in the military. Slave soldiers served in various parts of the 
Muslim world, and were of particular importance in the Islamic conquest of North Africa 
(Brunson & Rashidi, 1992; Pipes, 1980). Slavery in the Islamic world generally followed 
the ancient precedent and dubious distinction of being an equal-opportunity enterprise, 
but, as the numbers of “white” slaves declined and “blacks” became the vast majority of 
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Islamic slaves, the degradation, debasement and servility associated with slavery acquired 
a black face and a black identity.  
Issue (4)—the “mulatto problem”—introduces a critical psychosocial and political 
component in the development of “black” identity that is central to understanding the 
construction of “race” in the Islamic world and in the West. The Afrocentric historian 
Chancellor Williams coined the term and defined the “mulatto problem” in The 
Destruction of Black Civilization (1974), a classic work of twentieth century black 
scholarship devoted to establishing a new approach to African studies. Williams’ writings 
resonate with racialist concepts that reflect his vindicationist mission as a “black” 
historian. Although he generally treats race as a sociohistorical phenomenon rather than a 
biological fact, his ambition to place “blacks” “center stage—into their own history …” 
often results in his use of essentialist theories and rhetoric (1974, p. 45). This African-
centered approach and agenda dominates his discursive strategy and rhetorical style, as 
evidenced by this passage that locates the roots of the “mulatto problem” in the Asian 
invasions and conquests of Egypt: 
The invading conquerors not only capture and control all political and economic 
power by military might, but, even though they may be nomadic barbarians, they 
generally claim to be from a higher civilization and, therefore, reinforce the myth 
of being superior in fact, and not just because of military conquests. Even if no 
such claim is made, the new ruling classes and all members of their race are 
superior vis-à-vis the indigenous or conquered people.... This meant that even in 
the beginning, “siding with the Asians” was not solely determined by whether one 
was a half-breed or full-blooded African…. Indeed, so anxious were some of 
these early Blacks for “integration” with the Asians that they themselves did most 
in creating the new breed of Egyptians who were to become their mortal enemies. 
For in an all-out effort to appease the invaders they freely gave their daughters 
and other desirable females as gifts to become concubines, thus speeding up the 
reproduction processes on an ever-widening scale. Nor did this lessen the 
wholesale capture of women in raids on African villages for the same purpose and 
for export to Asia (C. Williams, 1974, pp. 76-77). 
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To appreciate Williams’ remarks in context it is necessary to ask the question: If 
not military might, what actually comprised and justified the Asian conquerors’ claims of 
superiority or compelled Africans to seek “integration” with their invaders? Before the 
rise and spread of monotheism in the Near East, Africans in Egypt shared a common 
cosmotheistic worldview with the Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and Romans who, in 
succession, conquered vast areas of the Nile Valley. Thus the notion that “my god is true 
and yours is false” did not contribute to the conception or perception of superiority or of 
other presumed differences between non-African invaders and the Africans they 
conquered and ruled. We need to look elsewhere, then, to understand the cultural 
differences that figured in this process and how they operated in alienating Africans from 
their own ethos. The Senegalese scientist and historian Cheikh Anta Diop in The Cultural 
Unity of Black Africa posits a “two-cradle theory” to account for “certain non-essential 
relative differences among peoples” (1978, p. 9). Diop defines and locates his “southern 
cradle” of socialization as follows: 
[…] the Meridional cradle, confined to the African continent in particular, is 
characterized by the matriarchal family, the creation of the territorial state, in 
contrast to the Aryan city-state, the emancipation of women in domestic life, 
xenophilia, cosmopolitanism, a sort of social collectivism having as corollary a 
tranquility going as far as unconcern for tomorrow, a material solidarity of right 
for each individual, which makes moral or material misery unknown to the 
present day; there are people living in poverty but no one feels alone and no one is 
in distress. In the moral domain it shows and ideal of peace, of justice, of 
goodness and an optimism which eliminates all notion of guilt or original sin in 
religious and metaphysical institutions. The types of literature most favored are 
the novels, tales, fables and comedy (1978, p. 195). 
 
Diop confines his “northern cradle” to Greece and Rome and argues that the 
patriarchal family, the city-state and xenophobia constitute the distinguishing 
characteristics of this category. He goes on to state: 
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An ideal of war, violence, crime and conquests, inherited from nomadic life, with 
as a consequence, a feeling of guilt and original sin, which causes pessimistic 
religious or metaphysic systems to be built, is the special attribute of this cradle. 
Technical progress and modern life, the progressive emancipation of modern 
women under the very influence of this individualism, so many factors make it 
difficult to recall the ancient condition of servitude of the Aryan woman. The 
literary style par excellence is tragedy or drama. The African, since the agrarian 
myths of Egypt, never went beyond the cosmic drama (Diop, 1978, pp. 195-196). 
Although Diop confines the northern cradle to Greece and Rome, elsewhere in his 
presentation he discusses Western Asia as the “zone of confluence or meeting place of 
the two cradles, that which has been most bitterly disputed between the two worlds” 
(1978, p. 94). Arabia falls within this zone. Citing similar data used by Drusilla Dunjee 
Houston (1926) in her classic Afrocentric text, Diop speaks of Arabs as resulting from 
the intermixture of northern and southern elements with the northern nomadic culture, 
“accompanied by the dominance of the patriarchal system,” triumphing over the southern 
or “Cushite” customs and traditions (Diop, 1978, pp. 94-100). It is northern nomadic 
culture that brings Arabia under the purview of Diop’s northern cradle, and provides the 
Arab invaders with customs and traditions that came into direct conflict with the 
indigenous African societies they conquered. 
Theories of patriarchy and matriarchy—based mainly on the work of nineteenth 
century scholars J. J. Bachofen, Lewis Henry Morgan and Friedrich Engels—figure 
foremost in Diop’s formation and analysis of his two general categories of socialization. 
According to those theories, early human groups defined relationships and traced their 
lineage through the female line, through motherhood, and this in turn became the central 
mechanism for determining social structure, social status, marriage arrangements and the 
transfers through inheritance of property, rights and honors (Bachofen, 1926). 
Motherhood and the prominent social status of women came first because the male role in 
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procreation remained largely unknown to early human groups. Diop, with customary 
caution, delineates and examines these arguments against a broad array of psychological, 
ethnographic and sociological data, pointing to inconsistencies, anachronisms, fallacies 
and analytical errors before placing them in the context of his own views. He 
categorically rejects the idea that “the participation of the father in the conception of the 
child” was totally unknown, and argues that it was viewed as “secondary and less 
operative than that of the mother. He states: “While it is known that the father does 
supply something, the identity of the child and the mother is a matter of conviction” 
(Diop, 1978, p. 41). In African American parlance, the saying goes: “Mama’s baby, 
daddy’s maybe.” 
Robert S. McElvaine in Eve’s Seed: Biology, the Sexes and the Course of History 
(2001), using an approach he calls “biohistory,” explores the effects of gender roles and 
misperceptions about sexual difference on human cultures over the last 10,000 years. 
McElvaine posits the discovery of paternity as follows: “At some point during the 
development of agriculture and animal husbandry, probably as a result of the observation 
of kept animals, people began to more fully perceive the male role in procreation …” 
(2001, p. 122). With paternity established as a biological fact, social structures gradually 
changed to reflect male centeredness or dominance in human reproduction as patrilineal 
customs emerged around the new organizing concept of biological fatherhood. Ironically, 
the discovery of paternity did not result in an understanding that males as fathers and 
females as mothers jointly created their offspring. Instead, the notion developed and 
proliferated that the male “planted” semen (“seed,” in Latin) in the female’s womb, 
which, without any genetic contribution from the female, was then brought to parturition. 
 176 
McElvaine labels this dualistic view of procreation the “conception misconception,” and 
argues that the radical shift from a “woman-born” to a “male-born” paradigm for human 
reproduction is the subject of numerous myths in the ancient world (2001, p. 122). The 
well know story in Genesis of Adam and Eve, which first appeared in written form 
sometime after 600 BCE, presents a typical example of the “male-born” paradigm, 
sacralized and rendered as holy writ. Eve’s emergence from Adam’s womb (rib) 
established a mythic typology for male reproduction. In Greek mythology the goddess 
Athena springs full-grown from Zeus’ forehead and is thusly “fathered.” The Greek 
playwright Aeschylus (circa 525-456 BCE) in The Eumenides has Athena proclaim: 
“There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth” (cited in McElvaine, 2001, p. 125). 
The “stage-theory” upon which nineteenth century concepts of matriarchy and 
patriarchy depended—the idea that all human societies passed through a universal 
matriarchy (female-dominated society) before becoming patriarchal—has been widely 
discredited along with the utility of the concept in explaining social development. Diop 
rejects the classical theory of a universal matriarchy in a chapter devoted to that issue 
(1978, pp. 25-54). But the terms matrilineal and patrilineal—defined as inheriting or 
determining descent through female and male lines—accurately reflect and denote 
gender-based lineal systems that functionally distinguish human societies around the 
globe. Diop generally identifies and locates matrilineal customs in his southern cradle 
and patrilineal customs in the northern cradle, and argues that these opposing forms of 
descent and inheritance owe their divergent evolutionary development and expression in 
part to different environmental conditions in the two zones. This idea of environmental 
causation is somewhat reminiscent of the Greek theory of seven latitudinal zones, and 
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Diop’s modeling of this concept brings to mind methods of Arabic ethnology discussed 
earlier. The point of this digression, however, is not to speculate as to causation but to 
uncover the cultural mechanisms by which the conquerors of African lands could assert 
their purported superiority over the conquered. Both Diop (1978) and Williams (1974) 
agree that the invaders of Africa came with patrilineal systems of inheritance and descent 
that provided a sharp contrast to the matrilineal structures that remained integral features 
of many African societies. This is not to say that outsiders introduced patrilineal systems 
to Africa. The discovery of the male role in procreation, as McElvaine argues, is 
connected to animal husbandry, a mode of food production that appeared in Africa in the 
Neolithic period sometime after 9000 B.C.E. But the shifting emphasis from the female 
to the male as the “creator” of new life possibly followed a shift in agricultural 
production from female labor to male labor brought about by the invention of the plow 
around 4000 BCE (McElvaine, 2001, pp. 119-134). These changes in food production 
altered concepts of human reproduction, and males, the newly self-proclaimed creators of 
both human life and the food that sustains it, gradually began to assert their authority as 
fathers over their children, and—to assure paternity—as husbands over their wives. 
These lines of dialogue excerpted from The Eumenides by Aeschylus, and articulated by 
the Greek god Apollo, furnish a later example of this ancient male concept of 
procreation: 
The mother is no parent of that which is called 
her child, but only nurse of the new-planted seed 
that grows. The parent is he who mounts (cited in McElvaine, 2001, p. 119). 
 
This revolutionary notion of fatherhood radically changed pagan religion. Father 
gods made their dramatic appearance in the ancient world, reflecting the new male 
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procreative role on a cosmic scale. Eventually, with the advent of the counterreligion and 
its subdistinctions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—the male became the dominant 
theomorphic form; god lost its feminine face and characteristics and became “our father 
who art in heaven.” But such changes took place gradually and unevenly throughout the 
world. As McElvaine notes:  
Much as the knowledge that seeds produce plants appears to have existed 
thousands of years before a whole new way of life based upon that understanding 
was instituted, knowledge of a greater male role in procreation probably existed 
for a long time before a whole new way of life based on this (mis)understanding 
was instituted” (2001, p. 123).  
 
With McElvaine’s point in mind, it seems that social structures and modes of 
production in Africa created conditions that enabled women to retain greater control over 
birth and birthrights during the early evolution and development of patrilineal customs. 
Although the reification and deification of fatherhood followed the discovery of paternity 
in Africa, as was the case elsewhere, feminine attributes of the cosmos were well 
integrated into African cosmotheism and were not easily supplanted. For this and other 
reasons African women continued to enjoy a higher degree of freedom and independence 
from male dominance than their counterparts in neighboring regions. Egyptologist Gay 
Robins in Women in Ancient Egypt summaries this point rather well in her comments on 
the status of women in Egypt’s New Kingdom era: 
Not only could women inherit, own, and dispose of property in their own right, 
they could enter into business deals, and they could go to court as plaintiff, 
defendant or witness, on an equal footing with men. In contrast to some cultures, 
a male guardian was not required to act for them (1993, p. 136). 
 
Robins is quick to point out that her findings refer to upper-class Egyptian women 
who had wealth and family status to back them in the event of business or legal problems. 
Nevertheless, the general consensus of the status of African women in the ancient world 
 179 
is that they enjoyed far more freedom than their sisters in the Near East and Europe—a 
fact underscored by the evidence of their reigns as pharaohs or queens over powerful 
states in the Nile Valley. Invasion and conquest, however, dramatically changed the 
gender status quo along with the ethnic make-up of North African populations. Williams 
notes these changes as follows: 
Intermarriages between conquerors and conquered continued along with 
concubinage as a national institution. The direct result was that more and more 
Egyptians became lighter and near-white in complexion. In short, they did in fact 
become more Asian in blood than African. Yet this upper ruing class of near-
whites was at no time more than a fourth of the population; for until the Islamic 
“flood” which began in the middle of the seventh century A.D., the vast majority 
of the Egyptians were what modern scholars like to characterize as “Negroid” 
(1974, pp. 77-78). 
 
Differences between the conquerors and the conquered in the social status of 
women, the social meaning of paternity, and related gender issues, provided the context 
and opportunity for the conquerors to reify the distinctive features of their ethos into the 
trappings and accoutrements of a “master race”—to borrow Williams’ term. 
Intermarriage and intermixture made “black” women key figures in the establishment of 
this new cultural regime and social consciousness in Africa through a “one-way sexual 
process” that brought them under foreign influence and control. The process was “one-
way” for the obvious demographic reasons that the armies of foreign conquerors were 
male, and more importantly, as Williams asserts:  
The “master race” always kept its own women “sacred” and secluded behind the 
walls of their homes. They were not allowed to go outside except under guard. 
African women had no such restrictions or protection. They were fair game for 
men of all races, and for them it was always open season…. The “master race,” 
then, while loudly proclaiming a strange doctrine of “racial purity” for itself, has 
been the world’s leader in bastardizing other peoples (1974, p. 77). 
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At no point in Williams’ exegesis of the “mulatto problem” does he portray 
Africans as merely the passive victims of foreign aggression. Not only does he cite 
examples of imperialist wars initiated by Africans, he also argues that Africans were 
complicit in their own subjugation through their acceptance and support of an ethnic 
status quo determined in part by patrilineal descent. Williams argues convincingly that 
the template for this process was established in Ancient Egypt when the offspring of 
Asian males and African females rejected the ethos and customs of their mothers in favor 
of their foreign fathers’ culture: 
These fathers recognized them … And since they claimed superiority over the 
Africans, their half-African offsprings considered themselves to be a superior 
breed also. These Afro-Asian offsprings were given preferential treatment, 
positions of authority, wealth according to the status of their patrilineal family, 
and an education that could draw on Asian culture as well as the highly advanced 
African civilization in Upper Egypt and southwards to the “Land of the Gods” 
(1974, p. 78). 
 
The fact that the majority of ‘“black” mothers’ were concubinary slaves 
undoubtedly shaped the attitudes of their “half-breed” children towards their mothers’ 
culture (C. Williams, 1974, p. 78). On their mothers’ sides of their families, these 
children were born into a servile or conquered class. But slave mothers had no control or 
claim over their sons and daughters; the children of such unions belonged to their Asian 
fathers who, according to Williams, “could and generally did consider them as free-born 
due to their Asian blood” (1974, p. 79). Conquest and the cultural and gender conflicts 
and compromises that accompanied the intermixture of native and foreign peoples 
produced over the centuries a “mulatto” population deeply indoctrinated in the concepts 
of the innate superiority of their Asian fathers and willing to assist in the advance of 
Asian culture into Africa. Williams locates the roots of the “mulatto problem” in Egypt, 
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but extends his analysis of the phenomenon into later periods of African history and other 
regions of the continent. Most important for this discussion, Williams uses the “mulatto” 
paradigm to explain the social consequences of the Arab invasions of Africa in the 
middle seventh century: 
And the same ethnic phenomenon that accelerated the process of racial 
disintegration in Egypt also operated in the Sudan. This was, simply stated, the 
widespread sexual activities on the part of Arab men and Black slave girls, the 
outcome of which was a new breed of Afro-Arabs—the same sexual process that 
produced “Egyptians” as a nationality group neither Asian nor African. In the 
Sudan Arabization and Islamization had another outcome: Not only did the Afro-
Arabs consider themselves Arabs and bitterly resented being called Sudanese 
(Black) but thousands of the jet-black, unmixed Africans insisted on being classed 
as Arabs. They still do… (1974, p. 165). 
 
The avowed desire to be anything but “African” reminds me of Lewis R. 
Gordon’s axiomatic statement on racist ideology in his insightful essays on neocolonial 
racism: Her Majesty’s Other Children. Gordon defines the “two dominant principles of 
racist ideology” as follows: (1) be white, but above all, (2) don’t be black” (1997, p. 63) 
Gordon goes on to say: “We can call the first the principle of white supremacy; and we 
can call the second the principle of black inferiority” (author’s italics) (1997, p. 63). 
Gordon’s principles of white supremacy and black inferiority seem apposite and 
applicable to the social effects of the “mulatto problem” on the construction of “black” 
identity, even though, at this particular sociohistorical juncture, racism, in the modern 
sense of the term, did not exist. But in Williams’ analysis and Gordon’s axiom we have a 
basis for understanding how foreign invaders—using gender and ethnic conventions 
initially born out of conflict and conquest and later given a religious etiology and 
impulse—created a predatory pattern of cultural aggression that in turn made it possible 
for Africans to be divided and conquered from within.  
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The emphasis on acquiring female concubines in the Islamic African slave trade 
continued and expanded the ancient pattern and practice of exploiting “black” female 
sexuality. It also created and sustained a large “mulatto” population in Africa and 
elsewhere in the Islamic world. Arabs mixed with non-Arabs throughout the Islamic 
empire, but due to their visibility Afro-Arabs “were more exposed to abuse and 
discrimination” (Irwin, 1977, p. 125). Irwin states: “’Son of a black woman” was a not 
infrequent insult addressed to such persons, and “son of a white woman” was accordingly 
used in praise and boasting” (1977, p. 125). The overt character of this type of Arab 
ethnic chauvinism influenced and encouraged “half-breeds” to detest and discriminate 
against “unmixed” Africans. It also explains the kind of self-effacing literature written by 
“blacks” in Muslim societies that featured half-hearted defenses of their African ancestry 
and appearance. Segal cites as an example two poems attributed to Suhaym, an African 
slave who died in 660 CE: 
If my colour were pink, women would love me 
But the Lord has marred me with blackness. 
Though I am a slave my soul is nobly free 
Though I am black of colour my character is white  
(quoted in Segal, 2001, pp. 46-47). 
 
Africans and Afro-Arabs in Arabia, from the beginnings of Islam and earlier, 
responded as best they could to the prejudices that confronted them in every day life. 
Among the early Arab writers of mixed descent, the work of Uthman Amr Ibn Bahr Al-
Jahiz (778-868), a Muslim scholar from Basra, stands out for its originality and 
controversial claims. A prolific author whose two hundred titles spanned subjects in 
theology, anthropology, zoology, philosophy and linguistics, Al-Jahiz has been credited 
as the founder of an Arabic prose style which bears his name and as the foremost Arab 
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scholar of the ninth century. In a controversial book titled The Book of the Glory of the 
Blacks (1981), Al-Jahiz challenged and contested the racial prejudices prevalent in the 
Islamic world of which he was perhaps a popular target given his dark skin and 
uncommonly large eyes (Jahiz is a nickname that means “bulging eyes” in Arabic). Using 
the adab style of Arabic prose, he composed a scholarly defense of “blackness” and 
“black” people that included in its recitation the claim that the Prophet Muhammad, his 
father Abdullah, and his grandfather Abd Al-Muttalib were all “blacks” (Al-Jahiz, 1981, 
p. 50). In a wide-ranging discussion of Arabic history, culture and literature, presented in 
the form of a letter, Al-Jahiz also introduces dozens of other prominent blacks from the 
pre-Islamic and Islamic eras. And, in a demonstration of rhetorical hubris that prefigures 
post-colonialist and Afrocentric discourses on Eurocentrism and white supremacy, Al-
Jahiz divides human populations into two categories, whites and non-whites, and includes 
anyone who is not white as part of a silent and culturally superior black majority:  
The number of Blacks is greater than the number of Whites, because most of 
those who are counted as Whites are comprised of people from Persia, the 
mountains, Khurasan, Rome, Slavia, France and Iberia, and anything apart from 
them is insignificant. But among the Blacks are counted the Negroes, the 
Ethiopians, the Fezzan, the Berbers, the Copts, the Nubians, the Zaghawa, the 
Moors, the people of Sind, the Hindus, the Qamar, the Dabila, the Chinese, and 
those beyond them. The sea is more extensive than the land, and the islands of the 
sea between China and the land of the Negroes are full of blacks, like Sarandib, 
Kalah, Amal, Zabij, and its islands up to Hindustan and China, and Kabul and 
those coasts. The Arabs come from us — not from the Whites — because of the 
similarity of their color to ours … The Hindus are more yellow in color than the 
Arabs, yet they are (counted) among the Black peoples. And the Prophet (God 
bless him and grant him salvation) said, ‘I was sent to the Reds and to the Blacks,’ 
and people already know that the Arabs are not red, as we mentioned before. That 
is our glory and that of the Arabs over the Whites, whether they like it or not. And 
if they hate (to admit) it, it is still our glory in what we have mentioned (here) 
over all (Al-Jahiz, 1981, pp. 55-56). 
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Al-Jahiz traveled extensively but spent most of his years in Baghdad. As one of 
the pre-eminent scholars of his day, located in one of the great centers of learning in the 
Muslim world, his provocative work must have aroused great interest and attention. 
Contemporary scholars Graham W. Irwin, Bernard Lewis and David Brion Davis see Al-
Jahiz’s text “as a parody of Shu’ubiyya tracts [written by Persians and other non-Arabs 
who resented Arab privileges], intended to throw ridicule on Persian pretences by 
advancing similar arguments on behalf of the lowly and despised Zanj” (Davis, 1984, p. 
44). Black scholars J.A. Rogers (1946) and William Preston recognize al-Jahiz’s satirical 
wit, but find no fault with his intentions or historical perorations. Preston, who 
commissioned a recent English translation of The Book of the Glory of the Blacks, 
specifically takes Irwin to task for claiming that it “cannot be taken at face value” 
(Preston, 1981, p. 65). Preston’s criticisms notwithstanding, Irwin does point to examples 
in al-Jahiz’s other writings where he denigrates the Zanj, an East African people who 
figured prominently in the Arab slave trade. Irwin reasons: 
Perhaps, in selecting the Zanj as his exemplar of baseness, he was trying, under 
cover of satire, to disassociate himself as much as he could from the inhabitants of 
a continent where all men were black and to which, ultimately, he owed his dark 
skin. That he should feel the need to do so is in itself a wry commentary on what 
it was like to be educated, admired, and famous—and yet part-African—in the 
medieval Muslim world (1977, p. 117). 
 
 Without wading in on either side of the controversy regarding Al-Jahiz’s 
intentions, I believe his work, satirical or not, reflects the kind of rhetorical and 
discursive gymnastics Afro-Arabs performed to avoid or deflect the taint of “blackness” 
and servility associated with their African mothers (an Abyssinian mother in Al-Jahiz’s 
case) from themselves. This headlong psychological retreat from African ancestry 
typifies the “mulatto problem” as defined by Williams and its enduring effects on the 
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social construction of “black” identity within and outside of the African continent. It is to 
developments outside Africa, specifically in the Iberian Peninsula, that we now turn our 
attention. For there, in Westernmost Europe, a strategic confluence of the counterreligion 
(Judaism, Christianity, Islam), “black” slavery, and the “mulatto problem” took place, 
establishing the foundation for the emergence of modern “black” identity and the 
antiblack racism that accompanied it. 
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In the midst of what scholars in the West have labeled the European Dark Ages 
(the period between the end of classical antiquity and the dawn of the Italian 
Renaissance) a seemingly minor incident may have set in motion a momentous chain of 
events in world history. According to legend, the daughter of Count Julian the Orthodox 
Christian governor of Ceuta, a city on the Moroccan coast, was raped by King Rodrigo at 
the royal Visigothic court in Toledo (Spain) where she had gone at the King’s invitation 
to learn the craft of lady-in-waiting. The young woman, Florinda, wrote and informed her 
father of Rodrigo’s assault and implored him to rescue her. Upon retrieving his daughter 
from the Visigothic court, Count Julian vowed revenge on the King and his kingdom. As 
the owner of estates on both sides of the Mediterranean, Julian knew the country well. 
With his knowledge of the terrain and the oppressive conditions that prevailed in Spain 
under Visigothic rule, he approached Musa ibn Nusayr, the Muslim emir who governed 
North Africa, with a plan for invasion and conquest wrought out of vengeance and 
perhaps a healthy dose of opportunism. Musa, not yet exhausted from the grueling wars 
of North African conquest, already had conceived his own plans for Spain, viewing the 
Iberian Peninsula as a stepping stone in a series of jihads that would sweep across 
Southern Europe, lay waste to Rome, and secure the region for the glory and 
advancement of Islam. He welcomed Julian’s assistance and perhaps exploited his anger
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in furtherance of his own ambitions. Whether Florinda existed in fact or as a figment of 
the imagination of later chroniclers of Moorish history, the Muslim invasion of Iberia was 
promptly organized and initiated. In April 711, a strike force led by a Berber general 
named Tarik ibn Ziyad crossed the Mediterranean and landed near the rocky promontory 
which now bears his name (Gibraltar, Jebal Tarik, “mountain of Tarik”). Commanding a 
small army of North African troops, Tarik, a former Christian, introduced Europe to the 
Muslim onslaught known as jihad. With the aid of Julian, and reinforcements from 
Morocco led by Musa, Tarik ended Visigothic rule in Spain and inaugurated through 
conquest a golden age of enlightenment and discovery that brought slavery, genocide, 
racism and religious intolerance following inexorably in its violent wake (Brunson & 
Rashidi, 1992, pp. 54-56; Fregosi, 1998, pp. 89-95). 
The Moorish conquest of Iberia received romantic and even hagiographic 
treatments in accounts written by Muslim chroniclers of the era, and by Washington 
Irving (1885) and Stanley Lane-Poole (1886), nineteenth century writers who popularized 
the topic in the West. Current scholarly approaches to this subject range from Richard 
Fletcher’s revisionist critique of Andalusian history and culture in Moorish Spain (1992), 
to a recent work by Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, 
Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (2002), that 
reintroduces the idea that al-Andalus (the name given the land by its Muslim conquerors) 
was an oasis of religious tolerance in the otherwise violent confrontations and conflicts 
between Islam and Christianity in Europe, Africa and the Near East. Black scholars and 
historians also have engaged in the romanticizing of this period and its players, operating 
from the reasonable conviction that the African origin of the Moors and their role as 
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“bringers of enlightenment” to the Dark Ages of Europe has been ignored or dismissed 
by the West. To this end, it is common to find Stanley Lane-Poole’s The Story of the 
Moors in Spain, which admittedly is among the first major studies of this subject to 
appear in English, quoted extensively in Afrocentric works despite the fact that Lane-
Poole never addresses the subject with anything approaching an awareness of the larger 
issues concerning the African presence and influence in Europe. The works of W. E. B. 
Du Bois (1946), J. A. Rogers (1952), J. C. deGraft-Johnson (1954), and John G. Jackson 
(1970) typify twentieth century Afrocentric approaches to this topic, and have influenced 
the current generation of Pan African scholars. Those pioneers of black history, although 
scrupulously honest in their attention to and use of Arabic and other sources, operated 
with the intention of correcting the omissions of Western history and of setting the record 
straight about African cultural and intellectual achievements. In pursuing those goals they 
often did not situate Moorish culture within the larger context of Arabic hegemony and 
its promotion and expansion of color prejudice and racial slavery. Their groundbreaking 
studies, however, laid the foundations for the most comprehensive treatment of this topic 
to appear to-date: Golden Age of the Moor (1992), a collection of essays edited by Ivan 
Van Sertima as part of the series of publications known as the Journal of African 
Civilizations. In addition to Van Sertima’s journal and the other sources cited above, 
studies by James H. Sweet (1997), Jack Forbes (1993) Jose Piedra (1993), and recent 
books by Maria Rosa Menocal (2002) and Richard E. Rubenstein (2003) also served as 
useful references for the discussions that follow.  
The identity of the Moors, the principal players in the events that transformed 
Iberian culture and European scholarship, remains a matter of considerable debate. 
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European scholars often have portrayed the invaders of Spain solely as Arabs, and have 
“whitened” them in an effort to omit or deny an African role in the conquest, colonization 
and enlightenment of Europe during this chaotic and formative period in its history. 
Inventing or employing terms such as “swarthy whites” or “dark-eyed whites” scholars 
like Joseph McCabe (1927) and Richard Brace (1964) assiduously followed the 
Eurocentric convention of “whitewashing” European history (Pimienta-Bey, 1992, pp. 
188-189). Maria Rosa Menocal, on the other hand, sees Iberia as a melting pot of mixed 
ethnicities that started out as “white” and remained so after the Moorish invasion (2002). 
She contends the ancestors of a tenth century Muslim in Cordoba, “were as likely to be 
Hispano-Roman as Berber, or some measure of each, perhaps with smaller dollops of 
either Syrian-Arab or Visigothic, these latter two having always been the smaller but 
politically dominant groups” (Menocal, 2002, p. 28). Based on this scientific method of 
apportioning or conferring “dollops” of ethnicity, Menocal claims the members of the 
Umayyad dynasty who ruled tenth century Iberia from their Cordoban capital “were 
nearly all children of Christian mothers from the north,” who consequently possessed 
“pale skin and blue eyes” that “were regularly remarked on by eastern visitors” (2002, p. 
29). After his family’s rulership over the House of Islam ended in Syria with a massacre 
by their Abbasid rivals, the Umayyad prince and heir Abd al-Rahman, grandson of the 
caliph, successor to the Prophet, and the spiritual and titular leader of the Islamic world, 
fled to the far western Islamic outpost of al-Andalus in 755, fifty years after it had been 
conquered by the Moors, and there established himself, after a decisive battle, as the new 
ruler of the land. Abd al-Rahman was born from the union of a Syrian father and a Berber 
mother from Morocco, neither of which had to be “white” or “light-skinned.” But 
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Menocal’s approach emphasizes the “Arab” and “Syrian” role in forming Andalusian 
culture and effectively minimizes ethnic and cultural influences in the peninsula that 
originated in North Africa. She asserts: “Arabness was the most aristocratic feature of 
ancestry one could want, and Syrian-Arabness was the venerable paternal line of 
Andalusian culture, both literally and figuratively” (Menocal, 2002, p. 29). Menocal 
never defines what she means by the term “Syrian” and regards the notion of Syrian 
“whiteness” as a matter of fact. Menocal also never uses the term “Moor,” and treats 
“Berbers” as the appendages and mere functionaries of Syrian-Arab masters, or, when the 
Almoravid and Almohad Berber sects invade and seize power, as religious fanatics and 
foreigners who destroy the delicate balance of Andalusian religious tolerance. Menocal’s 
persistent use of terms like “Arabization” and “Andalusian” in reference to the cultural 
transformation of Iberia, and without reference to the Moors, leaves as a glaring lacuna 
the questions of how and why this polity’s founders came to be identified and known 
throughout Europe as Moors. 
Lane-Poole, who wrote his history of Moorish Spain in the years leading up to the 
European partition and colonization of Africa, uses the term Moor to refer exclusively to 
the Berber populations of North Africa and Spain, thus distinguishing them from Arabs 
(Lane-Poole, 1886, p. 13n). Fletcher (1992) effectively ducks the issue of Moorish 
identity in the 175 pages of his treatment of Moorish Spain. Much of the confusion and 
disagreement surrounding Moorish identity seems to rest upon whether the Moors were 
Berbers, and who or what Berbers were before the seventh century Arab invasion and 
conquest of North Africa. It is common to find Berbers designated as “Caucasoid” in 
most anthropological texts. That “light-skinned” populations have had a significant 
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presence in North Africa since antiquity is not in dispute. That all North Africans or even 
Berbers were in fact “white” or “light-skinned” during the era in question or at any other 
time in the region’s past requires a kind of liberal application of the term that borders on 
racial hysteria. Given the double standard and social pathology with which the “one drop 
rule” operates in Euro-American psychology—one drop of “black” blood in the Americas 
makes a person “black” while one drop of white blood in Ancient Egypt or North Africa 
makes a person “white”—it comes as no surprise to find this kind of thinking dominating 
the historical treatment of this topic. The complexion of the North Africa’s population no 
doubt underwent changes after the Moorish conquest of Spain. The mixing of Moors and 
Europeans in Spain, the importation of thousands of “white” Christian slaves into the 
Maghreb under the auspices of Moorish rule, and the expulsion of tens of thousands of 
Moors and Muslim converts from Spain and Portugal to North Africa in the fifteenth 
century after the Reconquest, must be considered important factors in the composition of 
the current populations.  
That the Moors invaded Spain from North Africa is perhaps the only point of 
agreement among scholars regarding their origin and identity. In searching for their North 
African roots some have traced them to the Arabian Peninsula. Cheikh Anta Diop 
concurs with this finding as follows: “The Moors are Arabs, recent arrivals from Yemen, 
having come during the Islamic invasions (seventh century)” (1974, p. 200). Other 
Afrocentric scholars take issue with Diop on this point. Jose V. Pimienta-Bey (1992), 
Brunson and Rashidi (1992), and Wayne Chandler (1992), have sought the roots of 
Moorish culture among the Garamantes and other ancient populations of North Africa. 
While Diop’s contention that they arrived in North Africa in the seventh century with the 
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Arab invaders in no way suggests they were not phenotypically “African” in appearance 
(Diop cites an “African” origin for Arabs), other evidence does suggest the Moors were 
part of the indigenous population of North Africa, having emerged from ancient groups 
that roamed the Sahara for millennia(Diop, 1974). The late linguist Joseph Greenberg 
classifies Berber as a member of the Afroasiatic language family, and contends: “[it was] 
formerly spoken in all of North Africa except Egypt and the Canary Islands” (J. H. 
Greenberg, 1966, p. 75). Pimienta-Bey cites the work of a Moroccan linguist, Aziz Lofti, 
who posits a Kushitic origin of the Berber language, and contends that: “The Dra Valley 
of southern Morocco is largely regarded as having been inhabited long before the first 
Canaanite settlement of the 10th century B.C., by a Cushitic people whose descendants, 
the Haratins, represent one of the largest “Berber” speaking groups in Morocco” (1992, 
pp. 194-195).  
Berbers, Moors, Tawny Moors, and Blackamoors, are common and sometimes 
interchangeable labels for these North African populations, despite the fact that all of 
them may have been devised and imposed by outsiders to describe them. Jack D. Forbes, 
whose analysis of the term “negro” figures decisively in this thesis, provides an excellent 
overview of the meaning of “Moor” in European usage: 
The term more and its equivalents were widely used in late-medieval and early 
modern Europe. According to Simonet in his study of the language spoken by the 
Mozarabes (Christian Spaniards under Muslim rule before 1492), mauro meant 
negro and corresponded to Castillian usage in which moro was applied to horses 
whose color was negro. The corresponding more (French), maurus (Hispanic 
Latin), and moro (Valencian) were derived from Latin morus (negro) and 
ultimately from a Greek word meaning oscuro. Similarly, Mozarabic mauro was 
related to moro (Spanish and Italian), mouro (Portuguese and Gallego), mor 
(Provençal), maure and more (French), meaning ‘Moro; negro; hombre de color’. 
These forms stem from Latin maurus (also from Greek), ‘for the dark (oscuro) 
color of the Mauritanos o’ Moros (peoples of northwest Africa)’ (author’s italics) 
(1993, p. 67). 
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From Forbes’ linguistic analysis it is clear that Europeans saw these invaders 
coming out of North Africa mainly as “dark-skinned” Africans. The variant term “Tawny 
Moor,” which denotes a Moor of a lighter or “white” complexion, merely underscores the 
centrality of color in its etymology. The following passage from Fletcher puts into 
perspective the size and scope of the Moorish invasion in all its hues: 
The most authoritative estimate puts the number of Arab and Berber warriors who 
settled in Spain in the wake of the conquest as between 150,000 and 200,000. If 
they were accompanied, or later joined, by their wives, children, clients and slaves 
we should have to multiply that figure by perhaps four or five or six to arrive at an 
idea of the total number of immigrants to eight-century Spain. If on the other hand 
these were unattached warriors who acquired women and slaves for themselves in 
Spain, then the ethnic significance of the invasions will have been less marked. 
Common sense would suggest that both processes—single and group migration—
occurred. If the immigrants approached one million persons in the course of the 
eight-century this would represent a substantial shift in the ethnicity of the 
peninsular population. How substantial is a question that cannot confidently be 
answered since our information about the demography of late antique and early 
medieval Spain is almost non-existent (1992, pp. 25-26). 
 
Fletcher estimates the population of the Iberian Peninsula in the late Roman 
period to be approximately four million, and argues that it did not grow significantly 
under the harsh rule of the Visigoths, who had seized the territory from the Vandals 
nearly three hundred years earlier and then fought among themselves over its control 
(1992, p. 26). Given the human resources involved, and the Arab practice of enlisting 
entire armies of Berber converts into their ranks, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
vast majority of immigrants to Spain in the eight-century came from North Africa and not 
the Arabian Peninsula. The Arab conquest of North Africa was among the bloodiest and 
most fiercely fought struggles to expand the borders of Islam. Fletcher notes:  
They were nominally subjected by the early years of the eight-century, but 
continued to mount sporadic rebellions against Arab rule until the 740s and 750s. 
One way of taming the Berbers, and of simultaneously profiting from their 
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fighting skills, was to encourage or compel their enlistment into Arab-led armies 
for the prosecution of military campaigns elsewhere (1992, p. 20).  
 
The Berber warriors who eventually came to comprise the Arab armies in North 
Africa were recent converts from Christianity not acculturated to Arab ways or fluent in 
Arabic. The tribal confederacies, clans and families that both divided and loosely united 
the Berber peoples chafed under Arab authority, and from their continued treatment as 
second-class citizens in the expanding Muslim empire despite their conversion to Islam. 
Under these circumstances, unrest and revolts were common (Fletcher, 1992, p. 27). Pan 
African scholars also have investigated and documented the Berber roots of Moorish and 
Andalusian culture. James Brunson and Runoko Rashidi provide this useful background 
information: 
Among the most substantial Berber groups to occupy Spain were the Hawwara, 
Luwata, Nafza, Masmuda, Miknasa, Zanata, and Sanhadja. Before participating in 
the eight century invasion of Spain, the Hawwara Berbers in Africa occupied the 
province of Tripolitania and the deserts of southern Tunisia. They worshipped the 
Libyan sun-god Amun, who was depicted as a bull or ram. After the invasion of 
Spain, they settled in Cordoba, and established a fortified city near Jaen. A 
wealthy group of Hawwara also settled in Morida and Medellin (1992, p. 57). 
 
According to Brunson and Rashidi, Tarik ibn Ziyad, who led the invasion of 
Spain in 711, and Abd al-Rahman I, who founded the Umayyad dynasty in Cordoba, 
were both said to be Nafza Berbers. The Nafza supplied 40,000 troops that supported al-
Rahman’s usurpation of power in Iberia in 756 (Brunson & Rashidi, 1992, p. 57). It is 
from the Sanhadja Berbers, also know as the Mulaththamun or “people of the veil,” that 
the Almoravid sect arose in 1095, and created an empire that “lasted a hundred years and 
stretched from the Senegal River in West Africa to the Ebro River in northern Spain” 
(Brunson & Rashidi, 1992, p. 61). This puritanical sect of Islam eventually was overrun 
by an even more fundamentalist group know as the Almohades, whose guiding principle 
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was the unity of God. Rising up out of southern Morocco, these zealous sectarians ended 
Almoravid rule in the remaining territory of Andalusia in 1173 (Fletcher, 1992, p. 122). 
The Almoravid and Almohad dynasties represent the last two major migrations of troops 
and people from North Africa into Andalusia.  
Although the controversy over the origin and identity of the founders of 
Andalusian culture persists, artistic and literary sources in Europe also offer important 
avenues for examining this question. Brunson and Runoko, following in the footsteps of 
J. A. Rogers, a pioneer in photo-journalism and photo-anthropology, feature several 
photographs in their essay of notable paintings, drawings and designs that depict the 
Moors as a diverse but phenotypically African group (1992). Brunson and Rashidi also 
cite Arab chroniclers from the era who refer to the invading troops as “Sudanese,” which 
means, “black” in Arabic (1992, p. 55). Equally important, they note similar statements 
from primary Christian sources such as the Primera Cronica General of Alfonso X, which 
includes this graphic description of the Moors: “Their faces were as black as pitch, the 
handsomest among them was as black as a cooking pot (Brunson & Rashidi, 1992, p. 55).  
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The turmoil surrounding the Arab conquest of North Africa and the ethnic and 
sectarian divisions that emerged after the conversion of the Berbers to Islam suggests the 
invasion and occupation of Spain contained within it the seeds of later discord and 
division. The Moors’ opponents, the Visigothic rulers of Iberia—descendants of 
Germanic tribes who sacked Rome in 410 and dismantled what remained of the Roman 
empire—seized the Roman province known as Hispania from the Vandals, an earlier 
Germanic tribe of invaders, and inaugurated three centuries of repressive rule over the 
local Romanized inhabitants. Menocal (2002), Fletcher (1992) and others paint a picture 
of Visigothic Hispania in the eight-century that depicts a culture rife with conflicts and 
contradictions. Although the Visigoths were “Christianized,” they did not accept the 
orthodox doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church until 589 (Menocal, 2002, p. 24). In 
Hispania (the name by which the Iberian Roman province was then known), paganism or 
cosmotheism remained widespread among the rural masses despite the introduction and 
gradual spread of Christianity in the region. Jews, who had arrived with the Romans in 
the second century B.C.E., found themselves living in “nearly enslaved squalor” under 
Visigothic rule (Menocal, 2002, p. 25). Fletcher contends that what little is known about 
Hispania’s Jewish community comes mainly from the many laws the Visigoths enacted 
against them, and states: “These edicts make ugly reading, especially to a twentieth-
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century mind and to historians who cannot but be aware of later outbursts of anti-
Semitism in medieval and modern Spain” (1992, p. 24). According to Fletcher, this anti- 
Jewish sentiment came from attitudes and practices originating in the eastern Roman or 
Byzantine empire that were apishly adopted by the Visigoths in Hispania, the Lombard 
kings of Italy, and the Frankish kings of Gaul (1992, p. 24). With Jews daily confronted 
by persecution, and the rural peasants of the peninsula struggling to survive under the 
oppressive taxes of their overlords, it is not unlikely that these aggrieved groups viewed 
the Moorish invaders more as liberators than conquerors. What is certain is that the 
invasion and conquest of Hispania proceeded rapidly, with the Muslim forces seizing 
control of the peninsula after a series of battles that decimated their opponent’s forces in 
just three years.  
In distributing land and plunder among the victorious Muslim soldiers, the Arab 
minority who controlled the reins of military power openly discriminated against the 
newly converted Moors (Berbers) who comprised the majority of Muslim forces. Fletcher 
asserts:  
… the Arab minority among the conquerors got the most fertile lands, while the 
Berber majority were palmed off with the less favoured lands in the centre and 
north of the peninsula or in the more mountainous regions of the east and south. 
This inequality of distribution was to have serious consequences (1992, p. 25).  
 
Thus within the first years of Muslim rule, the new polity of al-Andalus set forth 
policies and practices of discrimination based on ethnicity. Despite Islam’s claims of 
universality, and Muhammad’s exhortations to his followers to treat all Muslims equally, 
Arab chauvinism perpetuated and preserved social distinctions based on ethnic origins. 
Arab identity required both fluency in Arabic and the ability to trace one’s ancestry back 
to the marauding Arab tribes who founded the growing Islamic empire. Few of the 
 198 
Moorish converts who made the conquest of Hispania possible could claim Arab 
ethnicity and few, initially, were fluent or literate in Arabic. Along with a pronounced 
attitude of religious superiority, Arabs also conveyed and expressed their color prejudice 
against “black” or “dark-skinned” peoples through various social policies and practices. 
Brunson and Rashidi offer the following illustrative comments on this point: 
With the conquest and settlement of Spain, the Arabs developed patterns of racial 
bias towards the Berbers. This bias, sometimes blatant and other times more 
subtle, manifested itself in various ways, including disproportionate tax 
assessments and poor land allotments. For example, after founding the Almohad 
dynasty, the Berber ruler Abd al-Mu’min offered the Granadan post of “able 
secretary” to an Arab poet named Abu Ga’far. Scheduled to work with as-
Mu’min’s son, Abu Said, the Arab poet hesitated “because the dark-skinned 
Berber seemed to him far below his own intellectual standards (1992, pp. 55-56).   
 
The above incident, minor as it may seem, followed a pattern throughout the 
Islamic world based on beliefs in “black” debasement stemming from Noah’s curse of 
Ham—as commonly interpreted by the three western monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam)—and by the massive increase in the Islamic trade in “black” slaves 
subsequent to the Muslim conquest of North Africa. Although the Noachic distinction is 
grounded in religious beliefs and texts, it also influenced the development of western 
ethnological discourse on “black” Africans. Several examples of Muslim treatises on this 
subject (al-Tabari, etc) have been previously cited, but similarly proto-racist statements 
can be found in the works of Jewish and Christian scholars of the same era, a number of 
whom were educated in the intellectual centers of Moorish Spain. The notable 
Andalusian writer, Benjamin of Tudela, offers an interesting case in point. A Jew from 
Navarre in the north of the Iberian Peninsula, Benjamin chronicled his travels in Europe, 
Asia and Africa between 1169 and 1171 in a diary known as The Itinerary. Writing in 
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Arabic, his first language, Benjamin described the places and people he visited. On a 
journey in the region south of Egypt, he made the following observation: 
There is a people among them who, like animals, eat of the herbs that grow on the 
banks of the Nile and in the fields. They go about naked and have not the 
intelligence of ordinary men. They cohabit with their sisters and any one they can 
find. When the men of Assuan make a raid into their land, they take with them 
bread and wheat, dry grapes and figs, and throw the food to these people, who run 
after it. Thus they bring many of them back prisoners, and sell them in the land of 
Egypt and in surrounding countries. And these are the black slaves, the sons of 
Ham (cited in Sweet, 1997, pp. 151-152). 
 
In this brief passage, Benjamin provides a glimpse into several literary genres—
travel writing, ethnography, and biblical exegesis—and how they were combined in a 
manner that was common among scholars of his era. What is equally noteworthy is his 
claim that the people he observed were “like animals” in their nakedness, lack of 
intelligence, eating habits, and credulity. His invocation of Noah’s curse shows its 
continuing and evolving use as a justification for “black” slavery in the Middle Ages. 
Several centuries before Benjamin’s text appeared, the Tanhuma, an eight-century 
Midrash offered this explanation for Ham’s predicament: 
As for Ham, because he saw with his eyes the nakedness of his father, his eyes 
became red; and because he spoke with his mouth, his lips became crooked and 
because he turned his face the hair of his head and his beard became singed and 
because he did not cover his father’s nakedness, he went naked and his prepuce 
became stretched, [all this] because all of God’s retributions are commensurate to 
a transgression (cited in Sweet, 1997, p. 148). 
 
Without explicitly mentioning “black” people or slavery, this attempt to explain 
Noah’ curse, tit for tat, seems to point directly to the constellation of stereotypes 
associated with Africans: big lips, big penises and kinky hair. This set of “racial” symbols 
and their associated myths found common and receptive ground in Andalusia in Jewish, 
Muslim and Christian communities. Dark skins, no doubt, offered a sharp contrast to the 
 200 
“light-skinned” inhabitants of Iberia and the so-called tawny complexions of many 
Muslims. Consequently, as Sweet notes: “The invidious perception of difference, 
expressed in language that suggested black inferiority, became refined and sharpened by 
Muslims, Jews, and Christians of Iberian origin” (1997, p. 149). Iberians of all 
backgrounds became conscious of the association of “blackness” with slavery through the 
introduction of the Muslim system of slavery into Andalusia. The “black” Africans who 
formed a significant group within the slave population of this regime were vilified by 
each monotheist party for being pagans, but in the hearts and minds of Iberian Christians 
“blacks” were “doubly cursed” (to use Sweet’s expression) because “they were the 
Muslim’s servants, the heathen’s heathen …” (Sweet, 1997, p. 149). The mutual hostility 
of Christians and Moors, the fact that they regarded each other as infidels, did not 
preclude, however, their finding common ground in their vilification and exploitation of 
“blacks.” In fact, they both viewed the Almoravid, the sub-Saharan Muslim sect who 
wrested control of North Africa and Andalusia from the Almohades in 1095, as “savages” 
and “barbarians” (Sweet, 1997, p. 153). The Cantigas de Santa Maria, a collection of 
poems celebrating the virtues of the Virgin Mary, which the king of Castile, Alfonso X 
(d. 1284), claimed to have composed, contains in its 427 verses numerous examples of 
negative images of “blacks.” Most noteworthy for this discussion is the distinction 
Alfonso makes between “white” and “black” Muslims. According to Sweet, cantiga 385 
describes an upcoming battle between Spaniards and Muslims as warfare against two 
enemies: “the Moors of Spain and the Africans” (1997, p. 153). It is possible Alfonso 
makes such a distinction because he viewed the “Moors” as fellow residents in Iberia 
(after their several centuries there) and the Almoravids as recent invaders and interlopers 
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in the affairs of the peninsula. But the general antipathy towards “blacks” in the cantigas 
seems to belie this point. Again, Sweet finds:  
While it should be stressed that Muslims and Jews generally are treated with 
scorn throughout the cantigas, the persons with the darkest skins are consistently 
portrayed as posing the gravest danger to Christian purity and receive more sever 
punishments than those meted out to other infidels. If these representations do not 
signify racism, they manifest a well-entrenched Christian aversion to blackness 
(1997, p. 154).  
 
Here, Sweet refers obliquely to the Manichaean iconographic conventions in 
Christian art that portray demons as black and suggests these notions found their parallel 
tropology in ethnographic and literary descriptions of African peoples. It is also 
important to reiterate the role of slavery and the slave trade in fostering these negative 
racial images. Slavery was widespread in the Iberian Peninsula. Fletcher points out: 
“Medieval Spain remained a slave-owning society at a time when slavery was gradually 
disappearing in western Christendom. And this was not just in the frontier areas” (1992, 
p. 136). Muslims enslaved Christian prisoners-of-war and Christians avidly employed a 
similar policy. For example, Christians used enslaved Muslims to build the cathedral of 
Santiago de Compostela in the twelfth century, while Christian slaves helped to construct 
the Kutubiyya mosque in Marrakesh. The Aragonese conquerors of the island of Minorca 
in 1287 sold the entire Muslim population into slavery, with the exception of the wealthy 
elite who paid a ransom so they could immigrate to North Africa (Fletcher, 1992, p. 136). 
Latin texts of the era demonstrate that Christians adopted the Muslim practice of and 
terminology for distinguishing light-skinned from dark-skinned slaves. “Black” slaves 
were called maurus, and “white” Muslim slaves were called sarracenus (Sweet, 1997, p. 
150). From as early as 1332, documents relating to the sale of slaves show Christians 
differentiating “white” from “black” slaves in this customary manner. These “racial” 
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markers comprised only a part of the lexicon of difference that came to typify the ethnic 
and religious categories used to classify Iberia’s diverse populations in the medieval era. 
In addition to Moors, Jews, Christians, Arabs, Visigoths, certain important 
subdistinctions developed indicative of the social dynamics that prevented the Iberian 
melting pot from reducing its constituents to a harmonious Andalusian homogeneity. 
Despite the obligation for the faithful to emigrate from lands taken by infidels, Muslims 
remained in provinces “reconquered” by Christian armies, and many Christian remained 
in Moorish-ruled territories. Fletcher furnishes this succinct description of two classes of 
Iberians (Mudejar and Mozarab) that developed from these circumstances: 
A person who elected to stay was known in the Romance vernacular as a mudejar, 
a word derived from the Arabic al-mudajjar, rendered in the thirteenth-century 
glossary of Ramon Marti as ‘persons allowed to remain’. Among historians of 
today the word Mudejar is widely used (both as noun and as adjective) to label the 
culture of the Muslims who lived under Christian rule in medieval Spain — just 
as the term Mozarab is used of the Christians who lived under Muslim rule (1992, 
p. 137).  
 
Other common designations of the era—Muladi (a Christian who converted to 
Islam); converso (a Jew who converted to Christianity); Marrano (a Jew who converted 
but remained a secret Jew); and Morisco (a Muslim who converted to Christianity—
reveal how religious identity was scrutinized, codified and obsessively guarded. Group 
identity as determined by religious affiliation constituted the most significant indicator of 
status in this hostile and fractious society. Special laws and edicts restricted and governed 
the activities of these groups within their respective polities. Mudejars enjoyed freedom 
to worship under Christian rule but were enjoined from proselytizing and were required 
to pay certain taxes. Under Muslim authority, Mozarabs also were permitted religious 
freedom subject to the same or similar restrictions. Sexual relations across the religious 
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and cultural divisions, however, were prohibited and punishable by death. Muslims 
publicly executed offenders by stoning. Through compulsion or by choice Mudejar and 
Mozarabs often lived in ghettoes within their respective polities. Under such 
circumstances, discrimination occurred frequently and often without any form or 
mechanism for redress. Fletcher uses the term “apartheid” to describe legislation of the 
era, which, among other prohibitions, segregated or restricted the use of municipal bath 
houses to specific days for Muslims, Jews and Christians, prevented them from hiring 
each other for certain employment (such as nannies), and even forbade them from 
wearing certain clothing styles or colors (1992, p. 138). Religion, of course, constituted 
the basis for these social and legal restrictions. The Mosaic distinction and its 
believer/non-believer dichotomy thus furnished the template from which an apartheid 
system (separate and unequal) developed to police and enforce religious and related 
cultural differences. It does not take a leap of faith or even a short walk along this path to 
see how “ethnic” traits or characteristics associated with these groups became 
incorporated in the theological and ideological construction of difference in Andalusian 
culture. The cognitive journey from religious antipathy to ethnic stereotypes to racial 
stereotypes to racism needed but a few conceptual missteps—fueled by ethnic 
chauvinism (Eurocentrism), acquisitiveness (capitalism), and the Will to Power cited by 
Dussel (Dussel, 1993, 2000) in his analysis of Eurocentrism and modernity. Iberia 
performed a decisive geo-social role in facilitating the cognitive steps or missteps of that 
journey. The story of Moorish Spain must be understood not only as a chronicle of 
Muslim conquest and colonization in Europe, but as the expansion of Christian power 
and authority during the “reconquest” of Iberia by the monarchies of Aragon, Castile and 
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Portugal. Through this conflict, in which Christians emerged as the dominant power in 
the peninsula from the twelfth century onwards, the Manichaean impulses within western 
monotheism, with its binary structure and color-coding, furnished the allegorical 
mechanism whereby ethnicity (especially, “blackness”) became an overt “sign” or 
“signifier” of difference. The final “blackening” of the “other” in European 
consciousness occurred when the term “negro” became synonymous with “slave.” This 
process had already taken place or was well under way within Islamic society. While 
Christians, Muslims and Jews held beliefs and doctrinal views that were in sharp contrast 
or contention, they could and did agree and cooperate in the debasement and exploitation 
of “blacks.” James H. Sweet expresses this same point thusly: “Though Christians and 
Muslims regarded one another as infidels, adherents of both faiths found common ground 
in their disparagement of black Africans. The rhetoric of black African subhumanity 
reflected a set of shared understandings by Christians and Muslims on the Iberian 
peninsula” (1997, p. 152). 
That Andalusia comprised a melting pot of sorts where pagans, Jews, Christians 
and Moors intermixed and intermarried cannot be disputed. However, the seemingly 
intractable role of skin color as a factor in its social stratification was no more mitigated 
by “miscegenation” than in America’s slaveocracy when Thomas Jefferson or other 
members of the ruling plantation aristocracy produced “half-breeds” with their slave-
mistresses. The result, of course, was more mulattoes or mixed persons, but that fact in 
itself generally strengthened the existing color line and its social regulation and 
enforcement. 
 205 




Spanish historians have coined and used the term convivencia (“living together”) 
to describe the social experimentation conducted by Muslim and Christian authorities that 
sustained the multi-cultural societies that existed in Iberia in the Middle Ages when the 
peninsula was a checkerboard of various Christian and Muslim principalities. The term 
implies a certain amount of cooperation and even harmony that is belied by the 
fundamental and deep social and doctrinal divisions that separated Jews, Christians and 
Muslims. The sub-title of Menocal’s book refers to “How Muslims, Jews, and Christians 
Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain” (italics added) (2002). Tolerance, 
according to the Random House Dictionary, denotes “a fair, objective, and permissible 
attitude toward those whose opinions, practices, race, religion, nationality, etc., differ 
from one’s own …” (Flexner, 1987). The attitudes, practices and polices prevalent in 
medieval Spain described thus far fall far short of the “culture of tolerance” suggested by 
Menocal’s sub-title. Moreover, despite the possibility of some confusion on this point, 
tolerance does not connote or imply acceptance. Underlying the concept of “culture” is 
the notion that it consists of commonly “accepted” and agreed upon normative beliefs 
and behaviors. What Menocal really seems to be referring to is the pragmatic and 
expedient manner in which Jews, Muslims and Christians grudgingly cooperated with 
each other to advance their own cultural causes and not necessarily a common cultural 
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cause or good. Charles J. Halperin, in his essay titled, The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice 
and Pragmatism on the Medieval Frontier contends: 
The demands of religious prejudice prevented the formulation or articulation of 
any medieval theories genuinely equivalent to modern concepts of peaceful 
coexistence or detent. One might admire, intermarry with, trade with, even 
borrow intellectual skills from the infidel, but never concede the legitimacy of his 
religion. To admit the legitimacy of the religion of the enemy would have 
automatically called into question the insistence upon the exclusive religious 
superiority of one’s own. Since religion subsumed under it one’s conception of 
the political and social order—one’s way of life—such ideological tolerance 
would have undermined the social, political, and cultural foundations of one’s 
own society and polity. For this reason, exchange at the intellectual level, 
inextricably tied to religion, became even more difficult to achieve (1984, pp. 
465-466). 
 
In Halperin’s view, the crusader kingdom of Valencia, a territory “reconquered” 
from the Moors in the thirteenth century, exemplifies the inevitable results of the culture 
of intolerance that prevailed in Moorish Spain. After the Christian takeover of Valencia, 
Catholics comprised less than fifteen percent of the population. Efforts by Catholic 
missionaries to convert the bulk of Valencia’s Muslim population to Christianity, coupled 
with legal and commercial assaults on the status and property of the Muslim aristocracy, 
led to a series of bloody revolts and the mass exodus of the wealthy Moorish elite for 
Moorish lands. The Mudejar, the Muslim peasants who remained behind under Christian 
rule, continued their precarious existence as an oppressed minority. Thus, Halperin 
concludes: “Ultimately hatred outran and overwhelmed cooperation in Spain, or, to put it 
another way, prejudice outweighed pragmatism” (1984, p. 447). 
The intellectual and artistic achievements that emerged from the three-way 
rapprochement between Christians, Muslims and Jews have fostered popular notions of 
benignancy and harmony in medieval Spain’s quest for social progress and 
enlightenment. This efflorescence of philosophical, scientific and technological 
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knowledge and skills in al-Andalus, when the rest of Europe languished in the doldrums 
of the dark ages, has resulted in the tendency to idealize and romanticize Andalusian 
culture. Menocal celebrates this supposed spirit of pre-modern ecumenicalism and refers 
to Andalusian culture as “first rate [in its] ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at 
the same time” (2002, p. 10). For Menocal, tolerance means these hostile religious groups 
were able to find, through a process of “unconscious acceptance,” some “positive” or 
“productive” mechanism for dealing with internal and external contradictions to their 
belief systems and behaviors (2002, p. 11). But such “positive” outcomes, as Menocal 
describes them, again point to a kind of pragmatism based on “self” rather than “mutual” 
interest. Here is how Menocal iterates the function and products of this Andalusian 
“culture of tolerance:” 
It was there that the profoundly Arabized Jews rediscovered and reinvented 
Hebrew; there that Christians embraced nearly every aspect of Arabic style—from 
the intellectual style of philosophy to the architectural styles of mosques—not 
only while living in Islamic dominions but especially after wresting political 
control from them; there that men of unshakable faith, like Abelard and 
Maimonides and Averroes, saw no contradiction in pursuing the truth, whether 
philosophical or scientific or religious, across confessional lines. This vision of a 
culture of tolerance recognized that the incongruity in the shaping of individuals 
as well as their cultures was enriching and productive. It was an approach to life 
and its artistic and intellectual and even religious pursuits that was contested by 
many—as it is today—and violently so at times—as it is today—and yet powerful 
and shaping nevertheless, for hundreds of years (2002, pp. 11-12).    
 
As we have seen, Maimonides’ pursuit of “the truth” led to his conclusion that 
genocide was an acceptable means to prevent the spread of false doctrines advocated by 
Muslims and the descendants of Ham. Maimonides and other Iberian intellectual 
luminaries of his era indeed may have pursued and found truth “across confessional 
lines,” as Menocal claims, but they validated such truths within the strictures and dogma 
of their own religious ideologies.  
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That incredible advancements in education and the arts and sciences occurred in 
Moorish Spain is not in dispute, nor is the notion that a “culture of enlightenment” 
flourished there for centuries. But one could equally propose that conflict and 
competition rather than “tolerance” promoted its evolution and development. Instead of 
“How the Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval 
Spain,” it could be argued that we are seeing in the efflorescence of Andalusian 
knowledge and culture: “how the Muslims, Jews and Christians initiated an intellectual 
revolution through competition, conflict and constant warfare.” The modern Cold War, 
which was fueled by a similar ideological divide—albeit one rooted in economics and the 
conflict between religion and atheism—also led to incredible advances in knowledge, 
particularly military and space technology.   
The culture of scholarship that made the “Golden Age” of Andalusian civilization 
possible was founded and grounded in Arabic, the “lingua franca” of intellectuals in the 
medieval era, and disseminated through the libraries and universities of Andalusia, which 
were regarded by many as the greatest institutions of learning in the medieval world 
(Pimienta-Bey, 1992). With the Arab conquest of Egypt and Iraq, Arabs rediscovered the 
vast repositories of ancient texts from North Africa and the Near East, and, with the aid 
of the conquered, set about the task of translating them into Arabic for study and 
dissemination. With the valuable literary resources of these ancient centers of learning, 
and new networks of scholarship initiated through Arab contacts in India and China, the 
Moors and Arabs devised and presided over a global think tank that revitalized and 
transformed education in the medieval world. Afrocentric historian John G. Jackson 
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vividly contrasts the intellectual lights of Moorish Spain with the stark illiteracy of other 
European countries in the late middle ages:  
Education was universal in Moslem Spain, being given to the most humble; while 
in Christian Europe, 99 percent of the population was illiterate, and even kings 
could neither read nor write. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, public libraries in 
Christian Europe were conspicuous by their absence, while Moslem Spain could 
boast more than seventy. One library in Cordoba housed 600,000 manuscripts. 
Christian Europe contained only two universities of any consequence, while in 
Spain there were seventeen outstanding universities. The finest were those located 
in Almeria, Cordoba, Granada, Jaen, Malaga, Seville, and Toledo. Scientific 
progress in astronomy, chemistry, physics, mathematics, geography, and 
philology in Moslem Spain reached a high level of development in Moorish 
Spain. Scholars, scientists, and artists formed learned societies and scientific 
congresses to promote research and facilitate the spread of knowledge (1990, p. 
133). 
 
Jan Carew, a founding figure in Pan African scholarship, has written extensively 
on the Moors and the role of Moorish arts and sciences in the rise of European imperial 
power. His work examines the scientific, technological, and literary legacy of Moorish 
culture and its influences on European artists and intellectuals as diverse as Cervantes, 
Dante, Defoe, Fielding, Shakespeare, Roger Bacon, and Lorca. He describes Moorish 
culture in Europe as having a “ripple-effect,” a movement “in concentric rings from 
centers of learning to the most backward areas of the continent” (J. Carew, 1992, pp. 260-
262). The following passage illustrates how this “ripple-effect” took effect, as an endless 
parade of scholars from England, France, Germany, Italy, and distant parts of the Muslim 
empire came to Andalusia in search of enlightenment:  
Many of the European scholars came to learn Arabic so they could read and 
popularize the knowledge acquired in Moorish centers of learning amongst their 
own relatively backward people. The Moorish city of Toledo, which was 
reconquered in 1085, became a cornucopia of newly discovered learning for a 
benighted population of Europe beyond the Pyrenees, and Christian rulers, from 
Alphonso VII (1126-1157) onward encouraged the establishment of schools of 
translation and of Arabic/Oriental studies in order to ensure a steady flow of new 
scholarship into their kingdoms (J. Carew, 1992, p. 258).  
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Much of the educational activity in Andalusian culture not inspired by Islamic 
theology and exegetical discourses on the Quran was sparked by the translation and 
circulation of classical texts dating from the Greco-Roman era and earlier. Richard E. 
Rubenstein in a recent book, Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims and Jews 
Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages (2003) examines how the 
great translation centers in Toledo, Paris, Padua and Oxford produced and distributed 
classical texts and Arabic treatises and commentaries that both heightened the 
contradictions between religion and science (faith and reason) and established new means 
to reconcile those conflicts within the Christian Church and European culture. In his 
dissertation, however, Rubenstein adheres closely to the Eurocentric tradition of 
presenting Aristotle as a self-created, singular force in the invention of the “western” 
scientific tradition. Rubenstein’s hagiographic treatment of Aristotle as the fount of 
ancient wisdom obscures the deeper African and Levantine roots of “Greek” science and 
philosophy as argued by W. E. B. Du Bois (1946) George G. M. James (1954), Cheikh 
Anta Diop (1955) Martin Bernal (1987), and others. This reification of all things Greek 
also is a common element in early and modern Islamic scholarship. Carew bluntly 
assesses this tradition as follows:  
… some Arab/Islamic scholars, while deriding the narrow focus of the 
Eurocentric tunnel vision, and the implicit racism built into it against them, 
become racists themselves when dealing with Black Africans. In addition to the 
reprehensible role they played in the Slave Trade, they have developed a myopic 
and chauvinistic vision of their role in history and cling to Greek and Middle 
Eastern civilizations while ignoring the tremendous contributions that Africa 
made to Islamic civilization (1992, p. 252).  
 
Carew’s comments specifically confront the views of some modern Arab 
scholars, but the same point applies to their predecessors in Islamic Spain who failed or 
 211 
refused to credit the important African (Egyptian) sources that informed and inspired 
Greek learning. Rubenstein’s comments on al-Kindi, who some regard as the ninth 
century founder of Muslim philosophy, illustrates this point: 
Al-Kindi … acknowledged his people’s debt to the Greeks. Without them, he 
wrote, “it would have been impossible for us, despite all our zeal, during the 
whole of our lifetime, to assemble these principles of truth which form the basis 
of the final inferences of our research.” He also described the Arab scholars’ 
method, which was “first to record in complete quotations all that the Ancients 
have said on the subject, secondly to complete what the Ancients have not fully 
expressed, and this according to the usage of our Arabic language, the customs of 
our age, and our own ability.” This bold attempt to “complete” the work of the 
Greeks permitted al-Kindi and his successors to adapt classical ideas to the 
requirements of contemporary Muslim civilization. For the next three centuries, 
the Arab philosophy movement (falsafah) generated works of great originality by 
thinkers like al-Farabi, the founder of Muslim Neoplatonism; the Jewish mystic, 
Ibn Gabriol (Avicebron to Latin-speakers); the brilliant Persian, Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna); Moses Maimonides of Cordoba, the Jewish sage; and his fellow 
Cordoban, the boldest of all commentators on Aristotle, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
(2003, p. 15).  
 
The works of these scholars and others from the Islamic world could be found in 
the libraries of Andalusia along with the corpus of classical writings that influenced them. 
But the great libraries and universities of Andalusia, like the great European universities 
of Heidelberg and Oxford, also served as incubators in the development of the philosophy 
and ideology of antiblack racism and Eurocentrism. Along with learned treatises on 
astronomy, chemistry, physics and mathematics, these educational institutions translated, 
taught and disseminated the popular ethnographic studies and travelogues of prominent 
Muslim scholars that authorized and promoted the stereotypic depiction of “blacks” as 
sub-humans fit only for servitude. The rarefied intellectual and urbane culture of al-
Andalus, with its public baths, ornate architectural styles and “modern” urban design 
features, rested on a foundation of human slavery, a base that became increasingly 
“black” as supplies of “white” slaves diminished significantly during the late medieval 
 212 
era. And although a significant percentage of the Moorish population could be described 
as phenotypically “African,” the presence of large numbers of free “blacks” in Andalusia 
did not seem to mitigate the negative racial imagery that permeated Iberian society. 
Factors having to do with Arab ethnocentrism, patrilineal customs, and the “mulatto 
problem” encouraged or coerced those of mixed ancestry to cast their lot with those who 
imposed the caste system and its color-code. Those caught “in the middle” consciously or 
unconsciously helped to enact and institutionalize the two dominant principles of racist 
ideology as defined by Lewis Gordon and cited earlier: “(1) be white, but above all, (2) 
don’t be black” (1997, p. 63). Gordon’s “principle of white supremacy and principle of 
black inferiority” contributed decisively to the sociology of knowledge in Iberia that 
formed and informed the “Golden Age” of the Moors.  
How Moors and other “blacks” in Iberia became complicit in their own 
denigration and “racial” debasement remains a subject ripe for further analysis and 
elucidation. In closing, however, it is important to address again the role of Islam in the 
formation of the white supremacy half of the racial ideology equation: Eurocentrism. The 
following comment by Menocal about the Visigothic role in the breakup of the Roman 
empire reflects the historicist ideology that informs the social construction of European 
identity and Eurocentrism: “The collapse of Rome’s northern and eastern frontiers and 
the assumptions of power by various Germanic tribes ruptured Europe’s connection with 
its own cultural past, an event that would shape the West’s consciousness of itself” (2002, 
p. 25). The assumption and view that Greco-Roman civilization is “European” is integral 
to the modern conception of Europe and European identity. Greece and Rome, however, 
regarded Egypt and Mesopotamia as the centers of ancient knowledge and technology 
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and viewed themselves as culturally connected to those southern regions across the 
Mediterranean. The Germanic “barbarians” who invaded and destroyed the Christianized 
Roman Empire from the north were more genuinely “European,” in a geographic sense, 
than those they conquered. Vandals, Visigoths, Franks and Britons therefore better 
exemplified “Europe’s own cultural past” than the Mediterranean societies who had 
assimilated the Egyptian-Babylonian-Judeo-Christian traditions and customs of Africa 
and the Near East. 
The emergence of the powerful empire of Islamic faith after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad erected a seemingly insurmountable ideological barrier for the first 
time in history between Mediterranean “Europe” and the “southern” lands across the 
Mediterranean. Beginning with the Moorish invasion and conquest of the Iberian 
Peninsula in the eighth century, and continuing until 1492 when the forces of Ferdinand 
and Isabella defeated Grenada (the last Moorish province in Andalusia or southern 
Spain), a technologically and intellectually underdeveloped Europe, under attack along 
the entire length of its southern borders, found itself in the paradoxical position of 
craving Muslim learning while crusading against Muslim religion. This conflict created 
the context and conditions for Europe’s isolation and differentiation from the rest of the 
known world. Dussel argues that prior to the twelfth century Europeans did not see 
themselves as categorically distinct from the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean or 
North Africa. He refers to this change in the meaning of the concept of Europe as a 
“semantic slippage” (Dussel, 2000, p. 465). But more important, like Martin Bernal in 
Black Athena, Dussel traces the origins and lineage of the “unilateral diachrony Greece-
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Rome-Europe” to “late-eighteenth-century German romanticism” (2000, p. 465). Dussel 
states:  
What became modern Europe lay beyond Greece’s horizon and therefore could 
not in any way coincide with the originary Greece. Modern Europe, situated to the 
north and west of Greece, was simply considered the uncivilized, the nonpolitical, 
the nonhuman… Therefore, the single line of development Greece-Rome-Europe 
is a conceptual by-product of the Eurocentric “Aryan model” (Dussel, 2000, pp. 
465-466). 
 
Dussel also makes the salient point that Latin Europe of the Middle Ages viewed 
Aristotle as belonging to the Arab rather than Christian world. Aristotle’s writings on 
metaphysics and logic did not arrive in Paris until the end of the twelfth century, and did 
so bearing a distinctly Muslim imprint after having been studied by Arab scholars in 
North Africa and the Near East for several centuries. European scholars like Abelard, 
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who espoused and drew heavily upon 
Aristotelian philosophy, did so at the risk of condemnation and even execution by the 
Latin Church (Dussel, 1993, 2000). Stretching as it did from the Atlantic to the Indian 
Ocean and into the Pacific, the Islamic empire, from the European perspective, seemed to 
encompass most of the known world. This geographic fact based in an ideological reality 
forced Europe for the first time in its history to differentiate its Latin, Christian, western 
world from the vastly larger and more sophisticated Muslim world. The fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 in the midst of the Italian Renaissance helped to spark a new geo-
social consciousness by uniting the eastern Greek (Byzantine) and western Latin worlds 
in confronting the Turkish-Muslim world. This strategic realignment of political and 
religious interests, according to Dussel, “thus allowed to emerge the false equation 
Western = Hellenistic + Roman + Christian. “In such a fashion,” Dussel argues, “the 
Eurocentric ideology of German romanticism … was born” (2000, pp. 467-468).  
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The European imperial expansion in the fifteenth-century that followed in the 
wake of the fall of Moorish Granada in Spain drastically redefined, through the exercise 
of raw power, the nature of prior global and cross-cultural relationships. Thus, according 
to Dussel, imperialism and colonialism fostered “the ideological invention that first 
kidnapped Greek culture as exclusively western and European and then posited both the 
Greek and Roman cultures as the center of world history” (Dussel, 2000, p. 468). 
Colonizing the past to control the present and reinvent the future, imperial Europe 
proclaimed itself the genealogical descendant of Greco-Roman culture and projected its 
imagined ancient lineage and centrality backwards in time to encompass all human 
history and development. The local “histories” of North Africa and Asia were subsumed 
or became peripheral appendages to modern monolithic Europe under a type of 
historicism that re-inscribed, erased or conveniently forgot the past. Besieged by the 
Islamic world from the eight to the fifteenth century, Europe, then, was not the “center” 
of anything (except, perhaps, resistance to Islam). As Dussel bluntly states, “[it] 
amounted to nothing more than a peripheral secondary geographical area situated in the 
westernmost limit of the Euro-Afro-Asian continent” (2000, p. 468).  
The claims of Menocal and others notwithstanding, Europe did not reclaim through the 
corpus of classical writings introduced by the Moors an ancient heritage that was its own, 
instead it established a modern identity based on its claims to an antiquity that was in its 
roots African and Asian, and in its modes and methods of transmission, Islamic. It 
merged Judeo-Christian ideology with classical Hellenism under the auspices of Islam to 
forge a new identity, a new ego and self, and reinvented geographical Europe as a polity 
and cultural ethos using technology and ideology borne out of religious conflicts and 
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warfare. The Moors and Arabs transformed Iberia, the westernmost region of Europe, 
from a remote and sleepy backwater under Visigothic rule to a vibrant center of Islamic 
faith, power and prestige. The Reconquest of the peninsula by Christian forces 
transformed it from an urbane outpost of Islamic civilization to the birthplace of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade, the Inquisition, Eurocentrism, colonialism, and antiblack 
racism.
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The dramatic surrender of Grenada, the last Moorish province in Spain, to the 
conquering forces of Ferdinand and Isabelle on January 2, 1492, was followed eight 
months later on October 12, 1492 by an initially unheralded event on an obscure island in 
the Caribbean Sea. When Christopher Columbus and his motley crew staggered up the 
beach on Guanahani, a tiny island in the Bahamas, blissfully ignorant of their 
whereabouts, they were greeted by a group of curious “Arawakian Lucayos,” who were 
blissfully unaware they would be the last of their kind and the first among millions of 
victims of Spanish colonial conquest and imperial expansion (J. Carew, 1994, p. 3). Had 
they been the benighted savages they were later portrayed to be by Columbus and the 
host of conquistadors that followed his ship’s wake across the Atlantic, they would have 
fallen on the foreigners and slain them to a man, thus preventing or at least delaying a 
horrific fate. Instead they probably watched in bemused silence as Columbus and his 
crew unfurled the flag of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon and loudly 
proclaimed the lands and its inhabitants to be the possessions of Spain. 
The European “voyages of discovery,” the “ceremonies of possession” enacted on 
countless “American” shores, and the enslavement, colonization and genocidal 
decimation of the Caribbean peoples that followed in their wake were the opening 
performances of European colonialism in the so-called New World, a system of conquest 
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and exploitation that had had its dress rehearsal in the Reconquista of Andalusia and in 
the establishment of the slave trade along Africa’s western coastline. Jan Carew, in Rape 
of Paradise: Columbus and the birth of racism in the Americas, argues the Spanish 
brought the long-term effects of religious warfare and centuries of hostility against the 
Moors and Jews with them to the New World where it “spilled over” and ignited a 
holocaust that decimated native peoples. Yet it was Moorish and Jewish thinkers and 
scientists who made Europe’s great leap backwards into the New World possible. Carew 
states: 
In spite of the militant rejection of everything Moorish by the victorious Spanish 
rulers after the fall of Granada, it is ironical that Columbus’ First Voyage across 
the Ocean Sea would not have been possible without the great advances in 
navigation, mathematics, geography and astronomy that the Moors had brought to 
the Iberian Peninsula. Columbus had spent a number of years in Portugal before 
moving to Spain. And it was during those years in Portugal, where the heritage of 
Moorish enlightenment had made that small country a great center for nautical 
sciences, that he mastered the crucial theoretical basics of navigation (1994, p. 
39). 
 
The “ripple-effect” of Moorish scholarship—what Carew describes as the 
movement of Moorish knowledge “in concentric rings from centers of learning to the 
most backward areas of the continent”— also conveyed the impulses and imperatives of 
racial discord and racial discourse (J. Carew, 1992, pp. 260-261). The educational 
philosophy disseminated and acquired during this era of enlightenment included an 
ideology of hate and its associated apparatus. The ideology of hate produced the edict 
signed by Isabella of Spain on March 31, 1492 ordering the expulsion of Jews from 
Spain. Her appointment of the infamous Tomas de Torquemada to head the Spanish 
Inquisition put in place the institutional apparatus needed to police and enforce Spain’s 
Christian identity with a brutal inefficiency. Property confiscated from the 
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disenfranchised Moors and Jews under the authority of Isabella’s edict was used to 
finance Columbus’ first voyage. Moreover, as Carew argues: 
“… ethnocide would become an intrinsic part of Spanish domestic and overseas 
policy. And this nefarious edict would also become the prelude to the 
extermination of the Guanches of the Canary Islands (Spain’s first overseas 
territory), and the Tainos, Caribs and other Native Americans of the New World. 
This Spanish precedent established an ethnocidal tradition that was soon adopted 
by all of the European colonizers who came in their wake (1994, p. 49). 
 
In addition to heretics and infidels, the apparatchiks of the Holy Inquisition 
consigned to the flames thousands of books from the great Moorish libraries, volumes 
that comprised “the cream of Islamic and Hellenistic learning which had been fed from 
its earliest beginnings by African roots buried deep in the creative soil of that much 
maligned and deliberately misunderstood continent” (J. Carew, 1994, p. 49). Supremely 
ignorant of the loss of these great intellectual treasures, the agents of the Inquisition sent 
the combined and collective heritages of the ancient and medieval worlds billowing 
upwards in clouds of smoke and soot. The result of this literary conflagration was 
twofold: knowledge that threatened the hegemony of the Holy Bible and the Catholic 
Church could be eliminated at the source, and the traces of non-European influences on 
Europe’s development and socialization could be erased or effaced. Thus the great 
European thinkers who emerged during the height of the imperial era in the so-called age 
of European Enlightenment could declare that Europe invented itself by itself. By sheer 
sophistry and intellectual sleight-of-hand European scholars like Hegel, Hume and Kant 
proclaimed Europe free of all external influences. Others Europeanized the Greco-Roman 
and Judeo-Christian traditions and used them to establish and articulate the Eurocentric 
discourse that claimed European culture was founded on rational principles and grounded 
in the “historical” reality of its centrality in human development. Martin Bernal’s Black 
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Athena furnishes an excellent summary of the genealogy of Aryan discourse and the 
particular historicist “model” it created to mythologize and reify the origins of modern 
Europe. Bernal shows how European scholars systematically erased the “Oriental” roots 
of European religious and intellectual traditions and substituted what J. M.  Blaut refers 
to as the “European Miracle”—the idea that Europe forged ahead of the rest of the world 
in its prehistory and thus dominated the history of the globe (Bernal, 1987; Blaut, 1993). 
Once this idea achieved it cogency and currency non-European cultures and civilizations 
were reduced to the dust-heaps of history. Bernal states: “Indeed, since the 19
th
 century it 
has become literally unthinkable to Europeans that peoples of any other continent could 
be “scientific” in the way they themselves are, or that Asians or Africans could have 
contributed in any profound way to the making of Europe” (1987, p. 236). 
The Spanish Inquisition’s burning of Arabic texts also set a precedent for book 
burning as a means of erasing the past of indigenous cultures in the Americas. In the mid-
sixteenth century Diego de Landa, the first Bishop of the Yucatan, destroyed the corpus 
of Mayan literature in an act of utter ignorance and bigotry. De Landa placidly describes 
and justifies his actions as follows: 
These people used certain characters or letters, with which they wrote in their 
books about their antiquities and their sciences; with these, and with figures, and 
certain signs in the figures, they understood their matters, made them known, and 
taught them. We found a great number of books in these letters, and since they 
contained nothing but superstitions and falsehoods of the devil we burned them 
all, which they took most grievously, and which gave them great pain (quoted in 
(cited in Mignolo, 1995, p. 71). 
 
Perhaps the most effective means for the erasure of the local cultures and histories 
of the diverse populations that inhabited the Americas, and their supplanting with 
European culture and history, occurred through the routine implementation and operation 
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of European colonial policies and practices. Ward Churchill offers this harrowing 
overview of the European impact on Native Americans: 
During the four centuries spanning the time between 1492, when Christopher 
Columbus first set foot on the “New World” of a Caribbean beach, and 1892, 
when the U.S. Census Bureau concluded that there were fewer than a quarter-
million indigenous people surviving within the country’s claimed boundaries, a 
hemispheric population estimated to have been as great as 125 million was 
reduced by something over 90 percent. The people had died in their millions of 
being hacked apart with axes and swords, burned alive and trampled under horses, 
hunted as game and fed to dogs, shot, beaten, stabbed, scalped for bounty, hanged 
on meathooks and thrown over the sides of ships at sea, worked to death as slave 
laborers, intentionally starved and frozen to death during a multitude of forced 
marches and internments, and, in an unknown number of instances, deliberately 
infected with epidemic diseases (1997, p. 1). 
 
These Native Americans also were the first unfortunate victims of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade, conveyed to Europe and sold as laborers by the celebrated 
“discoverer” Christopher Columbus. According to Jack Forbes, Columbus expressed his 
willingness on his first voyage to depopulate an entire island and transport its inhabitants 
to Spain for sale. Forbes quotes Columbus as follows: “when your highnesses so 
command, they can be carried off to Castile or held captive in the island itself, since with 
fifty men they would all be kept in subjugation and forced to do whatever may be 
wished” (1993, p. 22). During his first voyage Columbus only carried 25 kidnapped 
Amerindians back to Spanish slave markets. In subsequent voyages, he and the other 
Spaniards that followed in his wake transported thousands of Amerindians to be sold in 
Europe and Africa. Forbes estimates: “… at least 3,000 Americans are known to have 
been shipped to Europe between 1493 and 1501, with the likely total being possible 
double that” (1993, p. 24). He also notes that these Amerindians “wound up in the slave 
markets as negros” (Forbes, 1993, p. 24). The term negro, at this point in its ignominious 
history, did not exclusively denote people of African ancestry. As discussed at the 
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beginning of this thesis, it was indiscriminately applied to individuals and groups based 
on subjective perceptions of dark skin color. But as Forbes clearly points out, by the end 
of the fifteenth century the term was associated with slavery and the exploitation and 
social debasement that slavery entailed. The semantic journey from negro as a generic 
term for slave (or, in a sense, non-white) to negro as a precise label for “black” slave, 
took place as a result of the decline in the numbers of European slaves entering the 
European markets coupled with the increase in supplies of “black” slaves due to 
Portuguese exploration and trade along the West African coast (Blackburn, 1997a). 
Regardless of the lack of specificity of the term negro in the late medieval period, 
its use as a marker of difference provides an important context for understanding the 
evolution of its later pejorative permutations. Such notions of difference, viewed from the 
perspective of the Portuguese sailors raiding and exploring the West African coast in the 
mid-fifteenth century, provided a useful pretext for the capture and exploitation of its 
diverse populations. The Romanus Pontifex (1455)—a Papal Bull that justified and 
promoted the raiding and seizing of infidels and pagans as a kind of religious crusade—
specifically authorized the acquisition of those “described as ‘nigri’ and inhabitants of 
Guinea” (Blackburn, 1997a, p. 103). In 1543, to tighten controls over transatlantic slave 
trafficking, the Spanish Crown issued an edict that: “mulatos and other slaves ‘who are 
not Negroes’ were forbidden to go to the Americas without a special license” (author’s 
italics) (Forbes, 1993, p. 66). Thus “negro” functioned as a form of color coding or 
branding, a label that dehumanized “Africans” (and others) for commercial purposes, 
long before it became a pseudo-scientific description of supposed inferior “racial” 
characteristics to justify their commodification. This refutes the claims of racialist 
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historians who have attempted to make “negro,” from its inception, synonymous with 
“slave.” Slavery in Europe preceded the racialization of slavery in the Americas. 
“Africans” were introduced into the Europe’s slave culture mostly as pagans and infidels, 
as non-Christians who labored alongside Christian and non-Christian slaves of European 
origins. Central Europe’s Slavic communities (and their neighbors to the north and east) 
constituted the principal sources of slaves in Europe in the centuries prior to the 
establishment of the Atlantic trade: hence the derivations of the word “slave” in virtually 
every language in Western Europe. As William McKee Evans notes: “During the later 
Middle Ages certain Caucasian peoples such as the Circassians, the Abkhaz, and the 
Mingrelians were scarcely known outside their native region except as slaves” (1980, p. 
24). These traditional sources from the Balkans and the Black Sea were redirected to the 
Islamic world after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 (Davis, 1984, p. 56). 
By this time, however, Portuguese sailors were successfully raiding the coastline of 
Upper Guinea and transporting captive “Africans” to slave markets in Lisbon. Due to 
African resistance, raiding proved to be an inefficient means of supplying the 
increasingly demanding market. The Portuguese then established diplomatic and 
commercial relations with the elites in coastal African societies in Upper Guinea and 
southward as they explored more of the West African coastline (Thornton, 1998, p. 43).  
West Africa had been linked for centuries to Mediterranean commerce via the 
trans-Saharan trade through commercial networks that preceded the violent and brutal 
Islamification of North Africa. As Samir Amin points out: “the displacement of the center 
of emerging capitalism from the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic was to kindle a crisis 
in Africa” (1997, p. 39). This shift meant that Africans would now enter the systems of 
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trade and commerce from two directions (across the Sahara and from the Atlantic ocean), 
thus further draining the manpower and womanpower of African polities. With the 
development of these new sources, the numbers of “black” people routinely entering the 
Iberian Peninsula and other sectors of Mediterranean Europe dramatically increased. The 
intense mercantilist focus on West Africa as an inexhaustible source of cheap laborers 
resulted in the “negrofication” of its diverse populations irrespective of their ethnic and 
linguistic distinctions. As Evans points out, the Sons of Ham were suddenly transplanted 
to Upper Guinea in a location that happened to be “not far from the major trade-wind, 
sailing route between Europe and the Americas” (1980, p. 37). Thus the late medieval 
and early modern form of “negro” was invented from Yoruba, Akan, Fon, Kongo and 
myriad other “African” ethnicities to serve the hegemonic interests of European 
capitalism and religion, and Europe’s colonial expansion into the Americas. Racial or 
not, the conflation of “negro” with “slave” at this precise historical juncture marked a 
decisive turning point in the social construction of “white” and “black” identities.  
It also must be remembered that the word “African,” regardless of its original 
derivation, comes into common usage as a designation for the continent and its 
inhabitants from the Latin language and its Roman speakers who conquered millions of 
“Africans” and colonized a large portion of North African territory (Snowden, 1970, pp. 
11-16). To be an African (or negro), especially in the “modern” sense of the term, implies 
the tacit or complicit acceptance of a sociohistorical label or identity imposed by non-
Africans who were asserting the hegemonic prerogatives of colonizers in defining both 
the land and its peoples for the purposes of control, exploitation and assimilation. Seen 
from this perspective, the first half of Fanon’s remark quoted above—“It is the white man 
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who creates the Negro”—generally describes the Euro-American social construction of 
race and its imposition on non-Europeans through enslavement, conquest and 
colonization during the later stages of the transatlantic trade. Whereas the second half—
“But it is the Negro who creates Negritude”—describes the “African” or “black” adaptive 
response and reaction to the process of racialization in the Americas. This discussion of 
the invention of the “negro” by non-Africans posits a foundation upon which to examine 
how and when “blacks” in the Americas began to refer to themselves collectively as 
“Africans.” To follow the implications of this process it is necessary to explore how the 
shocking arrival and immersion of “Africans” in the new world slaveocracies catalyzed 
the formation of “black” diasporan identity. Such a study would complete the 
examination of the two templates that led to the formation of modern “black” identity: the 
stereotypic negative images fostered and imposed by the slave trade, and the positive 
ethnic attributes that informed the self-conceptions and perceptions of “Africans” within 
their own indigenous cultures and societies. In pursuing the further study of this subject, 
especially the notion of the invention of Negritude or Afrocentricity, it will be important 
once again to look at the role of religion—monotheism and cosmotheism—in forming 
and informing the critical didactic and discursive tools of “black” resistance and self-
determination. Such an approach recognizes the ideological nature of Afrocentric 
thought, and the fact that many of the founders of this discourse in America, Prince Hall, 
Samuel Cornish, Frederick Douglass and their scholar-activist compatriots, were “black” 
ministers devoted to realizing the universal humanism embodied in some aspects of 
Christian discourse and didacticism. 
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In parsing these difficult subjects, I have attempted to look forward from their 
specific geographical and cultural contexts, not backward through the modern lens of 
racialism. Although the subject is the formation of early modern racial identities, the 
predicate involves ancient and medieval notions of ethnicity and identity that cannot be 
categorized according to modern conceptions of race. In exploring the role of the three 
western monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) in the formation of antiblack 
racism I have taken a heuristic approach that often raised many more questions than 
provided answers. Nevertheless, I remain confident that I have exposed the basic building 
blocks of Eurocentrism and antiblack racism—the foundational materials from which the 
“master’s house” has been constructed. With this modest blueprint in hand, those 
engaged in the crucial task of dismantling the “master’s house” have access to additional 
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